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SUMMARY 
 
As a company is a juristic person it can only act through human agency.  A 
question that arises because of this fact is under what circumstances a company 
can be held to a contract by a third party where its representative was 
unauthorised to enter into such contract.  There should be a careful weighing and 
balancing of the interests of the shareholders and the company on the one hand 
and the contracting third party on the other.  It is further important to have legal 
certainty on the validity and enforceability of contracts concluded by and with 
companies as the absence of certainty can hamper business dealings with 
companies which would have an impact on the economy. 
  
The common-law principles of agency form the foundation upon which 
representation within the context of company law takes place.  The law of agency 
has been adapted in the context of company law to satisfy the unique needs that 
have originated in this regard.  One such adaptation is the creation of the 
Turquand rule by the English courts which rule was taken over by the South 
African courts.  One of the primary reasons for creating the Turquand rule was due 
to the harsh effect that the common-law doctrine of constructive notice had on 
third parties dealing with a company. 
 
In this study an examination of the current legal position regarding representation 
of a company in South Africa was undertaken.  The history and development of 
the common-law principles of agency and doctrines that are unique to 
representation in a company law context are analysed and the relevant sections of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 are discussed.  The integration of the common-law 
principles with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is 
considered and recommendations are made in respect thereof. 
 
In support of the analysis, a comparative study was undertaken of the history and 
development of this subject matter in England.  It was concluded that South 
African company law, with all its shortcomings and uncertainties is still to be 
preferred above the position in England. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Aangesien ‘n maatskappy ‘n regspersoon is, kan dit slegs deur middel van 
natuurlike persone as agente optree.  ‘n Vraag wat as gevolg van hierdie feit 
ontstaan is onder watter omstandighede ‘n maatskappy deur ‘n derde party 
gebonde gehou kan word aan ‘n kontrak waar die maatskappy se 
verteenwoordiger nie gemagtig was om die kontrak aan te gaan nie.  Daar behoort 
‘n versigtige afweging te wees tussen die belange van die maatskappy en sy 
aandeelhouers aan die een kant en ‘n derde party wat met die maatskappy 
kontrakteer aan die ander kant.  Dit is verder belangrik om regsekerheid te hê oor 
die geldigheid en afdwingbaarheid van kontrakte wat met maatskappye 
aangegaan word aangesien die afwesigheid daarvan besigheidsverkeer met 
maatskappye kan kortwiek wat ‘n impak op die ekonomie tot gevolg sal hê. 
 
Die gemeenregtelike beginsels van verteenwoordiging vorm die basis waarop 
verteenwoordiging binne die konteks van maatskappyereg plaasvind.  
Verteenwoordigingsreg is aangepas binne die konteks van maatskappye om 
voorsiening te maak vir die unieke behoeftes wat in hierdie verband ontstaan het.  
Een sodanige aanpassing is die skepping van die Turquand reël deur die Engelse 
howe, welke reël deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe oorgeneem is.  Een van die 
hoofredes vir die skepping van die  Turquand reël is die onregverdige uitwerking 
wat die gemeenregtelike leerstuk van toegerekende kennis op derde partye gehad 
het wat met ‘n maatskappy onderhandel. 
 
‘n Studie van die huidige regsposisie rakende verteenwoordiging van ‘n 
maatskappy in Suid-Afrika is hierin gedoen.  Die geskiedenis en ontwikkeling van 
die gemeenregtelike beginsels van verteenwoordiging en leerstukke eie aan 
verteenwoordiging in die konteks van maatskappyereg is geanaliseer.  Die 
betrokke artikels van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 wordbespreek.  Die 
integrasie van hierdie gemeenregtelike beginsels met die betrokke bepalings van 
die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 is oorweeg en aanbevelings in verband daarmee 
gemaak.  
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Ter ondersteuning van die analise is ‘n vergelykende studie van die gekiedenis en 
ontwikkeling van hierdie onderwerp in Engeland onderneem.  Daar is tot die 
slotsom gekom dat die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg, met al sy tekortkominge 
en onsekerhede nogsteeds bo die posisie in Engeland te verkies is. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Foundation of representation of a company 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the legal position in South Africa in terms 
of the common law and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Companies Act of 2008) regarding representation of companies to identify and 
analyse possible problem areas and shortcomings and to propose solutions to 
rectify identified weaknesses.  The integration of the common law with the 
Companies Act of 2008 is also analysed in an endeavour to clarify the uncertainty 
regarding such integration. 
 
When a company acts, the result may be liability by the company on grounds of 
delict, crime or contract.  This dissertation only deals with external relationships of 
a company that were contractually created.  The internal consequences of a 
contractual act are also not examined. 
 
In order for a contract to be valid and binding on a company –  
a) contracting parties must have the necessary capacity to contract (or must 
be deemed or presumed to have that capacity); and 
b) agents effecting the transaction on behalf of parties must have the 
necessary authority (real or apparent) to do so (or are deemed or presumed 
to have that authority).1 
These two aspects should be clearly distinguished from one another.   
 
In both these instances, it is sometimes said that an act is ultra vires.  An act ultra 
vires the capacity of the company and an act ultra vires the directors are, however, 
two distinct concepts.  When reference is made to the capacity of a company, it 
means the ability of the company itself to enter into the particular transaction.2  If 
the company does not have the power to perform the specific act, such act will be 
                                                          
1
  Sealy and Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials 78. 
2
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 150. 
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ultra vires.  When the term ultra vires the directors is used, it relates to acts which 
fall outside the authority of the directors.3   
 
This dissertation does not deal with the first aspect.  Only the authority of the 
agents who contract on behalf of the company is considered.  The English and 
South African common law still applies in respect of this topic, although in both 
cases legislation has impacted on the common law. 
 
The general principles of the law of agency form the foundation upon which 
representation within the context of company law takes place.4  These principles 
can be found in the common law5  and they are still in force today.6  The law of 
representation in the context of company law has evolved to cater for its unique 
needs.7  One such development is the creation of the Turquand rule by the English 
courts.8 This rule was taken over by the South African courts.9  One of the primary 
reasons for creating the Turquand rule10 was to mitigate the harsh effect that the 
common-law doctrine of constructive notice had on third parties dealing with a 
company.11 
 
1.2  The Turquand rule 
 
Although the Turquand rule was created by the courts, the exact content of this 
rule of fairness and the sphere of its application were not clearly circumscribed.  
Through the passage of time the rule was developed by the courts in a casuistic 
                                                          
3
  Leveson Company Directors 95; Naudé 1971 SALJ 505 at 505. 
4
  Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 179. 
5
  Transvaal Cold Storage Co Ltd v Palmer 1904 TS 4 at 19. See Inter-Continental Finance 
and Leasing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Stands 56 & 57 Industria Ltd 1979 3 SA 740 (W) 
748E-F where these common-law principles were applied. 
6
  Delport Nuwe Ondernemingsreg 101. 
7
  Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 179. 
8
  Smith v The Hull Glass Company 138 ER 729; The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 
E&B 327 Exch Ch; Ernest v Nicholls 10 ER 1351 (HL). 
9
  Paddon and Brock Ltd v Nathan 1906 TS 158; Acutt v Seta Prospecting and Developing 
Co Ltd 1907 TS 799; Welgedacht Exploration Co Ltd v Transvaal and Delagoa Bay 
Investment Co Ltd 1909 TH 90; SA Securities Ltd v Nicholas 1911 TPD 450; Legg & Co v 
Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 132; The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 
(A). 
10
  Another reason for the creation of the Turquand rule is that a company as an independent 
juristic person can only act through its representatives – Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 123. 
11
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 4. 
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manner.12  This resulted in conflicting decisions by the courts.  The English, and 
sometimes, the South African courts did not, for example, regard the Turquand 
rule as an independent rule, but as an appearance form of estoppel and therefore 
insisted on compliance with the requirements of estoppel to succeed with a plea 
based on the Turquand rule.13  As estoppel requires more elements to be proved 
than the Turquand rule,14 this resulted in disturbing the balance between the 
interests of the company and its shareholders on the one hand, and the interests 
of the contracting third party on the other.15  The possible consequence was that 
third parties might hesitate to contract with companies, as there was too great a 
risk of prejudice towards them.16 
 
In South Africa the courts generally saw the Turquand rule as an independent 
rule17 and did not make the protection of the third party dependent upon 
compliance with the requirements for estoppel.18  It is, however, important to 
establish the boundaries within which the Turquand rule operates so as not to 
benefit the third contracting party at the expense of the company19 and to create 
certainty regarding its field of operation.  There is still uncertainty as to what these 
boundaries are.20  Furthermore, the danger exists that the South African courts 
may in future fall back on decisions made by the English courts where even 
greater confusion regarding the sphere of application of the rule exists.21  See, for 
example, Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd,22 referring to One Stop Financial Services 
                                                          
12
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 126 and 417. 
13
  Houghton & Co v Nothard, Lowe & Wills Ltd [1927] 1 KB 246 (CA) followed by Kreditbank 
Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA); British Thomson-Houston Company 
Limited v Federated European Bank Limited [1932] 2 KB 176 (CA); Clay Hill Brick & Tile 
Co Ltd v Rawlings  [1938] 4 All ER 100; Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin & General 
Investments Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 554 (KB); Freeman & Lockyer  v Buckhurst Park 
Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA); Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 
QB 549 (CA);  Insurance Trust and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mudaliar 1943 NPD 45; Wolpert 
v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 264; Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) 
(Pty) Ltd 1970 1 SA 394 (A) 401. 
14
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 165. 
15
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 126 and 418. 
16
  Cassim et al Business Structures 144. 
17
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 465; Rabie Verteenwoordiging 164. 
18
  The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A) at 831; Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 184. 
19
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 124. 
20
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 255. 
21
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 465, states that there is a school of thought that does conflate 
the Turquand rule and estoppel and refers to McLennan 1979 SALJ 329. 
22
  2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [110]. 
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(Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as intervening 
creditor),  where it is stated that  
 
[i]t has been said that the Turquand rule of company law is merely an application 
of estoppel.23 
 
There is also a need for more clarity on the principle of estoppel, as applied in a 
company law setting.  Estoppel (or ostensible authority) has been confused with 
implied authority24 and more recently ostensible authority has been said to be 
actual authority and something other than estoppel with fewer requirements to 
prove.25  This is a deviation from a long line of authorities since the early twentieth 
century.26   
 
1.3  The Companies Act of 2008 
 
With the enactment of the Companies Act of 2008 an opportunity arose for the 
legislature to expel any uncertainties pertaining to estoppel and the Turquand rule 
as well as their sphere of application, by codifying these rules.  The legislature 
also had the opportunity to abrogate the doctrine of constructive notice which 
several writers had been advocating.27 
 
The new Companies Act of 2008 indeed has more extensive provisions regarding 
representation and also deals with the doctrine of constructive notice. 
 
Section 19(4) of the Companies Act of 2008 effectively abolishes the doctrine of 
constructive notice.28  This abrogation should be welcomed.  However, the 
doctrine of constructive notice still applies in relation to, inter alia, the so-called 
                                                          
23
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [25]. 
24
  Zelpy 1780 (Proprietary) Limited v Mudaly 2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [49]; Wolpert v Uitzigt 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266E. 
25
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
26
  As per the minority decision in Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [109].  
Also see Delport and Vorster Henochshberg 2008 98. 
27
  Du Plessis 1997 SA Merc LJ 281 at 284; Grobler Toegerekende kennis 41-46; McLennan  
1986 SALJ 558 at 560; Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 14.  The doctrine was abolished in 
England by section 35 of the Companies Act 1985 and in Australia by section 165 of the 
Corporations Law of 1989 which was perpetuated by section 130 of the Corporations Act of 
2001. 
28
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 468. 
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“RF” companies.29  The reason why the doctrine of constructive notice has been 
maintained in cases of “RF” companies is unclear.30  An “RF” company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation contains one or more restrictive conditions 
applicable to the company and any requirement for the amendment of any such 
condition in addition to the normal requirements for amendment which are set out 
in section 16 of the Act.  As “restrictive conditions” are not defined in the Act, it is 
uncertain what these words mean.  These restrictive conditions may only pertain 
to conditions restricting the capacity of the company to act (capacity of the 
company), or it may refer to conditions placing a restriction on the authority of the 
directors to act (representation) or to both.  This uncertainty calls for clarity. 
 
As the doctrine of constructive notice has been abolished31 (except for the very 
limited instances where the doctrine still applies)32 the questions arise as to 
whether there is still any room for the application of the Turquand rule as one of 
the special rules pertaining to company representation, seeing that the doctrine of 
constructive notice was the main reason for creating the Turquand rule.33 
 
1.4 The ultra vires doctrine 
 
As stated above, the capacity of the company, relating to the company itself and 
the authority of the directors, relating to the directors as agents of the company 
should be clearly distinguished from one another.  The need for emphasising the 
differentiation between the two concepts is because the distinction has become 
blurred in the way that the Companies Act of 2008 has been drafted.  Both these 
concepts are dealt with in the same section, namely section 20, where some of the 
subsections only pertain to the capacity of a company,34 other subsections to the 
                                                          
29
  An “RF” company’s Memorandum of Incorporation contains one or more restrictive 
conditions applicable to the company and any requirement for the amendment of such 
restrictive condition(s) in addition to the requirements set out in section 16 of the 
Companies Act of 2008.  The doctrine of constructive notice applies to these restrictive 
conditions, provided the company’s name includes the element “RF” and the company’s 
notice of incorporation or a subsequent notice of amendment draws attention to such 
restrictive conditions.  See s 19(5) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
30
  Cassim et al Business Structures 143. 
31
  S 19(4) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
32
  S 19(5) of the Companies Act of 2008. See the previous paragraph. 
33
  Cassim et al Business Structures 144. 
34
  Ss (1) and (4).  
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authority of directors as well as the capacity of the company35 and others only to 
the authority of the directors.36  It is not always clear whether some of the 
subsections of section 20 pertain to only the capacity of a company or the 
authority of the directors to act on behalf of a company or both.  Due to the 
modern trend of drafting legislation in plain and understandable language, it might 
have been better to more clearly distinguish between these concepts by using 
different sections for each. 
 
1.5 Statutory provisions regarding non-compliance with formal and 
procedural requirements 
 
Section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008 introduces a rule that appears to be 
similar to the common-law Turquand rule.  Instead of clarifying the uncertainty that 
prevails as mentioned above, it only added to it. 
 
Some of the differences and conflicts between the Turquand rule and section 
20(7) will be discussed.  These differences and conflicts create a problem in 
integrating the Turquand rule with section 20(7).  There is a presumption in the 
interpretation of statutes that the legislature intended to alter the existing law no 
more than is necessary.37  To the extent that the common law is not amended by 
statute, it still applies.  As the boundaries within which section 20(7) should apply 
have not been set out in this subsection, it would mean that it is left up to the 
courts to set those boundaries when dealing with section 20(7).  As already 
mentioned, the application by the courts of the Turquand rule and the 
establishment of boundaries within which the rule may find application differ from 
court case to court case and have been conflated with estoppel.  Furthermore, due 
to the conflicts between section 20(7) and the common-law Turquand rule, it might 
prove to be very difficult and artificial to supplement the statutory rule with the 
common law. 
 
                                                          
35
  Ss (2), (3), (5) and (6). 
36
  Ss (7) and (8). 
37
  This is subject thereto that such interpretation does not conflict with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 and that statutory rights and remedies more 
advantageous to those who stand to benefit from them will take precedence over common-
law rights and remedies.  See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 181. 
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In terms of section 20(8) of the Companies Act of 2008, section 20(7) must be 
construed concurrently with and not in substitution for any relevant common-law 
principle.  The common-law principle that comes to mind is the Turquand rule.  
This section can thus be interpreted that the other contracting party has a choice 
between relying on the statutory rule formulated in section 20(7) or on the 
common-law Turquand rule, thereby choosing the more favourable option.  
Conversely, this section can also be interpreted that section 20(7) must be used, 
but to the extent that it does not alter the common-law principles of the Turquand 
rule as created and developed by the courts. 
 
If section 20(8) is interpreted to allow a contracting party to use either section 
20(7) or the common-law Turquand rule, a problem arises as they conflict in 
certain respects.38  The Companies Act of 2008 does not indicate which one 
should take precedence in the event of a conflict, as it does in respect of other 
possible conflicts that may arise.39  Clarification regarding the relevant provisions 
of the Companies Act of 2008, as well as its integration with the common-law 
principles of representation in a company law context is therefore necessary. 
 
Another common-law principle that comes to mind when reading section 20(8) of 
the Companies Act of 2008, is estoppel.  The question whether section 20(8) also 
refers to estoppel needs to be answered.  A clear distinction should be made 
between the Turquand rule and estoppel, as these two doctrines differ from one 
another and the former is not an appearance form of the latter.  The question 
whether a third contracting party, if he has chosen to raise the statutory Turquand 
rule will be debarred from utilising any further possible remedies such as estoppel 
in the alternative, will also be analysed.  It is, however, not the intention to do an 
in-depth study of estoppel.  Estoppel has a very wide field of application.  This 
study will be limited to the role of estoppel in the context of company law 
representation. 
 
                                                          
38
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 469. 
39
  See for example sections 5(5) and 5(6) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
- 8 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
1.6 Directors to manage business and affairs of the company 
 
Another section that has been introduced in the 2008 Companies Act dealing with 
representation is section 66.  Section 66(1) provides that the business and affairs 
of a company must be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.  
Under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 a provision similar to section 66(1) was 
usually incorporated in the articles of association of a company.40  However, the 
question arises as to what the position would be if the board acts according to a 
resolution that was taken at a meeting where the procedural requirements were 
not met, for example the necessary quorum was not present.  Since it is not 
always practical for the whole board of directors to, in each and every transaction, 
represent the company, the board will usually delegate its authority to one 
director.41  Section 66 indeed makes provision for such delegation as it provides 
that the business and affairs must be managed by or under the direction of the 
board.42  In this event the question regarding the authority of the director that acts, 
brings one back to the application of the principles of representation in a company 
law context.  These principles are therefore still very relevant and important and 
representation cannot be solved by only referring to section 66.  Section 66 
provides further that the Memorandum of Incorporation might provide contrary 
provisions regarding the authority of the board of directors.  In such an instance 
the common-law principles regarding representation must again be reverted to.  
This section therefore does not expel the uncertainties pertaining to representation 
as entrenched in the common-law context and does not give a solution to the 
uncertainties and problems as discussed above. 
 
1.7 Methodology 
 
In Chapter 2 a study of the historical development of representation in England is 
undertaken.  The reason why England is important for this study is due to the 
shared history that it has with South Africa in respect of company law.43  Although 
Roman Dutch law forms the basis of the common-law position regarding 
                                                          
40
  Gibson et al Mercantile Law 337. 
41
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 177. 
42
  My emphasis. 
43
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 162. 
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representation (agency) in South Africa,44 these principles were further developed 
by the application of English law.45  An examination of the initial principles and the 
reason for the formulation of those principles that were taken over can assist in the 
examination of the position in South Africa.  England and South Africa have, 
however, through legislation moved into two different directions from the common 
point. It would therefore be worth considering whether South Africa can benefit or 
learn from the new approach followed in England. 
 
The common-law principles of agency in England and South Africa are therefore 
discussed in Chapter 2 and not again in Chapter 3 on South African law to avoid 
duplication.  As the main aim of this dissertation is not to analyse the principles of 
agency in depth,46 only the main features of the common-law principles of agency 
(“rules of attribution”47), which includes ostensible authority, with regard to 
contracts are discussed.48  The further common-law principles and doctrines that 
have developed in company law that are discussed, are the doctrine of 
constructive notice and the Turquand rule. 
 
Another reason for focusing on England is that the current Companies Act of 
England contains a statutory Turquand rule49 discussed in Chapter 2.  This lays 
the foundation for comparing this rule with the statutory rule that has been 
introduced in South Africa in section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008. This 
                                                          
44
  Kahn, Lewis and Visser Contract and Mercantile Law 844. 
45
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 12 and 162. 
Principles taken over from English law are for example -  
a) the Turquand rule - Paddon and Brock Ltd v Nathan 1906 TS 158; Acutt v Seta 
Prospecting and Developing Co Ltd 1907 TS 799; Welgedacht Exploration Co Ltd v 
Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Investment Co Ltd 1909 TH 90; SA Securities Ltd v 
Nicholas 1911 TPD 450; Legg & Co v Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 132; The Mine 
Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A); Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 5. 
b) The doctrine of disclosure - Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 188.  
 c)   The doctrine of constructive notice – Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 15. 
 d)   The ultra vires doctrine – Rabie Verteenwoordiging 109-112. 
 e)   Former company legislation of South Africa (Cape Joint Stock Companies Liability Act 
23 of 1861, Transvaal Companies Act 31 of 1909) - Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 37. 
46
  Whether a company will be bound by the acts of its agent in respect of a third party in the 
first instance depends on the rules of agency – Griffin Company Law 119. 
47
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 181. 
48
  Sealy and Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials 124; Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ 
Company Law 179-188; Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 119-123;  
Millet et al Gore-Browne on Companies  8-19 to 8-21. 
49
  S 40 of the Companies Act 2006. 
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comparison is dealt with in Chapter 4.  A comparison with the Companies Act 
200650 of England can prove useful in making recommendations. 
 
In Chapter 3 the history of the common-law principles pertaining to representation 
is not discussed again.  Merely a brief look is taken at its development in South 
African law.  Thereafter relevant sections of the Companies Act of 2008 are 
discussed in light of the relevant common-law doctrines.  The doctrines of 
representation as applied in South Africa are then considered in light of the 
development and/or abolition of similar doctrines in England. 
 
In conclusion, the weaknesses and omissions of the application of the common 
law by South African courts and of the Companies Act of 2008 regarding 
representation are summarised in Chapter 4 and recommendations are made 
regarding possible improvements and amendments to the Companies Act of 2008 
that will bring certainty to this important aspect of corporate law.  
 
To the best of my knowledge the law stated in the dissertation was correct as at 30 
November 2018. 
  
                                                          
50
  Companies Act 2006 (c 46), hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 2006. 
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CHAPTER 2  ENGLISH LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Due to the exceptional nature of the company as juristic person the common-law 
principles of agency law as applied to companies have undergone a process of 
adaption and amendment.51  In particular, the doctrine of constructive notice and 
the Turquand rule have been developed to cater for specific needs of outsiders 
transacting with companies.52 
 
The common-law principles in England are therefore discussed first, by looking at 
the principles of agency, namely actual authority that can be either express or 
implied, the concept of usual authority and ostensible authority53 as applied to 
companies, as well as common-law doctrines that have been developed 
specifically in the field of company law.  These doctrines are the doctrine of 
constructive notice and the Turquand rule.54  Thereafter the relevant sections of 
the Companies Act 2006 55 are analysed in determining how the common law has 
been amended and the interaction between the Companies Act 2006 and the 
common law. 
 
2.2 Common law 
 
A company is an independent juristic person distinct from its shareholders and 
directors.56  It is the carrier of its own rights and obligations.57  As the company is 
                                                          
51
  Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law at 179; Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 1. 
52
  Naudé 1971 SALJ 505 at 505. 
53
  Also referred to as “apparent authority”. 
54
  Although the law of agency in South Africa is based on our Roman-Dutch common law, the 
basic principles applicable to companies in particular are very similar to that of England as 
will become apparent in this Chapter and Chapter 3 dealing with South African law. This is 
primarily due to the fact that South Africa adopted the English common-law principles 
applicable to companies: Kahn, Lewis and Visser Contract and Mercantile Law 844; Rabie 
Verteenwoordiging 12 and 162. 
55
   Companies Act 2006 (c 46), hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 2006.  
56
  Griffin Company Law 6; Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 36. Also see s 16 of the 
Companies Act 2006. 
57
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 57; Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s 
Company Law 4. 
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only a reality in the juridical sense, it cannot act on its own but must necessarily 
act through agents.58 
 
The authority of persons who act on behalf of a company is therefore determined 
by the common-law principles of agency and a special common-law principle of 
company law namely the Turquand rule.59  Although this aspect has been largely 
covered in England by the Companies Act 2006, agency principles remain 
important in determining whether a company can be bound by the actions of its 
agent.60 
 
In England, the principles of the law of agency determine whether a principal 
(irrespective of whether that principal is a company or not) will be bound by the 
acts of an agent who purported to act on behalf of the principal.61 
 
In order to bind the company, it is necessary that the transaction with the company 
should have been authorised by the board or entered into by an agent with 
delegated authority from the board.62 
 
The basis for liability of the company is therefore still determined by the common-
law principles of agency.  A representative who acts within the boundaries of his 
authority will bind the principal and not himself.63  
 
As the common-law principles of agency, as developed in England, have strongly 
influenced South African law,64 reference to South African sources will therefore 
also be made in the discussion of these common-law principles. 
  
 
                                                          
58
  Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 113. 
59
  These principles are derived mainly from case law although statutory reforms have affected 
them ‒ Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 150. 
60
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 150. 
61
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 180. 
62
  Griffin Company Law 119-120. 
63
  Kunst et al Henochsberg 1973 127; Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 6. 
64
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 12. It should be noted, however, that in Trust Bank van Afrika 
Bpk v Eksteen 1964 3 SA 402 (A) the court cautioned that doctrines of English law may not 
without more be taken over by South African courts but should only be used for legal 
comparison purposes. 
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2.2.1 Actual authority 
 
In both England and South Africa actual authority is seen as a legal relationship, 
based on an agreement between the principal (company) and the agent.  The 
scope of the actual authority granted is to be determined by applying the ordinary 
principles of construction of contracts.65  The contracting third party is not part of 
this agreement and may even be totally ignorant thereof.66  Actual authority, 
unless the language explicitly points to the contrary, is confined to acts done for 
the benefit of the principal.67  Actual authority may be expressly68 or impliedly 
granted by the principal to the agent69 and can include usual authority.  
 
In England, the board of directors has express actual authority to exercise those 
powers of the company which are vested in it by the company’s memorandum and 
articles.70  The board must act collectively.71  The board of directors will, however, 
not usually act as a body on behalf of the company in the day to day transactions 
entered into by the company.72  In such an instance the board should delegate 
authority to an agent.  The board will only be authorised to delegate authority to 
such an agent if the board is duly empowered to do so by the articles of the 
company.73 
 
                                                          
65
  This includes any implications from the express words used, trade usages and the course 
of business between the principal and agent. 
66
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 1 QB 480 (CA) 502-
503 per Diplock LJ. 
67
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 30; Montrose 1934 LQR 224 at 228. 
68
  Express authority could have been granted in words (orally) or in writing.  Examples where 
express authority is given are in a power of attorney, board resolution and letters of 
authority ‒ Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 106 para 3-003. 
69
  Munday Agency 43.  Also see Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 105 para 3-003; 
Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 179; Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ 
Company Law 181. 
70
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 179; Griffin Company Law 120. 
71
  Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 145 
72
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-19. 
73
  Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 145. Other than in England, the power of the 
board under South African law is not delegated authority, but original. See para 3.3.1.1 in 
Ch 3. 
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The delegation by the board to an agent can take place either expressly74 or 
impliedly.  When delegation has taken place, the scope of authority of the agent 
must be determined.75 
 
Express authority is authority that has been granted through explicit words or 
actions.76  It could have been granted either in writing or orally.77  Usually this type 
of authority does not present any problems.78 
 
Authority is implied when it is inferred from the conduct of the parties and the 
circumstances of the case, such as when the board of directors appoints one of 
their number to be a managing director or where it can be regarded as customary 
authority.79  They thereby impliedly authorise him to do all such things as would fall 
within the usual scope of that office.80  Authority will also be implied if the agent 
performs acts that are reasonably incidental to the proper performance of these 
duties81 (to the extent that such reasonable incidental acts are not expressly 
excluded by the principal).82    An agent therefore has implied authority in respect 
of  
                                                          
74
  This authority can be delegated by means of, for example, the memorandum of 
incorporation or by a resolution of the shareholders or directors – Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14. 
75
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 180. 
76
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 95. 
77
  Kerr Agency 64; Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 146. 
78
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 15. 
79
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583; Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ 
Company Law 179; Munday Agency 50. Munday Agency at 56 states that a party to a 
contract can only be bound by usages that apply in the market within which the agent 
operates if those usages are certain, notorious and reasonable; Reynolds Bowstead and 
Reynolds Agency 106, para 3-003 and at 135 para 3-039. The authority of the agent under 
these circumstances is expanded by the acquiescence of his principal when the agent 
exercises further powers. 
80
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583 per Lord Denning MR. 
81
  This would be the case where the agent has implied authority to do whatever is necessarily 
or normally incidental to the act for which he has received express authority – see 
Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 106 para 3-003. 
82
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 181 as per Lord Denning in 
Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA); Girvin, Frisby and Hudson 
Charlesworth’s Company Law 120. In SMC Electronics Ltd v Akhter Computers Ltd [2001] 
1 BCLC 433 (CA) a company was therefore held liable for the acts of its director on 
grounds of implied authority even where that director’s employment contract was 
potentially ambiguous. 
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… matters that are necessary to enable him to perform the ordinary duties 
incidental to his position as agent or which form part of the ordinary course of 
business transacted by that agent.83    
 
Implied authority may also arise as a reasonable inference from the course of 
conduct (dealing) of the principal (company), where the company, through the 
person or persons empowered to confer a mandate, acquiesces in the activities of 
the agent.84 
 
Implied authority constitutes actual authority and it is not ostensible authority.85  In 
many instances it is not possible to ascertain whether the English courts in the 
nineteenth century based their decision on implied actual authority or ostensible 
authority and in some of those cases where it is clear that the court’s finding is 
based on ostensible authority, the courts have termed it as implied authority.86 
 
Actual authority (whether express or implied) is binding between the company and 
the agent and also between the company and others, whether they are within or 
outside the company.87 
 
In England the usual authority of an agent or representative can be described as 
the authority to execute those legal acts that are normally attributable to the 
position of representatives or officers of that class.88  Usual authority can therefore 
take on several different forms: 89 
                                                          
83
  In Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14.  
Also see Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 29. 
84
  De Villiers and Another NNO v BOE Bank Ltd 2004 3 SA 1 (SCA); Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14-15; Rosebank 
Television & Appliance Co (Pty) Ltd v Orbit Sales Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1969 1 SA 300 (T) 
303; Coetzer v Mosenthals [1963] 3 All SA 484 (A); Dickson v Acrow Engineers (Pty) Ltd  
[1954] 1 All SA 308 (W) 311; Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 
181. In other words, authority may be implied from the conduct of the parties and the 
circumstances of the case, as per Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA). 
Also see Fusion Interactive Communication Solutions Ltd v Venture Investment Placement 
Ltd [2006] BCC 187 (Ch). 
85
  Coetzer v Mosenthals Ltd [1963] 3 All SA 484 (A) at 486-487; Kerr Agency 67. 
86
  Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 107 para 3-005 and 337 para 8-016. Also see 
Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-22 and Du Plessis Grondslae 192-199. 
87
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583 per Lord Denning MR. Also 
see Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 106 para 3-004. 
88
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 45. See Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 502-505 and Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 
QB 549 (CA) 583, 593.  This is also the position under South African law. 
89
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 180. 
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First the usual authority could have been expressly granted to the representative.  
That is called express authority. 
 
Secondly, usual authority can also have been granted impliedly.  Over and above 
the authority that has been expressly granted to an agent, an agent also has the 
authority that is necessary to comply with his obligations towards his principal as 
well as authority normally, in terms of trade usage, granted to an agent.  If this 
implied authority has not expressly been limited by the principal (company), this 
implied authority, which is nothing more than usual authority, equals actual 
authority.90  In this instance it can be termed “implied usual authority”.91 
 
In respect of the abovementioned two instances there is no defect in the authority 
of the representative.92 
 
According to Bowstead and Reynolds the English courts do not regard usual 
authority as an independent type of authority.93  Usual authority is, therefore, not a 
separate ground on which a company can be held liable.  It is merely an aid to 
determine whether the company can be held bound on grounds of either implied 
authority, ostensible authority or the Turquand rule.94 
 
2.2.2  Doctrine of constructive notice and Turquand rule 
 
In applying the law of agency in a company law context, there are two additional 
aspects that have an impact on whether, in common law, a company can be held 
bound to a contract. These are first, that a contracting third party, through the 
                                                          
90
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 180; Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 
108 para 3-006;  Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 120 and Griffin 
Company Law 120; Rabie Verteenwoordiging 16. 
91
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 191; Griffin Company Law at 120 speaks about 
usual (real) authority. 
92
  Where the usual authority of the agent has been restricted or limited by private instruction 
or where such authority has been made dependent on the compliance with certain 
conditions which have not been complied with, a third party who is unaware that limitations 
or restrictions have been placed on the usual authority of the agent may still hold the 
company bound on grounds of ostensible authority or the Turquand rule. See paras 2.2.2 
and 2.2.3 below.   
93
  Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 110 para 3-006. 
94
  Usual authority is also not regarded as an independent type of authority in the law of 
agency in South Africa. See Rabie Verteenwoordiging 16. 
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doctrine of constructive notice, is deemed to know the content of a company’s 
public documents; and secondly, that since a company cannot itself act, it must do 
so through agents whose authority may have been made dependent on 
compliance with some or other internal requirement.95 
 
The doctrine of constructive notice was developed in the nineteenth century by the 
English courts96 entailing that any person dealing with a company registered under 
the companies’ legislation was deemed to have notice of its “public documents” 
(which would include the company’s then memorandum and now articles of 
association)97 which are required to be filed at the Companies House.98  The 
doctrine of constructive notice originated from the fact that the courts treated 
companies in the same way as partnerships in matters of representation.99 
 
In terms of this doctrine any person negotiating with a company is deemed to have 
knowledge of the arrangement of powers as it is set out in the public documents100 
of the company.101  The basis for this doctrine lies in the publicity that is given to 
such public documents.102  A third party contracting with the company is therefore 
deemed to be aware of any limitation imposed on the authority of company 
                                                          
95
  Although the common-law position pertaining to the first aspect has been affected by the 
Companies Act 2006, such impact can only be appreciated if the common-law position is 
considered. The same applies to the situation in South Africa: see Chapter 3 para 3.2.2 
below.   
96
  See for example the celebrated case of Ernest v Nicholls 10 ER 1351 (HL) and Mahony v 
The East Holyford Mining Co Ltd (1874-75) LR 7 (HL) 869. 
97
  The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327; Davies and Worthington Gower and 
Davies’ Company Law 169; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3044; Millett et al Gore-
Browne on Companies 8-13; Griffin Company Law 110; Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 
147; Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 4; Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 133; McLennan 2009 
Obiter 144 at 145.  
98
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 169; Millett et al Gore-Browne 
on Companies 8-13; Griffin Company Law 110; Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 
348 para 8-034; Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 129.  Also see The Royal British 
Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327 Exch Ch; Ernest v Nicholls 10 ER 1351 (HL). 
99
  See Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 92(3).  Before the Companies Act of 1844 (England) the 
position of joint stock companies was governed by the ordinary law of partnership – 
Montrose 1934 LQR 224 at 236. 
100
  Although it is unsure what would constitute all the public documents of a company, it would 
include the constitution of the company, in other words the memorandum and articles of 
association.  These documents have been accepted as public documents in Ernest v 
Nicholls 6 HLC 401 and Mahony v The East Holyford Mining Co Ltd (1874-75) LR 7 HL 
869. Public documents would be those documents registered at the Companies Registry -  
Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company law 178. 
101
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 1; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6. 
102
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 2; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6. 
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officials.103  It is irrelevant whether the third party has actual knowledge or whether 
it could reasonably have been expected of him to have notice thereof.  Logically, 
this would mean that where the authority of the board has, for example, been 
made dependent on the compliance of certain internal requirements, the third 
party, in light of his knowledge thereof (actual or constructive), is placed on his 
guard and must investigate further to determine whether there was compliance 
with the prerequisites for authority.104 
 
Whether the necessary procedures have been followed will not be gleaned from 
the public documents.105  Indirectly this duty to investigate is therefore extended to 
those aspects to which no publicity is given.  As no publicity is given to the internal 
administration of the company it would be unfair and unrealistic to expect from an 
outsider to ascertain whether certain requirements have been complied with or 
whether a particular agent has indeed been given the required authority.106  
Examples of internal management are where the authority of the board has been 
made dependant on sanction by the general meeting, whether the officers of the 
company have been duly appointed, whether meetings have been properly 
summoned and conducted, whether the necessary quorum requirements have 
been adhered to and whether resolutions have been passed by the requisite 
majorities.107  The third party can at most obtain knowledge of the potential 
authority of a representative.108 
 
The Turquand rule was introduced and developed by the English courts109 to 
temper the unfair operation of the doctrine of constructive notice110 because the 
                                                          
103
  Any limitation of the capacity of the company will necessarily also be a limitation on the 
authority of the directors. 
104
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6. 
105
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-13 
106
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 2; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6. 
107
  Sealy and Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials 116. 
108
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6. 
109
  The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327 Exch Ch; Mahony v The East 
Holyford Mining Co Ltd (1874-75) LR 7 (HL) 869; Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers 
Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA); British Thomson-Houston Company Limited v Federated 
European Bank Limited [1932] 2 KB 176 (CA). 
110
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 178; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210. 
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third contracting party does not have access to the internal administration of the 
company.111 
 
In The Royal British Bank v Turquand112 from whence the rule derives its name, it 
was formulated as follows: 
 
We may now take for granted that the dealings with these companies are not like 
dealings with other partnerships, and that the parties dealing with them are bound 
to read the statute and the deed of settlement.  But they are not bound to do more.  
And the party here, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition 
from borrowing, but a permission to do so on certain conditions.113  Finding that the 
authority might be made complete by a resolution, he would have the right to infer 
the fact of a resolution authorizing that which on the face of the document 
appeared to be legitimately done.114 
 
The third party’s knowledge (actual or constructive) of the company’s constitution 
will only reveal, for example that the authority in question might have been 
conferred upon the agent.115  Provided the agent would otherwise be held to have 
authority to enter into the transaction in question, the third party’s claim is not to be 
defeated solely on grounds of the non-compliance with some or other internal 
formality.116  In terms of the Turquand rule a third party (outsider) negotiating with 
a company in good faith is therefore entitled to assume that the internal 
management117 and procedures required by the articles of that company have 
properly taken place.118 
 
The third party is not released from his duty to investigate matters which receive 
publicity, but his duty is limited to those aspects.119  The third party is therefore 
                                                          
111
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 4. The Turquand rule was also imported from England into 
South Africa.  See Ch 3 para 3.2.2. 
112
  (1856) 5 E & B 248 and on appeal 119 ER 886; (1856) 6 E & B 327. This rule was laid 
down by the court of the Queen’s Bench and confirmed by the Exchequer Chamber. 
113
  In other words, the agent is authorised to act, but his authority is subject to compliance with 
some or other internal requirement. 
114
  (1856) 6 E & B 327 per Jervis CJ at 332.  The Turquand rule was approved and applied in 
Mahony v East Holyford Mining Co Ltd (1874-75) LR 7 (HL) 869. 
115
  In other words, the constitution of the company provides merely for the potential authority 
of the agents, for example that a managing director may be appointed and certain authority 
may be delegated to him, or that certain powers may be granted to a director or particular 
official of the company – Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 191. 
116
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3053. 
117
  Also known as indoor management. 
118
  Sealy and Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company Law 117; Oosthuizen 
1977 TSAR 210 at 210. Cilliers et al Celliers and Benade Corporate Law 191. 
119
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6. 
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protected against the internal irregularities in respect of which no publicity is 
given.120  If that third party acts bona fide, he is entitled to assume that the internal 
management of the company has been conducted properly and that all internal 
requirements have been met.  He does not need to make further investigations in 
that regard.121  He therefore does not need to satisfy himself for example that the 
directors’ meeting has been convened on proper notice, or whether a quorum was 
present or whether the directors have properly been appointed.122  In instances 
where the internal management has not properly taken place, the Turquand rule 
can therefore assist the third party to hold the company bound if the transaction 
was not contrary to the constitution of the company.123  In this way the Turquand 
rule tempers the unrealistic and unfair operation of the doctrine of constructive 
notice and third parties are protected in the process. 
 
The Turquand rule therefore did not abolish the doctrine of constructive notice but 
only limited the extent of the investigation that is required from a third party to 
those aspects to which publicity is given.124 
 
Without the Turquand rule, the transacting of business with companies would  be 
very cumbersome, laborious and risky to third parties and even impossible, as a 
third party would not have access to the internal management of a company to 
ensure that the transaction that he is about to conclude with that company was 
duly authorised.125  The rule was therefore created to make negotiations with 
companies simpler and thereby improve the position of the third contracting 
party.126  Although one reason for this rule is business convenience, a much more 
                                                          
120
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210. 
121
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6. 
122
  Leveson Company Directors 97. 
123
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 1 at 6; Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 2. 
124
  SA Securities v Nicholas 1911 TPD 450. 
125
  Legg & Co v Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 132 at 143-144 and quoted with approval in 
Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 1961 2 SA 257 (W) at 264. Also see 
Morris v Kanssen [1946] 1 All ER 586 at 592; [1946] AC 459 at 475 per Lord Simonds: 
The wheels of business will not go smoothly round unless it may be assumed that that is in 
order which appears to be in order. 
126
  In The Mineworkers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 at 845 it was stated that the 
Turquand rule is based  
… on the principle of convenience, for business could not be carried on if a person dealing with 
the apparent agents of a company was compelled to call for evidence that all internal 
regulations had been duly observed.  
Also see Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459 at 475; [1946] 1 All ER 586 at 592 (HL); 
Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 34; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 181. 
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important reason is the fact that a person dealing with a company does not have a 
right to insist on proof that the provisions of the memorandum and articles of the 
company have been complied with. He can therefore not be penalised by the 
attribution of constructive notice for a failure to comply with these provisions which 
he is unable to verify.127  Palmer’s regards the Turquand rule as  
 
… eminently practical, for business could not be carried on if a person dealing with 
the apparent agents of a company was compelled to call for evidence that all 
internal regulations had been duly observed.128 
 
The Turquand rule amends the normal principles of agency.129  This rule operates 
in favour of the contracting third party (outsider) against the company.  If this rule 
is applied without setting down certain boundaries within which it can find 
application, the scale would tip too heavily in favour of the third contracting party to 
the detriment of the company, which is compelled to contract through 
representatives.130  Although the exact boundaries within which the rule finds 
application are still uncertain,131 the operation of the rule has been limited in the 
following respects:132 
i) It does not find application in dealings between natural persons.133 
ii) Where the third contracting party knew (or was deemed to know, due to the 
operation of the doctrine of constructive notice) that the internal 
requirements set down in the articles of the company have not been 
complied with.134  
                                                          
127
  Pennington Pennington’s Company Law at 130  Also see County of Gloucester Bank v 
Rudry Merthyr Steam and House Coal Colliery Co [1895] 1 Ch 629 at 636 per Lindley LJ. 
128
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law at 3053. The doctrine of constructive notice in English 
law has been abolished insofar as the third contracting party can bring the relevant 
transaction within the scope of s 40 of the Companies Act 2006. S 40 is discussed in para 
2.3 below.  If not, then the doctrine of constructive notice still operates and if an agent acts 
on behalf of a company in contravention with a provision in the articles of the company that 
deprives him of authority, it will still be deemed that the third party had knowledge of such 
limitation on the authority of such agent even if such third party did not have knowledge 
thereof as he did not actually read the articles of the company. In such an instance the 
application of the Turquand rule still plays a relevant and much needed role in assisting the 
third contracting party to hold the company to the contract. 
129
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 124. 
130
  Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 10. 
131
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 255; Du Plessis Grondslae 207-210. 
132
  Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 192; Van Dorsten Company Directors 160. 
133
  The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A); Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) 
Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 264F. 
134
  See for example the following English judgments and authors: Criterion Properties Plc v 
Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] 1 WLR 1846 (HL) 1856;  Rolled Steel Products 
- 22 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
iii) Where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the representative 
of the company did not have the necessary authority to act on behalf of the 
company.135  There are reasonable grounds for suspicion if a transaction is 
so unusual as to put the third contracting party on inquiry.136 
iv) The act which the organ or officer performs on behalf of the company must 
be one that is normally consistent with that position (in other words, the 
organ or officer had to act within his usual authority137).138  The act of the 
representative must therefore be of such a nature that it does not make the 
third party suspicious. 
v) In cases of fraud.139 
 
The English courts have confused the Turquand rule with estoppel, seeing it as 
just another form of estoppel.140  This confusion led to the apparent extension of 
the application of the Turquand rule to situations for which it was not originally 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 246 (CA) 284 and 304; Birds et al 
Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 178; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3053. 
This is also the case in South African law. See for example: Levy v Zalrut Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 1986 4 SA 479 (W) 487B-C; Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 
266; Burstein v Yale 1958 1 SA 768 (W) 772; The Mineworkers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 
SA 831 (A) 845 and 849. Also see Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 192; 
Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 34-1.    
135
  Big Dutchman (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1979 3 SA 267 (W) 
284-285. 
136
  English decisions in this regard are: Wrexham Association Football Club v Crucialmove Ltd 
[2007] BCC 139; Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 
246 (CA) 284.  Also see Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 170-
171; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3058; Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 
178; Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-13; Pennington Pennington’s Company 
Law 130. 
Judgments in South Africa include Big Dutchman (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Barclays 
National Bank Ltd 1979 3 SA 267 (W) 280; Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 
257 (W) 266. Also see Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 192. 
137
  For acts within usual authority in English law, see British Thomson-Houston Company 
Limited v Federated European Bank, Limited [1932] 2 KB 176 (CA) 181; Freeman and 
Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA). In South Africa 
see Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W). 
138
  For an English judgment see Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin and General Investments 
Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 554 (KB).   
Examples of South African decisions include Holgate v Minister of Justice 1995 3 SA 921 
(E) 932; Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 265-267; Tuckers Land 
and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14-15. This 
requirement would have excluded the application of the Turquand rule in situations such as 
Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W). 
139
  See Ruben v Great Fingall Consolidated [1906] AC 439, HL, particularly per Lord Loreburn 
LC at 443; Griffin Company Law 123; Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company 
Law 124-125 in respect of English law and Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 
192 for South African law. 
140
  Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA); Houghton & Co v 
Nothard, Lowe & Wills Ltd [1927] 1 KB 246 (CA).  
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intended.  The courts applied another legal rule, usually estoppel, and the success 
of a third party was made dependant on compliance with the requirements laid 
down for estoppel.  The courts, however, then labelled the doctrine as being that 
of the Turquand rule instead of estoppel.141  This has led to a lot of confusion and 
the requirements to be successful with an estoppel have been supplanted by the 
application of the Turquand rule.142   The Turquand rule should, however, be seen 
as an independent rule. There is also support for this approach in England.143 
 
2.2.3 Ostensible authority144 
 
Ostensible authority is described in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park 
Properties (Mangal) Ltd 145 as a 
 
… legal relationship between the principal and the contractor created by a 
representation, made by the principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact 
acted upon by the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the 
principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the ‘apparent’ authority, so as 
to render the principal liable to perform any obligations imposed upon him by such 
contract.  To the relationship so created the agent is a stranger.  He need not be 
(although he generally is) aware of the existence of the representation but he must 
not purport to make the agreement as principal himself.  The representation, when 
acted upon by the contractor by entering into a contract with the agent, operates 
as an estoppel, preventing the principal from asserting that he is not bound by the 
contract.  It is irrelevant whether the agent had actual authority to enter into the 
contract.146 
 
                                                          
141
  A typical example hereof is Houghton & Co v Nothard, Lowe & Wills Ltd [1927] 1 KB 246, 
CA  
142
  McLennan 2009 Obiter 144 at 150; Du Plessis Grondslae 166.This conflation of the 
Turquand rule and ostensible authority (estoppel) also affected South African writers and 
courts.  See Ch 3 para 3.3.2.5 below. 
143
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-14; Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 
130. 
144
  Also called apparent authority. The term “ostensible authority” is actually a misnomer, as it 
does not constitute authority at all.  It is sometimes referred to as “estoppel”, “estoppel by 
representation” or “agency by estoppel”.  See for example Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst 
Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 498 and 503;  Ebeed (trading as 
Egyptian International Foreign Trading Co) v Soplex Wholesale Supplies Ltd and P S 
Refson and Co Ltd (The Raffaella) [1985] BCLC 404 (CA) 411; Ernest v Nicholls 10 ER 
1351 (HL) 412;  Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin & General Investments Ltd [1952] 1 All 
ER 554 (KB) 556;  Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA) 835. 
145
  [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) per Diplock LJ. 
146
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 503, 
per Diplock LJ. 
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The burden of proof lies with the person alleging ostensible authority,147 in other 
words, on the third party contracting with the company. 
 
For a more modern formulation, ostensible authority is described in ING Re (UK) 
Ltd v R & V Versicherung AG 148 as follows: 
 
The doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority is based on estoppel by 
representation.  Where a principal (P) represents or causes it to be represented to 
a third party (T) that an agent (A) has authority to act on P’s behalf, and T deals 
with A as P’s agent on the faith of that representation, P is bound by A’s acts to the 
same extent as if A had the authority which he was represented as having.149 
 
It is possible for a company to be bound by a contract with a third party if, although 
the agent acting on behalf of the company did not have actual authority, the agent 
had ostensible authority to bind the company.150  Actual and ostensible authority 
may overlap, coincide and co-exist,151 but either one of the two may exist without 
the other and their respective scopes may be different.152  Ostensible authority can 
for example be present in the instance where the agent has no actual authority.153 
 
In this regard the relationship between ostensible (apparent) authority and actual 
authority has been stated to be as follows: 
 
[A]pparent authority … often coincides with actual authority.  Thus, when the board 
appoint one of their number to be managing director, they invest him not only with 
implied authority, but also with ostensible authority to do all such things as fall 
within the usual authority of a managing director.154 
 
                                                          
147
  Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 337 para 8-016. 
148
  [2006] EWHC 1544 (Comm), per Toulson J. 
149
  ING Re (UK) Ltd v R&V Versicherung AG [2006] EWHC 1544 (Comm) [99]. 
150
  Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 120. According to Charlesworth’s 
Company Law (at 121) actual and ostensible authority are not mutually exclusive and may 
in certain instances co-exist. 
151
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583 per Lord Denning MR; Munday 
Agency 61. 
152
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 502 per 
Lord Diplock LJ. 
153
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 180; Munday Agency 52 and 61; Reynolds 
Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 107 para 3-005. 
154
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 459 (CA) 583. 
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If that is the case, usual as well as ostensible authority will apply and they are 
therefore not mutually exclusive.155 
 
According to Munday156 it is no easy task to establish the legal foundation of 
ostensible authority especially since the decisions of the courts are difficult to 
reconcile, as the court itself has admitted.  In this regard the following is stated in 
Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin & General Investments Ltd:157 
 
Ostensible or apparent authority … is merely a form of estoppel and has been 
termed agency by estoppel, and a party cannot call in aid an estoppel unless three 
ingredients are present: (i) a representation, (ii) a reliance on a representation, and 
(iii) an alteration of his position resulting from such reliance.158 
 
The contracting third party will not be able to rely on the ostensible authority of the 
agent and thereby seek to bind the company if the third party knew that the agent 
did not have actual authority to bind the company.159  The third party will also not 
be able to enforce a contract against a company if he was put on inquiry as to 
whether the agent was acting within his authority because of, for example, 
suspicious circumstances. In other words, the third party ought to have known that 
the agent did not have actual authority to act.160 
 
                                                          
155
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 459 (CA) 593 per Lord Pearson  Birds et al 
Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 180-181; Munday Agency 52; Morse et al Palmer’s Company 
Law 3054; Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 107 para 3-005. 
156
  Munday Agency 62. See for example Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) v 
Akai Holdings Ltd (in liquidation) [2010] HKCFA 64 at [42] per Lord Neuberger of 
Abbotsbury NPJ. 
157
  [1952] 1 All ER 554 (KB). 
158
  [1952] 1 All ER 554 (KB) at 556 per Slade, J. 
159
  Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] 1 WLR 1846 (HL); Davies and 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 185; Millett et al Gore-Browne on 
Companies 8-22; Sealy and Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials 107; Griffin 
Company Law 121; Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 149; Munday Agency 73; 
Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 361 para 8-050; Morse et al Palmer’s Company 
Law 3053. 
160
  AL Underwood, Limited v Bank of Liverpool and Martins [1924] 1 KB 775; Rolled Steel 
Products (Holdings) v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 246 (CA); The duty to enquire as 
to the authority of the agent is only present under circumstances where the agent performs 
an act that an agent of his type would not normally transact. Also see Reynolds Bowstead 
and Reynolds Agency 362 para 8-051. This is also the current position. See for example 
Hopkins v TL Dallas Group Ltd [2004] EWHC 1379 (Ch); Criterion Properties plc v Stratford 
UK Properties LLC [2004] 1 WLR 1846 (HL) 1856; Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 
8-22; Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 185  Pennington 
Pennington’s Company Law 150; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3053; Munday 
Agency 86. 
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The classic case in which the requirements to succeed with reliance on ostensible 
authority were laid down is Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) Ltd.161  These requirements are that – 
(i) there must have been a representation that the agent had the authority to 
enter on behalf of the company into a contract of the kind sought to be 
enforced; 
(ii) the representation must have been made by a person or persons who 
themselves had actual authority to manage the business of the company 
either generally or in respect of those matters to which the contract relates; 
(iii) the third party must have relied upon the representation; 
(iv) the company should not under its memorandum or articles of association 
have been deprived of the capacity to enter into a contract of the kind 
sought to be enforced. 
 
2.2.3.1 Representation of authority  
 
Without a representation there cannot be ostensible authority, as the basis for 
ostensible authority is a representation.162  The representation can be made in 
different ways. 
 
A representation can be made by words or conduct, including acts, omissions or 
silence.163  The representation may for example be contained in the company’s 
public documents164 or in the power of attorney granted to the agent165 or in the 
official correspondence of the company that a particular person possesses the 
necessary authority.166  Representation by the company can therefore also entail a 
                                                          
161
  [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 506 per Diplock LJ.  
162
  Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 337 para 8-017. 
163
  Griffin Company Law 121; Universal Stores Ltd v OK Bazaars 1973 4 SA 747 (A) 761; 
Insurance Trust and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mudaliar 1943 NPD 45 at 54. 
164
  Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 121; Also see Lovett v Carson 
Country Homes Ltd [2011] BCC 789 (Ch). If the third party relies on a representation in the 
company’s constitution, such reliance must be as a direct result of the third party’s actual 
knowledge thereof ‒ Griffin Company Law 121; Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 
151.  The doctrine of constructive notice, which has only a negative application, cannot be 
applied in such an instance. See Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company 
law 186. 
165
  Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China [1937] 1 All ER 
231. 
166
  Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved & and General Investments Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 554 (KB). 
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representation by the members or the board of directors,167 or duly authorised 
executive168 being a positive statement that the agent is authorised, or it may arise 
out of the conduct of the members or directors whereby they acquiesce in the acts 
of the agent, with full knowledge thereof.169 
 
Where a company appoints a representative in a particular position it creates the 
appearance that that representative possesses all the powers which are normally 
associated with that office.  In such event the authority of the officer could have 
been restricted by a confidential agreement between the company and the officer.  
Where that officer then exceeds his authority the third party can rely on ostensible 
authority to hold the company bound to the acts of its agent.170  What the precise 
extent of the officer’s authority will be is, however, a question of fact that must be 
determined by taking into account the usage in trade, the nature of the business 
and the position that the representative holds in the company.171 
 
The representation may also be implied by previous dealings between the 
parties.172  In other words, the holding out should be determined by looking at the 
factual circumstances of each case.173 
 
2.2.3.2 Representation made by person with actual authority to manage the 
business  
 
The representation must have been made by the company and not by the agent.  
A particular difficulty arises with this requirement in the case of a company as a 
company can only act through human agency.  The question that arises is which 
representatives’ representation will be regarded as that of the company. 
                                                          
167
  Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 121. 
168
  Griffin Company Law 121. 
169
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd 1 QB 549 (CA) 592 per Pearson LJ; Freeman & Lockyer v 
Buckhurst Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA); Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ 
Company Law 184; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3056; Reynolds Bowstead and 
Reynolds Agency 337 para 8-017. 
170
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [165] per Wallis AJ. 
171
  Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA).  For the position in South 
Africa in this regard, see Ch 3 para 3.2.3.1. 
172
  Munday Agency 68; Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 337 para 8-017. 
173
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 184. See the remarks of Pearson LJ in Freeman & 
Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 498 as qualified 
by his later remarks in Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 593. 
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This question was analysed in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) Ltd 174 where it was required that the representation as to the authority of 
the agent had to be made by some person or persons who have “actual” authority 
to manage the business of the company either generally or in respect of those 
matters to which the contract relates.175  The agent himself can therefore not 
represent that he has more authority than what he in actual fact has176 and 
generally neither can an agent who does not have authority represent that 
someone else has authority, who does not really have authority.177 
 
In Ebeed (trading as Egyptian International Foreign Trading Co) v Soplex 
Wholesale Supplies Ltd and P S Refson and Co Ltd (The Raffaella)178  Browne-
Wilkinson LJ remarked obiter that a third party should be able to rely, as part of the 
holding out by a company, on a representation by an agent with ostensible 
authority about the authority of another agent of the company to enter into a 
transaction, where such representation was incorrect.179 
 
This was confirmed in ING Re (UK) Ltd v R&V Versicherung AG,180 but the court 
added that the critical requirement is that the authority of the second agent, who 
enters into the transaction on behalf of the company must be able to be traced 
back to the company by a representation or chain of representations upon which 
the third party acted and whose authenticity the company is estopped from 
denying by its representation through words or conduct.181 
 
                                                          
174
  [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) per Diplock LJ. 
175
  645B and at 645F. Also see Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd 1 QB 549 (CA) 593; Birds et 
al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 185. 
176
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 506 
per Diplock LJ; Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 182; Munday 
Agency at 75; Zelpy 1780 (Proprietary) Limited v Mudaly 2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [42]; 
Glofinco v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a United Bank 2002 6 SA 470 (SCA) [13]; Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 15H. This has also been 
confirmed in South African case law. See Northern Metropolitan Local Council v Company 
Unique Finance (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 SA 323 (SCA) [28]; NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce (Pty) 
Ltd 2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) [25]; Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [66]. 
177
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 186. 
178
  [1985] BCLC 404 (CA). 
179
  [1985] BCLC 404 (CA) 414. This was followed by the court in First Energy (UK) Ltd v 
Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] BCC 533 (CA).The principles in the First Energy 
case were also applied in Kelly v Fraser [2012] UKPC 25. 
180
  [2006] EWHC 1544 (Comm). 
181
  ING Re (UK) Ltd v R&V Versicherung AG [2006] EWHC 1544 (Comm) [100]. 
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This line of reasoning is to be welcomed.  If a company can be held bound by acts 
of an agent who has ostensible authority to conclude a contract on its behalf, the 
company should also be capable of being held bound by a representation made by 
an agent who has ostensible authority to bind the company. 
 
This approach which is more favourable to the third party has, however, according 
to Munday,182 still to be fully developed.   
 
2.2.3.3 Reliance on the representation by the third party  
 
Whether this requirement has been satisfied should be determined by looking at 
the factual circumstances of each case.183 
 
The third party can only successfully rely on ostensible authority if he can prove 
that he relied on the representation whereby he has been moved to conclude the 
contract.184  In other words, there must be a causal link between the 
representation and the acts of the third party.185  The causal connection is not 
present where the third party has knowledge of the true state of affairs.186 
 
It seems that it would not be very difficult for the contracting third party to prove 
that he relied on the representation.  In this regard the following has been said in 
Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) v Akai Holdings Ltd (in 
liquidation) by Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbur, NPJ: 
 
[O]nce a third party has established that the alleged agent had apparent authority, 
… and that the third party has entered into a contract with the alleged agent on 
                                                          
182
  Munday Agency 84. 
183
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 184. 
184
  Midland Bank v Reckitt [1933] AC 1 (HL) 17; Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin & 
General Investments Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 554 (KB) 556; Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst 
Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 506. 
185
  Munday Agency 85. 
186
  In Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA, The Ocean Frost [1986] 2 All ER 385 (HL) the contracting 
third party could not prove that the principal represented that the agent had authority to 
enter into a three-year charter-party.  It was known that the agent did not have authority to 
do so and the third party could only show that it entered into the transaction through 
misguided reliance on what the agent himself had represented. 
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behalf of the principal, then, in the absence of any evidence or indication to the 
contrary, it would be an unusual case where reliance was not presumed.187 
 
Although not applied to the facts of the case, the court held that a third party could 
rely on the agent’s appearance of authority unless its “belief in that connection was 
dishonest or irrational (which includes turning a blind eye and being reckless)”.188   
 
2.2.3.4 Knowledge of the constitution 
 
In Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd189 the court held 
that the memorandum and articles of association are always relevant (whether 
they are in fact known to the third party or not) in determining whether this 
requirement has been fulfilled.190  If the common law is applied, a third party may 
not, due to the doctrine of constructive notice, be able to hold a company bound 
on grounds of ostensible authority where the agent of the company concluded the 
transaction in breach of the provisions in the articles which limit his authority.191  
This would be the case even if the contracting third party did not actually have 
knowledge of the contents of the articles.192 
 
2.2.3.5 Alteration of position by third party 
 
An additional requirement laid down in Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin & 
General Investments Ltd193 is that there has to be an alteration of position on the 
                                                          
187
  [2010] HKCFA 64 at [75].This statement was delivered by the Hong Kong Final Court of 
Appeal. 
188
  [2010] HKCFA 64 at [62]. The test in the Thanakharn case was adopted in Newcastle 
International Airport Ltd v Eversheds LLP [2012] EWHC 2648 (Ch). In South African law 
the reliance must be reasonable. This is discussed in Ch 3 para 3.2.3.4. 
189
  [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA). 
190
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 506. 
191
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 185-186. 
192
  One part of this requirement, ie that the memorandum or articles of association of the 
company should not deprive the company of the capacity to enter into the particular 
contract, is no longer relevant as the ultra vires doctrine has effectively been abolished in 
its external operation in England by the Companies Act – s 39(1) of the Companies Act of 
2006.  This, however, falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
The other part of this requirement, ie that the delegation of authority by the company may 
not be restricted by its articles, has been affected by s 40 of the Companies Act of 2006 
and is discussed in para 2.3 below. See Ch 3 para 3.2.3.6 below for a discussion of this 
requirement in South Africa law.   
193
  [1952] 1 All ER 554 (KB) 556. 
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part of the third party.  Sometimes actual loss is expressly stated as a requirement 
for ostensible authority.194 
 
In most agency cases the courts only require an alteration of position, without 
evidence of prejudice suffered.195  The alteration of position need only consist of 
the third party entering into the contract with the principal.196 
 
Munday197 questions whether an alteration of position actually constitutes a 
separate requirement at all in light of these court cases.  Bowstead and 
Reynolds198 are also of the opinion that this requirement merges with the 
requirement that the third party should have relied on the representation. 
 
2.2.3.6 Culpability 
 
Initially the view of the courts was that the representation must have been made 
intentionally by the company in order to succeed on grounds of ostensible 
authority (estoppel),199 or that at least negligence was required.200   It is now 
accepted that even non-intentional conduct would be sufficient and that culpa on 
the side of the estoppel-denier is not the decisive factor: it is the effect that the 
representation has on the person relying on estoppel.201 
 
                                                          
194
  Whitechurch Ltd v Cavanagh [1902] AC117 (HL). In this case at 135 the following was 
stated in this regard: 
My Lords, the case of the respondent is one of estoppel, and it is an essential element in such 
cases …. that the person to whom the representation was made has suffered loss by acting 
upon it; or, to put it another way, has altered his position to his detriment by acting on the 
representation.  
195
  See Munday Agency 89 and Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 342-343 para 8-
026 and the cases cited there. 
196
  Also see Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 
(CA) per Diplock LJ at 503:   
The representation, when acted upon by the contractor by entering into a contract with the 
agent, operates as an estoppel, preventing the principal from asserting that he is not bound by 
the contract. 
197
  Munday Agency 89. 
198
  Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 343 at para 8-026. See Ch 3 para 3.2.3.4 below 
for a discussion of this requirement in South African law. 
199
  Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 AD & E 469. 
200
  Freeman and another v Cooke [1843-60] All ER Rep 185; Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 90. 
201
  Freeman and another v Cooke [1843-60] All ER Rep 185. 
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According to Gore-Browne202 it might be argued that in the Freeman case203 it was 
required that the company should subjectively have intended that the third party 
should act on the representation but the author believes that the test should be 
objective, in other words, how a reasonable person would view the representation.  
In this regard, the following passage from ING Re (UK) Ltd v R&V Versicherung 
AG 204 is referred to: 
 
If, however, the circumstances are such that the person dealing with the supposed 
agent knew or ought reasonably to have appreciated that the representation relied 
upon was not intended to be made to him or for his benefit, then there is no good 
reason in principle why that person should be entitled to rely on the representation 
to create a contract.205 
 
Bowstead and Reynolds206 also regard the statement in the Freeman case207 
requiring that the principal should have intended that his representation should be 
acted upon as too narrow and points out that the wording does not appear 
elsewhere in the judgment. 
 
2.3  Companies Act 2006  
 
English company law underwent a fundamental change with the promulgation of 
the Companies Act 2006.208  As will become clear in the discussion below, the 
Companies Act 2006 and sections 40209 and 41 in particular, also had an effect on 
the common-law doctrines regarding the representation of a company. 
 
Griffin210 suggests a two-step process to be followed in order to ascertain whether 
the agent of the company had the necessary authority to act on behalf of the 
company and therefore to bind the company to a contract.   
                                                          
202
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-23. 
203
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 503. 
204
  [2006] EWHC 1544 (Comm). 
205
  [2006] EWHC 1544 (Comm) [104]. 
206
  Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds Agency 339 para 8-020. 
207
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 503. 
208
  Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 66. 
209
  The previous Companies Act 1985 (c 6), hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 
1985 had a similar provision set out in section 35A thereof. 
210
  Griffin Company Law 120. 
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a) The first step is to determine, by applying the common-law principles 
relating to agency, whether the board of directors or an agent acting with 
delegated authority of the board, had the necessary authority.211 
b) The second step is to ascertain whether there are limitations on the 
authority of company agents in the company’s constitution, resolutions by 
the company or its shareholders or in shareholders’ agreements. 
 
After the first step has been conducted, as suggested by Griffin,212 the second 
step should be followed, which entails determining whether there are limitations on 
the authority of company agents in the company’s constitution, resolutions by the 
company or its shareholders or in shareholders’ agreements.  The doctrine of 
constructive notice, the Turquand rule and ostensible authority may be relevant in 
this determination.213  If the situation can be brought under the provisions of 
section 40, then section 40 of the Companies Act 2006 shall apply.  If section 40 is 
not applicable, one must revert back to the common law which entails the doctrine 
of constructive notice, the Turquand rule and ostensible authority.214  
 
The reason why section 40 is only used as a second step is due to the negative 
operation of section 40.215  This means that the limitations in the company’s 
constitutive documents (or resolutions or agreements, as the case may be) placed 
on the powers of the directors to bind the company, are removed.216  Section 40 
does not make provision for determining whether the directors have the power to 
                                                          
211
  Griffin Company Law 120. The situation is the same in South African law where the liability 
of the company against a third contracting party must also be partly tested against the 
normal principles of agency: see Naudé 1971 SALJ 505 at 507-508; Fourie 1992 TSAR 1 
at 2. 
212
  For a discussion on the application of the common-law principles in this first step, see para 
2.2.1-2.2.3 above.  
213
  If a third party, for example, relies on the ostensible authority of the representative and he 
has proved all the other requirements for ostensible authority, save for the requirement that 
the delegation of authority by the company should not have been restricted by the 
company’s memorandum or articles, this last requirement can be negated by the provisions 
of section 40 of the Companies Act of 2006. See para 2.2.3.4 above.   
214
  If the contracting third party is not able to rely on section 40, the last recourse would be to 
determine whether the transaction cannot be brought within the ambit of the Turquand rule 
to temper the operation of the doctrine of constructive notice and hold the company bound 
on those grounds ‒ Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 186.   
215
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3045. 
216
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3045.   
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bind the company or authorise others to bind the company in the instance where 
there are no limitations in the company’s constitution.217   
 
In terms of section 40 of the Companies Act 2006 the power of the directors to 
bind the company, or authorise others to do so,218 is deemed to be219 free of any 
limitation under the company’s constitution, in a resolution of the company or of 
any class of shareholders, or in any agreement between the shareholders or any 
class of them.  This deemed provision is in favour of a person dealing with a 
company in good faith and does not operate in favour of the company who wants 
to enforce a contract where the authority of its representative is lacking because a 
restriction in the articles was exceeded.220 
 
The goal of section 40 is to negate the doctrine of constructive notice thereby 
making it easier for third parties to contract with a company, as section 40 deems 
the power of directors to bind the company to be free of any limitation under the 
company’s constitution.221  However, the operation of section 40 is limited by a 
number of factors as explained below. 
 
2.3.1 Documents in which the limitations must be contained 
 
The power of directors to bind the company is only deemed to be free of any 
limitation entrenched in the constitution of the company.  If the limitation on the 
directors’ power is the result of another document or arrangement, then section 40 
will not find application.222 
 
Although there is no definition of what constitutes a company’s constitution, the 
articles of association of a company will definitely form part of the constitution of 
                                                          
217
  See Wrexham Association Football Club Ltd (in admin) v Crucialmove Ltd [2007] BCC 139 
at 152. 
218
   The board of directors or individual directors are not usually involved in the day to day 
running of the company including the conclusion of day to day contracts, which are left to 
the officers of the company, especially in larger companies. 
219
  This deeming provision overrides any wording to the contrary in the constitution ‒ Millett et 
al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-15. 
220
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-15. 
221
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 178 to 179. 
222
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 179. 
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the company.223  The reference to any limitations on the director’s powers under 
the company’s constitution include resolutions of the company or of a class of 
shareholders as well as agreements between members of the company or any 
class of them.224 
 
Examples of areas where limitations can be found that are not in the constitution of 
the company are the bylaws, authorising resolutions by the board, coupled with 
restrictions or other internal rules of the board of directors.225 
 
2.3.2 Types of limitations 
 
Objects clauses now form part of the articles of a company and may restrict the 
authority of the directors to act on behalf of the company in the same manner as 
other clauses in the articles, for example restrictions on borrowing.226 
 
The restriction could therefore be a limitation in the objects of a company (in 
respect of those companies incorporated under older legislation which did not 
delete their objects clauses or those companies which elected to have objects 
clauses) or limitations imposed by other provisions of the articles.227  Limitations 
further include limitations imposed by a resolution of the company or a meeting of 
any class of shareholders or from any agreement between the members of the 
company or any class of shareholders. 
 
This would therefore include a restriction in the articles where the directors have to 
obtain an ordinary resolution at a general meeting of shareholders before they are 
                                                          
223
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3045. 
224
  Section 40(3); Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 176; Morse et al 
Palmer’s Company Law 3052; Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 
117. 
225
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 179; Morse et al Palmer’s 
Company Law 3052. 
226
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-11. In terms of section 28 of the Companies Act 
2006 the clauses in the memorandum of a company incorporated before the coming into 
operation of the Companies Act 2006 should be regarded as provisions of the articles. As 
the objects clauses previously set out in the memorandum are now found in the articles, 
these clauses do not have an impact on the capacity of the company anymore, but they still 
restrict the authority of the directors. 
227
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 167. Also see Davies and Worthington Gower and 
Davies’ Company Law at 168; Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-15. 
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allowed to borrow money on behalf of the company.228  It would also include ad 
hoc special resolutions or shareholder agreements limiting authority that was 
otherwise delegated to directors.  It will also apply to direct restrictions in the 
articles placed on, for example, the authority of a managing director as they are 
indirect limitations on the board to grant a wider authority.229 
 
Gore-Browne230 is of the opinion that section 40 would not apply to procedural 
irregularities such as where a board has not been appointed or where a board is 
appointed at a meeting where the required quorum was lacking or where improper 
notice of the meeting was given.231  The view that section 40 would also cover 
procedural irregularities is, according to Gore-Browne,232 strained and the 
Turquand rule should rather be used to settle such matters. 
 
Although the third contracting party is not deemed to know of any limitations in the 
constitution of the company where section 40 applies, he must nevertheless 
ensure that the person who acts on behalf of the company was authorised by the 
board as a first step.233  This is impliedly confirmed by section 40(b)(2)(i) where it 
is provided that the third party is not bound to enquire as to any limitation on the 
powers of the directors to bind the company or authorise others to do so.234  When 
a director therefore enters into a transaction on behalf of the company without any 
authority from the board of directors, the third party will not be able to rely on the 
authority of such director.235 
 
                                                          
228
  Smith v Henniker-Major & Co [2002] BCC 544 (Ch) 549. These are the facts of The Royal 
British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327 Exch Ch. 
229
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-15. 
230
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-15. 
231
  His opinion is in line with Smith v Henniker-Major & Co [2002] BCC 544 (Ch) 550. 
232
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-15. See, however, TCB Ltd v Gray [1986] 1 All 
ER 587 (Ch) 596; Smith v Henniker-Major & Co [2003] Ch 182 (CA) [35]-[41] per Walker LJ 
(minority decision) and Ford v Polymer Vision Ltd [2009] EWHC 945 (Ch) [74] and [78] for 
the view that procedural irregularities would also be covered by section 40. 
233
  Griffin Company Law 126. Although this was stated in respect of section 35A of the 
Companies Act 1985 as amended by the Companies Act 1989, the principles still apply in 
respect of section 40. Also see Smith v Henniker-Major & Co [2003] Ch 182 (CA). 
234
  Griffin Company Law 126. Although Griffin still refers to section 35B of the Companies Act 
1985, its wording is almost the same as that of section 40(2)(b)(i). 
235
  Smith v Henniker-Major & Co [2002] BCC 544 (Ch) 550 per Rimer J. The appeal against 
the decision of Rimer J was dismissed. Griffin Company Law 126. 
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The reference to “directors” in section 40, instead of “board of directors” as 
referred to in Section 35A of the Companies Act 1985,236 caused new 
uncertainties in its interpretation. 
 
According to Palmer’s237 it is possible to interpret section 40 as not being available 
in respect of an act by a single director.  Charlesworth’s238 state that “directors” 
should be interpreted as the board acting as such.  Boyle & Birds’239 are of the 
opinion that it is possible to interpret “directors” as that each individual director or 
several directors acting together can bind the company under section 40.  There 
are cases decided under section 40 where the acts of a single director were 
regarded as being capable of falling under section 40.240 
 
It should be noted that only acts by a person who holds the office of a director or a 
person authorised by a director will fall under the protection of section 40, which 
would exclude any non-director’s act or authorisation.241   
 
2.3.3 The power of directors to authorise others to bind the company 
 
It is very rare that the whole board of directors or the whole body of shareholders 
would act on behalf of the company in transactions concluded by the company.242  
This would be impractical and inconvenient.243  It is therefore commendable that 
section 40 not only covers the instance where the “directors” act directly with a 
contracting third party but also where lesser officers are authorised by the 
directors to act on behalf of the company.244  Where a company is represented by 
a single director, or manager or other person, the question arises as to how 
section 40 applies to such a situation. 
                                                          
236
  Under the Companies Act 1985 the phrase “board of directors” also caused uncertainties 
about its interpretation. See Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 167-170; Griffin 
Company Law 128; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3046. 
237
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company law 3046. 
238
  Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 117. 
239
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 170. 
240
  Ford v Polymer Vision Ltd [2009] EWHC 945 (Ch) and Sargespace Ltd v Eustace [2013] 
EWHC 2944 (QB). 
241
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 170. 
242
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-19. 
243
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 177. 
244
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 168; Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-
16. 
- 38 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
The powers of the directors to authorise others to act are also deemed to be free 
of any limitation in the constitution of the company. Where the board (or even a 
single director) authorises a lesser officer (for example a manager or senior 
employee) to act on its behalf in contravention of a limitation in the company’s 
constitution to delegate such authority, such lesser officer would not be authorised 
to act on behalf of the company.  In such an instance the third party would not be 
able to rely on ostensible authority of the lesser officer, as the directors would not 
have any authority under the constitution of the company to make a representation 
that such lesser officer does have the necessary authority to act.  Section 40 
would under these circumstances come to the rescue of the bona fide third 
contracting party as section 40 deems the directors to have that authority.245 
 
Section 40 only removes limitations in the articles on the power of directors to 
authorise others to bind the company.  If the board of directors therefore has total 
power to authorise others to act on behalf of the company and grants authority to 
an agent to act on behalf of the company, but restricts the power granted to the 
agent, section 40 does not apply.246  Such limitation will in the first place not fall 
under a limitation that would be covered by section 40 and secondly it will also not 
be a limitation on the board’s competence to authorise the agent, but a restriction 
on the authority of the agent himself.  In such an instance, section 40 will not come 
to the rescue of a bona fide third party and the common-law principles of agency 
law must then be applied. 
 
It should further be noted that section 40 only allows the third party to deem that 
the directors have the power to delegate authority free from any limitation of such 
power to delegate as might be contained in the constitution of the company.  It 
does not deem that delegation has in actual fact taken place.247  Whether 
delegation has taken place or whether the company may be estopped from 
denying that the delegation has taken place, should be answered by applying the 
principles of agency, (actual or implied authority) or should be answered by 
                                                          
245
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 168. 
246
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 180. 
247
  Griffin Company Law 126. 
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applying the principles of ostensible authority and will be determined by the 
particular circumstances of each case.248 
 
2.3.4 Dealing with a company 
 
A third party can only utilise the protection of section 40 if he dealt with the 
company in good faith.  As there was doubt under section 9(1) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 and later section 35 of the Companies Act 1985 whether a 
third party that deals with a company would include a third party dealing in respect 
of a gratuitous transaction with the company,249 section 40(2)(a) of the Companies 
Act 2006 specifically provides that a person “deals with” a company if he is a party 
to any transaction250 or other act251 to which the company is a party.  The third 
party would therefore be entitled to the protection of section 40 of the Companies 
Act 2006, not only where he has concluded an agreement with the company but 
also in respect of gratuitous acts by the company in his favour for example gifts, 
the distribution of assets, the grant of a debenture or an option.252 
 
2.3.5 Good Faith 
 
Only third parties that acted in good faith may benefit from the protection afforded 
by section 40.  Section 40(2)(b) of the Companies Act 2006 sets out what is meant 
by good faith and grants wide protection to third contracting parties. 
 
Section 40(2)(b)(i) provides that a person dealing with a company is not bound to 
enquire about any limitation on the powers of the directors to bind the company or 
authorise others to do so.  This section limits the application of the doctrine of 
constructive notice.  If a contracting third party did not make such inquiries the 
                                                          
248
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 168. Also see Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 
3052 and Griffin Company Law 126. 
249
  International Sales and Agencies Ltd v Marcus [1982] 3 All ER 551 at 559-560; Griffin 
Company Law 114; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3046; Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ 
Company Law 170-171; Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016 (Ch) 1039-1040. 
250
  For example if the third party is a party to the contract ‒ Davies and Worthington Gower 
and Davies’ Company Law 173. 
251
  For example the payment of money ‒ Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ 
Company Law 173. 
252
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 170-171; Girvin, Frisby and Hudson 
Charlesworth’s Company Law 115; Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-16. 
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company cannot successfully argue that the third party has not acted in good 
faith.253  There is therefore no duty on the contracting third party to enquire as to 
the restrictions in the articles.254 
 
The third contracting party is further presumed to have acted in good faith, unless 
the contrary in proved.255  This procedural provision places the burden of proving 
that the third contracting party did not act in good faith upon the company that 
wants the protection afforded by section 40 not to apply in favour of the third 
contracting party.256 
 
Section 40(2)(b)(iii) further provides that a person dealing with the company 
 
is not to be regarded as acting in bad faith by reason only of his knowing that an 
act is beyond the powers of the directors under the company’s constitution.  
 
Although the Act does not stipulate what will constitute bad faith, knowledge alone 
will not constitute bad faith, but most probably an understanding and/or correct 
interpretation of the limitation in the constitution of the company by the third party 
may constitute the required bad faith.257  According to Gower actual knowledge 
can, however, be a factor when determining bad faith.258 
 
If the contracting third party was placed on notice due to suspicious 
circumstances, it would be difficult, according to Gore-Browne, to rely on the fact 
that the third party had been placed on notice as section 40(2)(b)(iii) states that 
even actual knowledge of the transgression does not in itself constitute mala 
fides.259  
 
                                                          
253
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3047; Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 174. 
254
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 172. 
255
  S 40(2)(b)(ii). 
256
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 173; Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ 
Company Law 172; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3047. 
257
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3047; Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-16; 
Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 116. According to the latter, it is 
unclear whether the understanding is to be subjectively or objectively tested. This section 
would also cover the instance where, although the third contracting party knows of the 
restriction, he misinterprets it ‒ Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-16. 
258
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 172. 
259
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-16. 
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Boyle & Birds’260 have an opposite view on this point and are of the opinion that 
the particular circumstances of a transaction placing the contracting third party on 
inquiry, and the third party makes no such inquiry, would defeat the presumption of 
good faith. 
 
There is great uncertainty as to what good faith (or bad faith) entails and section 
40,261 instead of clarifying the uncertainty, only added thereto. 
 
2.3.6 Exceptions 
 
In terms of section 40(6) there are two instances where the effect of section 40 is 
limited. These exceptions are regulated by sections 41 and 42262 respectively. 
 
Section 41 applies when a director of the company (or a director of the company’s 
holding company or a person connected263 with any such director) is a party to a 
transaction with the company where the directors of such company have 
transgressed any limitation set out in the constitution of the company and the 
validity of the transaction thus depends upon section 40.264  In such a case the 
transaction is voidable at the instance of the company. 
 
The contract will thus be binding unless set aside by the company, without the 
necessity of having to approach the court.265  The transaction remains valid until it 
                                                          
260
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 174. As support for this view they refer to 
Wrexham Association Football Club Ltd (in admin) v Crucialmove Ltd [2007] BCC 139 [47] 
where the third contracting party had knowledge of the fact that the directors who acted on 
behalf of the company had a conflict of interest. Also see Pennington Pennington’s 
Company Law 150 (Pennington does, however, hold this view in respect of section 35A of 
the Companies Act 1985). 
261
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 174; Griffin Company Law 125. 
262
  S 42 relates to companies that are charities and provides that inter alia s 40 does not apply 
to acts of a company that is a charity, subject to certain limitations. This will not be 
discussed further as it does not form part of the scope of this dissertation. 
263
  S 41(7) provides that reference to a person connected with a director has the same 
meaning as set out in s 252.   
264
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3048. 
265
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 175. In multi-party transactions, 
where one of the third parties to the contract also includes a person who is not a director of 
the company or of its holding company, or a person connected with any such director, the 
contract remains valid for him and the court may, on the application of the company or any 
such party, make an order affirming, severing or setting aside the transaction on such 
terms as appear to the court to be just (s 41(6) of the Companies Act 2006). 
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is voided by the company (unless it is void for some other reason).266  If the 
transaction, however, falls outside section 40 it will be governed by common law 
and it will not be binding unless it is ratified by the company.267 
 
In Smith v Henniker-Major & Co268 the court had to deal with the interaction 
between the predecessors269 of sections 40 and 41 of the Companies Act 2006.  
In terms of the minority judgment270 the now section 40 can also be used by a third 
contracting party who is an insider, such as a director, although the validity of the 
transaction could still be trumped and therefore voided through the now section 
41.  In other words, the word “person” in section 40 would always include 
corporate insiders.  Where a corporate insider (the same as any other independent 
person) falls within the ambit of application of section 40, the protection that he 
obtains is laid down in section 41 with the result that the transaction is voidable as 
opposed to void.271 
 
The majority of the court272 disagreed with this reasoning and were of the opinion 
that as the agreement was concluded by an inquorate board meeting, one Smith 
had no authority to act on behalf of the company.  Carnwath LJ was of the opinion 
that as Smith was not only a director of the company but also its chairman,273 he 
was under a duty to ensure that the constitution of the company was properly 
applied and that he could not rely on now section 40 
 
                                                          
266
  Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law 118. 
267
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 175 and Morse et al Palmer’s 
Company Law 3048. 
268
  [2003] Ch. 182 (CA). This judgment was based on ss 35A and 322A of the Companies Act 
1985 (the present ss 40 and 41 of the Companies Act 2006). 
269
  Ss 35A and 322A of the Companies Act 1985 are substantially the same as ss 40 and 41 
of the Companies Act 2006. 
270
  Per Walker LJ. 
271
  Smith v Henniker-Major & Co [2003] Ch 182, CA [50] per Walker LJ:  
   
… Section 322A, by contrast, is said to have effect ‘notwithstanding’ section 35A, so (as it were) 
allowing section 35A to play its card, but then trumping it to the extent that a director or 
associate is involved (a three-cornered transaction between a company, a director and an 
outsider illustrates this). 
  
 See also Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 175. 
272
  Carnwarth and Schiemann LJJ. 
273
  This is a rare recognition of the importance of the chairman of the board.  See Davies and 
Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 175 and Morse et al Palmer’s Company 
Law 3048. 
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to turn his own decision, which had no validity of any kind under the company’s 
constitution, into a decision of ‘the board’.274   
 
The position must then be determined by common law instead of the now section 
41 of the Companies Act 2006.  Carnwath LJ held that as chairman, the director 
was responsible for the error in the transaction with him. 
 
Schiemann LJ accepted that technically a director could also fall under a “person” 
referred to in the now section 40, but in the present case,  
 
there is no difficultly in excluding from such persons the very directors who 
overstepped the limitations in the company’s constitution. 275 
 
Commentators are divided in their opinions on the judgment in Smith v Henniker-
Major & Co.276 Some277 summarise the position that has arisen through this 
judgment as being that directors who deal with a company would be entitled to rely 
on section 40 except where they have transgressed their authority.278  They 
criticise this position as unnecessarily confusing and regrettable that the 2006 
Companies Act did not clear up this confusion.279 
 
In other words, if a director is the “person” referred to in section 40, the transaction 
will fall under section 40.  As the “person” is a director, section 41 will apply, 
namely the contract will be voidable at the option of the company.  In the instance 
where the director has overstepped his authority, the transaction will not fall under 
section 40 and as a result section 41 cannot apply.  In such an instance the 
validity of the transaction will be determined by the application of the common law, 
unless it is ratified by the company. 
 
                                                          
274
  [2002] 2 BCLC 655 at [125]. 
275
  [2002] 2 BCLC 655 at [128]. Also see Griffin Company Law 128. 
276
  [2003] Ch. 182 (CA). 
277
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 172. Also see Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 
3048. 
278
  In EIC Services Ltd v Phipps [2003] EWHC 1507; [2003] 3 All ER 804 Neuberger J held the 
view in the Smith v Henniker-Major case to mean that where the director was responsible 
for the mistake (whether it was innocent or not) that resulted in the breach of the articles of 
the company, he could not rely on s 35A (now s 40). If he was not so responsible, s 40 
would find application, subject to s 41. 
279
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 173. 
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Others, however, agree with the reasoning in the minority decision set out above 
that, due to the fact that the legislature has expressly dealt with corporate insiders 
in the now section 41 of the Companies Act 2006, the courts do not have to 
enforce a limitation on the interpretation of “person” in the wording of section 40.  
According to this view, corporate insiders who deal with the company in good faith 
should also be entitled to the protection afforded by section 40, subject to the 
provisions of section 41.280 
 
There is also uncertainty regarding the position of a shareholder as a third party.   
In EIC Services Ltd v Phipps281 the directors of the company allotted bonus shares 
to shareholders.  The constitution of the company required an ordinary resolution 
of shareholders to be passed for such an act.  This resolution was not passed.  
The Court of Appeal did not regard the issue of bonus shares to the shareholders 
as dealing by the shareholders with the company.282  As section 35A of the 
Companies Act 1985 (the predecessor of section 40 of the Companies Act 2006) 
was only available to a third party who dealt283 with the company, this meant that 
the shareholders could not rely on this section to hold the company bound. 
 
Even if the issue of the shares could be seen as a “dealing” by the shareholders 
with the company, it would appear that the court was still of the opinion that 
section 35A of the Companies Act 1985 would not apply.284  The court referred to 
Art 9(2) of the First Council Directive on Company Law,285 which was the source 
for drafting section 35A of the Companies Act 1985   and in which a distinction is 
made between third parties and members.   The court believed that “third party” 
referred to persons other than the company and its members.  As Art 9(2) of the 
Directive is not available to shareholders (members), the same had to be said of 
section 35A of the Companies Act 1985.286 
 
                                                          
280
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 175. 
281
  [2005] 1 WLR 1377 (CA). 
282
  [2005] 1 WLR 1377 (CA) 1387. 
283
  My emphasis. 
284
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3050. 
285
  68/151/EEC. 
286
  [2005] 1 WLR 1377 at 1387. Also see Griffin Company Law 128. 
- 45 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
Section 40 can therefore not be utilised if the third party is a shareholder and the 
transaction is entered into between the company and the shareholder as 
shareholder. 
 
According to Gower,287 as the legislature expressly made provision in section 41 
for directors, it is unlikely that it would not have dealt with shareholders if it had 
wished to qualify the protection afforded to shareholders by section 40.  The word 
“person” in section 40 should, therefore not be strictly interpreted to exclude 
shareholders. 
 
Boyle & Birds’288 make a distinction between the instance where the shareholder 
transacts with a company in his capacity as a shareholder (which they refer to as 
“inside” transactions, for example the issue of bonus shares) and where the 
contracting third party happens to be a shareholder (which they refer to as 
“outside” transactions).  They contend that a shareholder in an outside transaction 
will be entitled to rely on the provisions of section 40.  Where the shareholder, 
however, transacts with the company in his capacity as shareholder, he would not 
be able to rely on section 40.289 
 
2.3.7 Effect of section 40 on the Turquand rule 
 
The common-law Turquand rule has not been repealed by this legislation and 
operates alongside the statutory protection of section 40.290  The importance of the 
Turquand rule has, however, decreased due to the protection now afforded by 
section 40 of the Companies Act 2006.291  It is possible that section 40 and the 
Turquand rule overlap as in the following example based on the facts in The Royal 
British Bank v Turquand:292 
 
[I]f the articles cap the directors’ borrowing power by requiring them to seek the 
approval of the shareholders in general meeting by ordinary resolution for 
borrowings over a certain amount, the lender can either assume that the ordinary 
                                                          
287
  Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies’ Company Law 175 at fn 40. 
288
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 172. 
289
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 172. 
290
  Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 130. 
291
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 178. 
292
  The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327 Exch Ch. 
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resolution has been obtained, because, under the Turquand rule, this matter is a 
matter of internal management, or can disregard the need for the resolution 
because this is a limitation on the directors’ power which is overridden by s 40.293 
 
At common law a third party cannot rely on the Turquand rule in cases where he 
knew that the agent’s authority was defective or where he was put on inquiry.294  
The nature of a transaction can even put a third party on inquiry.295  Where there is 
an overlap between section 40 and the Turquand rule, the contracting third party 
might benefit more from section 40 because even actual knowledge of the 
irregularity does not constitute bad faith and such third party would still be able to 
rely on section 40.296 
 
Section 40 only removes restrictions in the constitution of the company on the 
powers of the directors to bind the company in a transaction with a third party.  It 
does not confer the power on directors to deal with a third party on behalf of the 
company.297  To firstly ascertain whether an agent (board of directors or an 
individual) had the necessary authority to act on behalf of the company, the 
common-law principles of agency (including ostensible authority) and the 
Turquand rule must be applied.  Only if it is ascertained that the agent did have 
authority, can any limitation in the constitution of the company restricting the power 
of that agent, be ignored through the operation of section 40.  If no authority can 
be established in the first place, but for a limitation in the constitution of the 
company, section 40 can never come to the rescue of the third party. 
 
The converse is also true.  If section 40 does not apply, the question whether the 
company will be bound to the contract must be answered by referring to the 
common-law principles of agency and the Turquand rule.298 
 
                                                          
293
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 178. 
294
  B Liggett (Liverpool) Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1928] 1 KB 48; Morris v Kanssen [1946] 1 All 
ER 586 (HL); Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 
246 (CA).  
295
  AL Underwood Limited v Bank of Liverpool and Martins [1924] 1 KB 775; Northside 
Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General [1990] HCA 32. 
296
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 178. 
297
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3053. 
298
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3053.  In other words, actual and ostensible authority. 
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As section 40 only applies in the instance where the contracting third party dealt 
with the board of directors or an agent authorised by the board of directors (in 
other words the delegation of authority by the board to an agent), it will not find 
application where the agent was not authorised by the board to act on behalf of 
the company.299  In such an instance the common-law principles of the Turquand 
rule or ostensible authority should be applied to determine whether the company 
may be held bound. 
 
Although the Turquand rule was originally developed to mitigate the severe effects 
of the doctrine of constructive notice, the function of the Turquand rule was wider 
than that alone.  It might be that questions regarding compliance with internal 
management arise even though no requirements were expressly laid down in the 
constitution of the company.  In Mahony v The East Holyford Mining Co Ltd 300 the 
liability of the company did not depend on the bank having knowledge or notice of 
any particular provision in the constitution of the company.  As section 40 only 
removes limitations in the constitution of the company and in shareholders’ 
resolutions, the Turquand rule will therefore still be of assistance where, for 
example, the board has delegated authority to an individual director but placed 
certain restrictions on such delegated authority (which restrictions are not 
contained in the articles of the company or in a shareholders’ resolution).  
 
When applying the Turquand rule where the third contracting party is a director of 
the company with which he transacts, the courts have made a distinction between 
                                                          
299
  Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 148-149. 
300
  (1874-75) LR 7 (HL) 869.  In this case a mining company was founded by Wall and certain 
of his friends and relatives. The memorandum and articles were registered and 
subscriptions for shares were obtained from the applicants. These moneys were paid into 
the bank which had been described in the prospectus as the company’s bank. Cheques 
issued by the company and signed by two of the three named directors, were honoured by 
the National Bank, Dublin. The bank had done so after it had received a letter signed by a 
person who described himself as the secretary of the company, enclosing a copy of the 
resolution by the board of directors of the company in which three directors were named 
and the bank was instructed to pay cheques that were signed by any two of them and 
countersigned by the secretary and to which their signatures were appended. When the 
funds of the company were almost depleted, the company was ordered to be wound up. 
However, neither a secretary nor any directors were duly appointed by the company, but 
Wall and his friends and relatives had assumed these roles and had appropriated the 
subscription moneys. The subscribers of the memorandum were aware of this conduct but 
did not do anything to stop it. The bank was successful in resisting an action by the 
liquidator for the repayment of the money. As there was nothing contrary in the articles of 
the company, the bank was entitled to assume that the directors were properly appointed.     
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the instance where the director as third party is also the agent who represents the 
company in the contract concluded with him, on the one hand and instances 
where another person acts as agent of the company in concluding the contract 
with the director as third party.301  In the former case, the director may not rely on 
the Turquand rule, whereas in the latter case he may. 
 
Section 41 of the Companies Act does not make this distinction and treats 
directors under all circumstances in the same way.  Where a contract that a 
director of a company has concluded with his company transgresses limitations in 
the articles of the company, such contract is voidable irrespective of the 
involvement of the director on behalf of the company.  A director cannot rely on the 
Turquand rule in respect of a transaction which is voidable in terms of section 
41.302 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
England and South Africa have a shared history with regard to the common-law 
principles of representation in a company law context, as principles of common 
law in England particular to companies have been taken over by South African 
courts, such as the doctrine of constructive notice and the Turquand rule.303  With 
the enactment of statutes by both England and South Africa the paths of these two 
countries have diverged and each has followed its own direction.  This is just as 
well for South Africa, because the current position in England is anything but 
satisfactory. 
 
England has made a half-hearted effort to deal with the doctrine of constructive 
notice.  Instead of following through and abolishing this doctrine, it enacted section 
40 of the Companies Act 2006.  This section provides that the power of directors 
to bind the company, or authorise others to do so, is deemed to be free of any 
limitation under the company’s constitution, in a resolution of the company or of 
                                                          
301
  In this regard, see Hely Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA). 
302
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 179. He would also not be able to rely on the 
Turquand rule where he has knowledge that a meeting of the board was improperly 
constituted and unable to act. In this regard, see Smith v Henniker-Major [2002] BCC 544 
(Ch) and on appeal [2003] Ch 182 (CA). 
303
  See para 2.2 above. 
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any class of shareholders, or in any agreement between the shareholders or any 
class of them.  This deemed provision is in favour of a person dealing with a 
company in good faith.304  The default position in England remains that the 
doctrine of constructive notice applies to documents of a company which receives 
publicity.  Section 40 is not at all clear and does not solve the difficulties of 
representation of a company. 
 
Section 40 does not address the problem where the board or another agent acts 
on behalf of the company without the necessary authority.  Whether a company 
may be bound to a contract entered into on its behalf should therefore still be 
determined by first ascertaining whether the board of directors or an agent acting 
with delegated authority of the board had the necessary authority to enter into the 
contract on behalf of that company305 by applying the common-law rules of 
representation, being actual authority, implied or express, the Turquand rule or 
ostensible authority. 
 
The principal will be bound by the acts of the agent if the agent acted within his 
actual authority or ostensible authority.  The board of directors has express actual 
authority to exercise those powers of the company as are vested in it by its 
memorandum and articles.306  Usually the board would delegate authority to an 
agent to act on its behalf.  The board would only be authorised to delegate 
authority to such an agent if it has the power to do so under its articles.307  Such 
delegation can take place either expressly or impliedly. 
 
If an agent acts without authority or exceeds his authority, the company may still 
be held bound by a third contracting party on grounds of ostensible authority.308  A 
company will be prohibited from denying liability if the third contracting party can 
prove all the requirements for the successful reliance on ostensible authority.  
Proving all these requirements is, however, very cumbersome.  
 
                                                          
304
  See para 2.3 above. 
305
  Griffin Company Law 120. 
306
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 179; Griffin Company Law 120. 
307
  Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 145. 
308
  Also known as estoppel by representation. 
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Unfortunately, the courts have in some instances confused implied authority, 
which constitutes actual authority, with ostensible authority which does not, and 
have, for example, reached a conclusion that there is implied authority, terming it 
as such, even where it is clear that the reasoning of the court is in fact based on 
ostensible authority.309 
 
In the field of representation in company law a further rule was created and 
developed by the English courts, namely the Turquand rule.310  This rule was 
created to temper the unfair operation of the doctrine of constructive notice.311  
This rule provides that a third party negotiating with a company in good faith is 
entitled to assume that the internal management and procedures required by the 
articles of that company have properly taken place.312 
 
In certain instances, both ostensible authority and the Turquand rule can be used 
as grounds for the liability of the company towards a third party.313  In these 
circumstances the third party would have a choice between relying on ostensible 
authority or the Turquand rule as basis for holding the company liable.  As there 
are more difficult requirements to prove when relying on ostensible authority, it 
would be easier for the third party to rely on the Turquand rule if the transaction 
can be brought within its application.314 
 
The English courts have, however, in some cases confused ostensible authority 
and the Turquand rule and regarded the Turquand rule as only an appearance 
form of ostensible authority.315  As a result, the requirements to succeed with 
ostensible authority have been imported into the application of the Turquand rule.  
This is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs, as the third party is deprived of the 
benefit of the Turquand rule in its pure form, which, as already stated, is easier to 
comply with. 
 
                                                          
309
  See para 2.2.1 above. 
310
  See para 2.2.2 above. 
311
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’Company Law 178; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210 at 210. 
312
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210 at 210. 
313
  Du Plessis Grondslae 206. 
314
  Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 9-10; Du Plessis Grondslae 206. 
315
  Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA); Houghton & Co v 
Nothard, Lowe & Wills Ltd [1927] 1 KB 246 (CA). 
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The position regarding the application of the common-law principles of agency, 
which remain necessary to determine authority, are therefore mired in uncertainty 
and not clearly and consistently applied. 
 
Later statutory provisions were enacted that impacted on the doctrine of 
constructive notice (although not abolishing this doctrine) and the foundation for 
liability of a company for the unauthorised acts of its agents.316  As alluded to 
above this was, however, not a very commendable attempt. 
 
After it has been determined that an agent of the company would have had 
authority, but for a particular limitation in the constitution of the company, the 
contracting party can then make use of section 40 of the Companies Act 2006 to 
hold the company bound to the contract. 
 
Section 40 can also be used by a third contracting party who relies on ostensible 
authority to negate one of the requirements317 that he has to prove for successful 
reliance on ostensible authority, as section 40 allows such third party to hold the 
company liable irrespective of any restrictions on the agent’s authority that might 
be present in the articles of the company.318 
 
The application of section 40 has its own challenges.  There exists uncertainty as 
to the type of limitations which would be covered by this section and how the word 
“directors” should be interpreted 319 as well as what the requirement of “good faith” 
entails.320  The scope of application of section 40 is further limited and might not 
always come to the rescue of a third contracting party acting in good faith.321 
 
                                                          
316
  Ss 35A and 322A of the Companies Act 1985 followed by ss 40 and 41 of the Companies 
Act 2006. 
317
  The requirement that the company should not under its memorandum or articles of 
association have been deprived of the power to delegate authority to enter into a contract 
of that kind to the agent (s 40). 
318
  See para 2.3 above. 
319
  See para 2.3.2 above. 
320
  See para 2.3.5 above. 
321
  See para 2.3.1 - 2.3.6. 
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The exception to section 40, set out in section 41, is capable of different 
interpretations resulting in different outcomes in a particular set of facts.322  This 
creates uncertainty which should have been avoided. 
 
The common-law Turquand rule has not been repealed by the Companies Act 
2006 and operates alongside the statutory protection of section 40.323  As an 
alternative to relying on section 40, the third contracting party can therefore still 
make use of the common-law Turquand rule to bind the company.  Under certain 
circumstances the contracting third party would be successful when relying on 
section 40, but not when relying on the Turquand rule and vice versa.324 
 
Although the problems experienced by the application of the common-law 
principles pertaining to company representation have been alleviated by the 
introduction of section 40 of the Companies Act 2006, the limited operation of 
sections 40 and 41 and the uncertainties pertaining to its interpretation still leave 
this area of company law in an unsatisfactory state. 
 
It would have made sense for South Africa to follow England with its statutory 
enactment, bearing in mind the shared common law of both these countries, but it 
is clear that the current position in England cannot be supported as a workable 
solution to company representation.  The only thing that South Africa can learn 
from England is what not to do.  However, although South Africa took a totally 
different direction with the enacting of its Companies Act of 2008, its position also 
needs serious reconsideration and attention.325 
 
  
                                                          
322
  See para 2.3.6. 
323
  Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 130. 
324
  See para 2.3.7. 
325
  See Ch 3 para 3.3 below. 
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CHAPTER 3  SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
When a body or agent acts on behalf of the company such body or person must 
be properly authorised to act by somebody or something.326  In terms of section 
66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as the Companies 
Act of 2008 or the 2008 Act) the business and affairs of the company must be 
managed by or under the direction of the directors.  The board, therefore, has all 
the powers to act on behalf of the company.  Usually the board is only a body that 
determines the policy and procedures in the company and the day to day 
management is left to a managing director, other managers, and employees.  
When a company contracts with third parties it would therefore usually do so 
through the agency of the managing director, a single director or committee of 
directors, a manager, employees etcetera. 
 
The normal common-law rules of agency provide the foundation for representation 
in company law in South Africa.327    However, the common-law principles of 
agency could not in all instances provide a satisfactory solution to the problems 
that arose in the case of companies, due to the fact that the principal (the 
company) is a juristic person that cannot act on its own.328  As a result, a specific 
branch of the law of agency developed that was used in instances where a 
company was the principal.  For example, the doctrine of constructive notice and 
the Turquand rule were developed to cater for specific needs in the area of the law 
pertaining to the representation of a company.329  In terms of the South African 
common law, the authority to represent a company as principal can be based on 
actual authority, the Turquand rule or estoppel.  The general principles of common 
law in respect of agency are still applicable to representatives that act on behalf of 
                                                          
326
  Gibson et al Mercantile Law 337; Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 133. 
327
  Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 179; Benade Ultra Vires 137; Naudé 1974 
SALJ 315 at 316-17; Naudé 1971 SALJ 505 at 507-508.   
328
  Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 179. 
329
  Naudé 1971 SALJ 505 at 505. 
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the company.  The common-law principles are, however, subject to the provisions 
of the Companies Act of 2008.330 
 
3.2 Common law 
 
3.2.1 Actual authority331 
 
In order to bind the company, the agent should have actual authority.  Actual 
authority can either be express or implied.  The question whether the 
representative had actual authority to bind the principal (company) is a question of 
fact.332  If a third party relies on the actual authority of the representative of the 
company, he will have to prove such actual authority.333 
 
It is not difficult to ascertain whether express authority has been conferred on a 
particular agent.  Express authority can be delegated by means of, for example, 
the Memorandum of Incorporation or by a resolution of the shareholders or 
directors or by a person with the authority to delegate such authority.334 
 
With implied authority the position is rather more difficult.  In Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief335 the following description of 
implied authority is quoted by the court: 
 
The rule applicable is set out in The Law of agency in South Africa by De Villiers 
and Macintosch, 2nd ed p 56: ‘Where an agent is employed to act in the course of 
his trade, business or profession as agent, he has implied authority to bind his 
principal in regard to matters which are necessary to enable him to perform the 
                                                          
330
  Delport Nuwe Ondernemingsreg 101. One of the common-law principles pertaining to 
companies that have been amended by the 2008 Act is the application of the doctrine of 
constructive notice. This doctrine has to a large extent been abolished by the Act in s 
19(4). See para 3.3.2 below. 
331
  See the discussion of “actual authority” in Ch 2 para 2.2.1 above, which is also the position 
under South African law. 
332
  Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law at 146. 
333
  South African Broadcasting Corporation v Coop 2006 2 SA 217 (SCA) 233; Zelpy 1780 
(Proprietary) Limited v Mudaly 2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [37]. 
334
  Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) at 14. 
335
  1978 2 SA 11 (T) at 14. 
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ordinary duties incidental to his position as agent, or which form part of the 
ordinary course of business transacted by that agent. 
 
Implied authority may also be  
… inferred from the acquiescence of the directors in a course of dealing inside the 
company itself.336 
 
It should be noted that implied authority constitutes actual authority and it is not 
estoppel (or ostensible authority as more commonly termed by the English 
courts).337  In Insurance Trust and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mudaliar338 the court 
stressed the importance of clearly distinguishing between implied authority and 
estoppel as it considered the law in England at that time to be in a state of 
confusion, especially as applied to companies.339  The court further stated that part 
of the confusion was seated in the fact that judges (in England) tended to use the 
same facts to conclude that there was implied authority as to conclude an 
estoppel.340  Unfortunately this confusion also appears in the judgments of South 
African courts.341 
 
I agree with Blackman et al342 and Oosthuizen343 that the view that implied 
authority may exist even where the agent exceeds his actual authority cannot, with 
respect, be correct, as implied authority is actual authority and where an official 
therefore exceeds his actual authority, he cannot have actual authority and 
                                                          
336
  Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) at 14-
15.  Also see Rosebank Television & Appliance Co (Pty) Ltd v Orbit Sales Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd 1969 1 SA 300 (T) at 303. 
337
  Coetzer v Mosenthals Ltd [1963] 3 All SA 484 (A) at 486-487; Kerr Agency 67. 
338
  1943 NPD 45 at 54 and 63 respectively. 
339
  Also see Montrose 1934 LQR 224 at 226: 
The term ‘apparent authority’ (or its synonym ‘ostensible authority’) has been used in what may 
be called an objective sense. This is due, perhaps to its confusion with ‘implied authority,’ or to 
the convenience of a distinction between ‘apparent’ and ‘actual’ authority applicable generally 
and not in a specific instance. 
340
  Insurance Trust and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mudaliar 1943 NPD 45 at 62.   
341
  See for example Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266E: 
[I]mplied authority can be inferred, when the official acting on behalf of the company purports to 
exercise an authority which that type of official usually has even though the official is exceeding 
his actual authority ... .   
 Unfortunately this view has been quoted with approval in Tuckers Land and Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14. It has also been followed in Zelpy 
1780 (Proprietary) Limited v Mudaly 2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [47]. 
342
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 fn 197. 
343
  Oosthuizen 1978 TSAR 172 at 173. 
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therefore also not implied authority.344  The third party may, however, be 
successful in relying on estoppel, provided that he is able to prove all its elements. 
The usual authority of an agent or representative can be described as the authority 
to execute those legal acts that are normally attributable to the position of 
representatives or officers of that class.345 
 
Kerr346 warns that, since the content of usual authority is determined by custom 
and usages of trade, it is not a stagnant concept and what the courts considered 
as being usual in the past might not be usual in present circumstances. 
 
As is the case in England, usual authority cannot be regarded as an independent 
type of authority in the law of agency in South Africa.  Usual authority only serves 
to ascertain whether actual or ostensible authority was present.347  It also assists 
in determining whether the Turquand rule finds application.348 
 
If the representative does not have the necessary authority or if he exceeds his 
authority, the principal (company) will usually not be bound.  In such an instance 
the principal will only be liable at common law in one of the following three 
instances:349 
a) If, after the conclusion of the contract, the principal supplements the lack of 
authority by ratifying or confirming it.  The agent is thereby ex post facto 
clothed with the necessary authority and the position is as if he initially had 
the necessary authority; or 
b) Through the operation of the Turquand Rule; or 
c) If the principal has represented that the representative has the necessary 
authority and that the extent thereof is wider than what it really was.  In this 
instance the principal’s liability is founded on estoppel;350 
 
  
                                                          
344
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 fn 197; Oosthuizen 1978 TSAR 172 at 173. 
345
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 45.  
346
  Kerr Agency 71. 
347
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 16. For a discussion of usual authority, see Ch 2 para 2.2.1 
above. 
348
  See para 3.2.2 below. 
349
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 13. 
350
  Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 6. 
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3.2.2 Doctrine of constructive notice and the Turquand rule 
 
The doctrine of constructive notice, as developed by the English courts, was taken 
over by South African law.351  Historically the Turquand rule was introduced and 
developed by the English courts due to the operation of the doctrine of 
constructive notice applicable to companies.352  The Turquand rule has also been 
taken over from England by South African law.353 
 
The Turquand rule provides that a third party (outsider) negotiating with a 
company in good faith is entitled to assume that the internal management354 and 
procedures required by the articles of that company have properly taken place.355  
 
The Turquand rule amends the normal principles of agency.356  This rule operates 
in favour of the contracting third party (outsider) against the company.  The courts 
have applied this rule within certain boundaries, although the application of these 
boundaries is still uncertain.357  The circumstances where the Turquand rule does 
not find application, listed in Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd,358 were later 
confirmed as still reflecting the current legal position.359  Some of the aspects of 
the application of the Turquand rule are discussed below. 
                                                          
351
  The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A) 845; Potchefstroom se Stadsraad v 
Kotze [1960] 3 All SA 402 (A); Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W). 
The doctrine of constructive notice has, however, effectively been abolished under South 
African law, save for, inter alia, so-called “ring-fenced” companies. See para 3.3.2 below. 
See paras 2.2.2 and 2.3 of Ch 2 above for the position regarding this doctrine in English 
law. 
352
  See para 2.2.2 in Ch 2 above for a discussion on the origin and content of the rule. 
353
  Paddon and Brock Ltd v Nathan 1906 TS 158; Legg & Co v Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 
132; The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A); Farren v Sun Service SA 
Photo Trip Management (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 146 (C) to name but a few. In Wolpert v 
Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 261 the Turquand rule was also accepted 
as follows: 
South African law has adopted the ‘rule in Royal British Bank v Turquand,’ viz. that a person 
dealing with a corporation is bound by the terms of the statutes or constitution governing its 
contractual power, but that the necessary acts of internal management of the corporation are 
presumed to have been performed. 
354
  Also known as the indoor management. 
355
  Sealy and Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials 117; Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210 at 
210. 
356
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 124. 
357
  Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 10. See Ch 2 para 2.2.2 above for the boundaries within which 
the South African courts have also applied the Turquand rule. 
358
  1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266. 
359
  Quintessence Opportunities Ltd v BLRT Investments Ltd; BLRT Investments Ltd v Grand 
Parade Investments Ltd [2008] 1 All SA 67 (C) 74. 
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3.2.2.1 Persons (bodies) representing the company360 
 
The board is the organ of the company which is normally vested with full authority 
on matters that fall within the powers of the company.361  It is usual that the board 
possesses these powers and insofar as the application of the Turquand rule is 
concerned, no further investigation is undertaken into the bona fides of the third 
party if he contracts with the board.362  Usually these cases do not present any 
problems and the Turquand rule will find application.363  In larger companies, 
however, a third party would usually not deal with the board but with one of its 
delegates and it is here where most of the problems occur. 
 
Usually the board of directors delegates wide authority and powers to the 
managing director.  It has become usual that a third party contracting with the 
company in good faith may assume that the managing director possesses all of 
the authority which, in terms of the articles, may be delegated to him364 and which 
is not of such an extraordinary nature so as to put the third party on inquiry.365 
                                                          
360
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.2 bounday (iv). 
361
  Van Dorsten Company Directors at 153. The third party could therefore under the 1973 
Companies Act assume that the board could exercise all powers which could be delegated 
to it in terms of the articles ‒ Cilliers et al Company Law at 124; Oosthuizen 1978 TSAR 
172 at 173-174. For the position of the board under the Companies Act of 2008, see para 
3.3.1 below. 
362
  In Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 265 it is stated: 
The board is ordinarily the organ of a company vested with plenary authority on matters intra 
vires the company. There is therefore no difficulty in applying the Turquand rule in cases where 
the board has contracted. 
This judgment was delivered in terms of the 1973 Companies Act. Section 34 of the 1973 
Companies Act provided that a company shall have plenary powers, including the 
common-law powers as stipulated in Schedule 2 to the Act, to enable it to achieve its main 
and ancillary objects. Usually the articles of a company provided that the directors may 
exercise all the powers of the company which are not restricted to the company in general 
meeting. 
363
  The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327; 119 ER 886; The Mineworkers’ 
Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A) (where it was not the board that acted but an institution 
within a union akin to a board of directors); Mahony v East Holyford Mining Co Ltd (1874-
75) LR 7 (HL) 869. 
364
  Acutt v Seta Prospecting & Development Co Ltd 1907 TS 799 at 816; Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) at 14-15; Van Dorsten 
Company Directors 154; Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 38; Oosthuizen 1978 TSAR 172 
at 174. This was the case under the Companies Act of 1973, where the board could only 
delegate authority if authorised thereto in the company’s articles. As the authority of the 
board under the Companies Act of 2008 is original, the board does not need to be 
authorised by the articles in order to delegate its authority. See para 3.3.1.2 below in this 
regard. 
365
  In terms of, for example, Paddon and Brock Ltd. v Nathan 1906 TS 158. 
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The courts have, however, held that the Turquand rule would not find application 
where an ordinary director acts on behalf of a company.  An ordinary director does 
not have the authority, solely on the basis of his directorship, to bind the company 
as a director,366 as he is not, in that capacity, an agent of the company.367  Here 
the importance of distinguishing between the powers contained in the articles and 
the means used to exercise these powers become more obvious.  In terms of the 
doctrine of constructive notice a third party would be presumed to know that, for 
example, any one of the directors may be authorised to act in a particular 
transaction by means of a resolution of the board.  The third party would, however, 
not know whether the authority has indeed been granted by the board to the 
particular director that he is dealing with, in other words, whether the particular 
director has been selected as the means through which the company exercises 
the power.  The outsider will therefore have to prove that the ordinary director had 
either actual authority, or that an appearance of authority has been created by the 
company whereby the company can be estopped from denying authority.368 
 
It is possible that in a small private company one of the only two directors has 
usual authority to manage the company.369  In big companies it may even be a risk 
to assume that individual directors may perform administrative acts.  In this regard 
Claassen J in Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd declared: 
 
… the position of an ordinary director may vary from company to company.  In 
some companies, particularly in large public companies, he usually only attends 
board meetings, and only takes part in the decisions of the board, but he takes no 
part in the internal running of the affairs of the company. In other companies again, 
and that is often true of private companies, the ordinary director besides attending 
board meetings, also takes an active part in the day to day running of the affairs of 
the company. If that is the case, he may also have some managerial functions 
…370 
 
It would therefore be wise for a third party to not rely on any usual authority of an 
individual director, but to ascertain whether such director has actual authority to 
                                                          
366
  Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266-267; Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 216-217; Rosebank Television & Appliance Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Orbit Sales Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1969 1 SA 300 (T). 
367
  Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 216. 
368
  Leveson Company Directors 99. 
369
  Rosebank Television & Appliance Co (Pty) Ltd v Orbit Sales Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1969 1 
SA 300 (T). If there is only one director he would of course have authority to contract on 
behalf of the company – Milne v Fabric House (Pty) Ltd 1957 3 SA 63 (W). 
370
  1961 2 SA 257 (W) at 267. 
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enter into the contract on behalf of the company.371  As the usual authority of a 
director is limited in extent and has an uncertain content, a third party would only 
be entitled to rely on the Turquand rule in highly exceptional instances.372 
 
It could be that the required authority was delegated to the director, but that the 
actual exercise of that authority has been made subject to compliance with some 
or other internal formalities.  In such an instance, the Turquand rule may be relied 
on.373 
 
In respect of company secretaries, it would seem that their position in the 
company has changed and the English courts have also supported the view that a 
company secretary would be authorised to conclude contracts that relate to 
administrative issues on behalf of the company.374  The question whether our 
courts would follow the English courts was, however, left open in Tucker’s Land 
and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief.375 
 
Henochsberg376 states that the mere fact that a person holds the office of a 
secretary can never imply that the board of directors delegated some of their 
powers to such secretary for any purpose and that such secretary has been 
                                                          
371
  See ch 2 para 2.2.2 above where one of the boundaries within which the Turquand rule 
finds application is that the representative had to act within his usual authority. 
372
  Welgedacht Exploration Co Ltd v Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Investment Co Ltd 1909 TH 
90;  Strathsomars Estate Co Ltd v Nel 1953 2 SA 254 (E); Marshall Industrials Ltd v Khan 
1959 4 SA 684 (N). 
373
  Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) at 14-
15; Hosken Employee Benefits (Pty) Ltd v Slabe 1992 4 SA 183 (W) at 190; Blackman et al 
Commentary ch 4 38. 
374
  Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 3 All ER 
16 (CA).  In this case, at Denning MR stated at 19: 
He is an officer of the company with extensive duties and responsibilities. This appears not only 
in the modern Companies Acts, but also by the role which he plays in the day-to-day business 
of companies.  He is no longer a mere clerk. He regularly makes representations on behalf of 
the company and enters into contracts on its behalf which come within the day-to-day running of 
the company’s business. So much so that he may be regarded as held out as having authority 
to do such things on behalf of the company. He is certainly entitled to sign contracts connected 
with the administrative side of the company’s affairs, such as employing staff, and ordering cars, 
and so forth. All such matters now come within the ostensible authority of a company’s 
secretary. 
Also see Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 146-147. 
375
  1978 2 SA 11 (T) at 17. In Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v 
Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) at 17 reference is made to Strathsomars Estate Co Ltd v Nel 
1953 2 SA 254  (E) wherein Reynolds J applied the dictum of Bowen LJ in Newlands v 
National Employers Accident Association Ltd 53 LT 224 where the authority of a secretary 
of a company was considered and where the duties were said to be “clerical and ministerial 
and beyond that it is a question of fact in each case what his duties are.” 
376
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 99. 
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authorised to act in any type of contract merely because he is the secretary.  
According to Henochsberg a secretary is merely an employee of the company and 
the circumstances of each case will dictate whether such secretary had authority 
(either express or implied actual authority or ostensible authority).  Although stated 
in respect of actual or ostensible authority, this principle can also be used to 
ascertain what the usual authority of the secretary is in the application of the 
Turquand rule. 
 
If rules are laid down as to whether the Turquand rule may find application in every 
situation by looking at the type of person who represented the company, the law 
will be developed in a casuistic manner.  It would be better to apply the boundaries 
referred to above to determine whether the third party would be able to hold the 
company bound to the contract.  To exclude the application of the Turquand rule 
where ordinary directors or persons of lower rank have represented the company, 
relates directly to the fact that only bona fide third parties are entitled to the 
protection of the Turquand rule and that the rule does not find application where 
the third party has been placed on inquiry.  Individual directors and persons with 
lower rank usually do not have the authority to contract on behalf of the 
company.377 
 
3.2.2.2 Persons entitled to rely on the Turquand rule 
 
As regards the person who may rely on the Turquand rule, the general view is that 
only outsiders will be entitled to use the common-law Turquand rule and that 
persons connected to the company (insiders) are not protected by this rule.378  
                                                          
377
  This falls under the boundary that the representative had to act within his usual authority.  
See Ch 2, para 2.2.2 above. The courts, for example regard a chairman as in the same 
position as an ordinary director and a third party dealing with such a director  without actual 
authority from the  board or the managing director, does so at his own peril ‒ Wolpert v 
Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266. The chairman of the board 
of directors is however one of the most important sources of legally binding decisions taken 
at board meetings. If he therefore presents a resolution from the minute book of a meeting 
of directors to a third party in terms of which he is authorised to contract on behalf of the 
company, the third party may rely on such resolution and can hold the company bound to 
the contract ‒ Goode, Durrant and Murray Ltd v Hewitt and Cornell 1961 4 SA 286 (N) 289. 
378
  In Mahony v The East Holyford Mining Company (1874-75) LR 7 (HL) 869 at 894 the 
Turquand rule was intentionally connected with dealings with a company and “persons 
external to the company”. In County of Gloucester Bank v Rudry Merthyr Steam & House 
Coal Colliery Co [1895] 1 Ch 629 (CA) 633 reference is made to the “outside person” who 
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Since the English decisions in Howard v Patent Ivory Manufaturing Co379 and 
Morris v Kanssen380 the common-law position in respect of the Turquand rule was 
generally accepted as not being available to directors as they have a duty to 
ensure that the management of the company takes place in the prescribed 
manner. 
 
This position was changed by the judgment  in Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd381 
which distinguished the Howard and Kanssen cases from the case at hand by 
indicating that in the former two cases the director was not only the contracting 
third party but also the director of the company representing the company and was 
therefore considered to be an insider.  In the Hely-Hutchinson case the court was 
of the opinion that where a director only acted in his capacity as a contracting third 
party and the company was represented by somebody else, he should not be 
regarded as an insider and should still be entitled to benefit from the Turquand 
rule.382 
 
The approach in Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd383 is, however, criticised by 
several writers.384  Other writers,385 however, accept the exposition of the court as 
                                                                                                                                                                                
may rely on the Turquand rule; Morris v Kanssen [1946] 1 All ER 586 (HL) 592. Also see 
Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 40; McLennan 1979 SALJ 329 at 352. 
379
  (1888) LR 38 Ch D 156. 
380
  [1946] 1 All ER 586 (HL). 
381
  [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) per Roskill J. 
382
  At 567. It should be noted that in this case, following Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park 
Properties (Mangal) Ltd [964] 2 QB 480 (CA), the Turquand rule was confused with 
estoppel and the two doctrines were intermingled. 
383
  [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA). 
384
  According to Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 176, such a view would be in conflict with the 
Turquand rule, because if the director knew from his position as director that there were 
internal irregularities he would not be bona fide anymore. The Turquand rule should not 
operate in favour of persons who form part of the management body of the company as 
these persons have access to the internal management of the company. Such a person 
has the means to ascertain the position regarding the internal management irrespective in 
which capacity he is acting (as director or as third contracting party). The view of 
Oosthuizen is supported by McLennan, with qualification, however. McLennan 1979 SALJ 
329 at 354 states that:  
Whilst I would agree that this [the approach of Oosthuizen] is the better approach, one should 
not lose sight of the fact that some irregularities may be so well hidden that they would be 
extremely difficult to uncover. For instance, the authority to enter into a particular transaction 
may have been conferred by a resolution passed many years ago; it may be difficult, if not 
actually impossible, for a recently appointed director to discover, for example, that the notice 
convening the meeting had been defective or that a proper quorum had not been present. Such 
difficulties would be aggravated where minutes and other documents had been falsified by a 
previous management. In such circumstances a director ought not to be prejudiced: it is 
submitted, therefore, that the rule ought to be that a director is obligated to take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that internal regulations have been complied with; should he take such steps 
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the correct position.  According to Du Plessis,386 being an insider should not be 
made one of the exceptions to the Turquand rule when its application is excluded.  
The question whether the Turquand rule may be applied in such an instance 
should be whether there existed circumstances whereunder it could have been 
expected from the third party to investigate further whether the internal 
requirement has been complied with and whether he did indeed investigate further 
or not.  In other words, the usual exception to the Turquand rule, being placed on 
inquiry due to suspicious circumstances, should be applied.  I endorse this 
approach by Du Plessis.  If the third contracting party is a director then that will 
form part of the circumstances in determining whether he has been put on inquiry.  
It can therefore be agreed with Henochsberg387 that in principle a director would 
also be able to rely on the Turquand rule, but that it would be very difficult for such 
director not to be regarded as having been put on inquiry as a consequence of 
which the rule would not be available to him anymore. 
 
3.2.2.3 Exercising powers for an improper purpose 
 
In Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation388 the court 
held389 that it is implied in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and still fail to find the irregularity or if, in any event, he would not reasonably have suspected 
the existence of the irregularity, he should not be liable for the consequences.   
385
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-14; Baiketlile Corporate Capacity 16 fn 50; 
Girvin, Frisby and Hudson Charlesworths’ Company Law 124. Compare, however, Griffin 
Company Law 123; Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3058; Pennington Pennington’s 
Company Law 144.  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 178 adds that if it is the duty 
of the director to have knowledge of the real position, he would not be entitled to rely on the 
Turquand rule. 
386
  Du Plessis Grondslae 70. 
387
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(3).  See para 3.3.4.1 below for the position of 
insiders and outsiders in the application of section 20(7) of the Companies Act 2008. 
388
  [1986] Ch 246 CA 292 to 293. 
389
  Slade LJ followed In Re David Payne & Co Ltd [1904] 2 Ch 608 (CA).  In the David Payne 
case the court held that the loan by the company (which was represented by a director) 
was not invalid due to the fact that the director intended to use the money for a purpose not 
authoritsed by the constitution of the company, as the third party did not have any 
knowledge of such intention of the director. The court held (at 613, per Buckley J and at 
617 per Romer LJ) that a person who lends money to a company, where the constitution 
provides for a general power to borrow, limited only that it should be done for the purposes 
of the company’s business, is not bound to inquire to what purpose the borrowing company 
is about to apply the borrowed money.  In In re Jon Beauforte (London) Ltd [1953] Ch 131 
the court held that a transaction where coke (fuel) was purchased by the company was 
void as the coke was purchased for a purpose other than for the business of the company 
and the contracting third party knew this.  In In Re Introductions Ltd, Introductions Ltd v 
National Provincial Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 199 the court held that where money borrowed by 
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directors can only exercise their powers on behalf of the company if it is for 
purposes of the company’s business.390  If the third contracting party therefore 
knew that the board exceeded the authority conferred on them by the company by 
entering into a transaction for purposes other than the company’s corporate 
purpose (in other words for an improper purpose) he or she cannot rely on the 
Turquand rule and hold the company liable.  On the other hand, if the third party 
did not have any knowledge that the directors exercised their authority for an 
improper purpose, they would be able to rely on the Turquand rule and assume 
that the directors were acting properly and regularly in the internal management of 
its affairs by exercising their powers for the purpose of the company’s business.391  
The court further stated that if the third party is able to prove all the elements of 
estoppel, he can also hold the company liable on estoppel under these 
circumstances.392 
 
Blackman393 does not agree with the reasoning of the court in the Rolled Steel 
Products case.394  Although he agrees that the company should be held bound, he 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the company are to be used for a purpose not authorised by the objects of the company, 
the company would be bound to the contract. In this case the bank did not have knowledge 
of the unauthorised purposes for which the monies were to be used and the contract was 
therefore held to be valid and binding. 
 
From the above cases the following rule transpired, namely that the knowledge of the 
contracting third party of the purpose for which the director enters into the transaction 
determines whether a transaction is ultra vires or not. I agree with Blackman 1990 SA Merc 
LJ 1 at 2 that such a rule causes confusion and is uncertain. It seems as though an ultra 
vires act (beyond the capacity of the company) is confused with the authority of the 
directors to act. 
390
  The court held that a transaction is not ultra vires the company just because the directors 
were acting for a purpose not authorised by the objects clause of the company. To 
ascertain whether a transaction is ultra vires, an objective test is used, in other words it 
should be determined whether the transaction is capable of being performed as  
reasonably incidental to the attainment or pursuit of any of its express objects, unless such act 
is expressly prohibited by the memorandum (at 287). 
It would be a matter of interpretation to ascertain whether a particular act falls within the 
capacity of the company or not. It might, however, happen that, although the transaction is 
intra vires the company, the directors acted for an improper purpose in other words not for 
the purpose of the business of the company. Although the directors in such an instance are 
in breach of their fiduciary duty towards the company, they also act beyond their authority. 
As a part of internal management, a contracting third party can therefore assume that the 
directors of the (for example, borrowing) company were acting properly and regularly in the 
internal management of its affairs and were acting (for example, borrowing) for purposes of 
the company’s business. 
391
  Even if there is an express requirement in the constitution of the company that the power is 
only exercisable for purposes of the company’s business, the third party is not put on 
inquiry ‒ per Browne-Wilkinson LJ at 306. 
392
  At 292. 
393
  Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 12  
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is of the view that the basis for liability can be neither estoppel395 nor the Turquand 
rule.396  If the directors exercise their powers for an unauthorised purpose, so he 
reasons, they are in breach of their fiduciary duty but they do not act beyond their 
powers: they just abuse their powers.397  According to him, such a transaction 
would be binding on the company, except if the third party knew of the fact that the 
directors acted for an improper purpose, in which event the transaction would be 
voidable at the option of the company.398 
 
Blackman399 explores the basis of the generally accepted principle in agency law 
that the liability of a principal (including a company) is not affected by the unknown 
motives of his agent (including directors of a company).  He refers to two theories 
in this regard: 
 
The first theory is that where an agent (director) acts for an improper purpose (in 
other words not for the purposes of the business of his or her principal or for his or 
her own personal interest), the transaction concluded by the agent would be 
beyond the authority of such agent (or director) and would therefore be void.  The 
third party may under these circumstances rely on estoppel or the Turquand rule 
to hold the principal (company) bound to the transaction. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
394
  [1986] Ch 246 CA at 292-293. 
395
  Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 12-13: 
If the third party is to rely on ostensible authority in this situation, he will have to establish not 
that the company represented that its directors had authority to do ‘anything which its 
memorandum of assocation expressly or impliedly empowered the company to do’, but that it 
represented that its directors had authority to act for purposes not authorised by its 
memorandum. 
396
  Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 14: 
In Contemporary Refrigeration (Pty) Ltd Miller J said, correctly, that ‘the rule in Turquand’s case 
may not strictly be applicable’. In truth, it is not applicable at all. The rule in Turquand’s case 
merely provides that a person dealing with a company may assume that the internal formalities 
of the company’s constitution have been complied with. To state the obvious, failure on the part 
of directors to act for the purposes authorised by their company’s memorandum is not a failure 
on the company’s part to comply with the internal formalities prescribed by its constitution. 
 Also see Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 51.  
397
  Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 10.  Blackman distinguishes the situation where the 
directors do not act with authority, which would mean that the directors act in excess of 
their authority as opposed to the situation where the directors abuse their powers in which 
event they do not act in excess of their authority. 
398
  See Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 15 and the cases cited there. Also see Blackman et 
al Commentary ch 4 51. 
399
  Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 11. 
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The second theory, which Blackman supports, entails that although a transaction 
entered into for an improper purpose is in excess of the authority of the agent 
(director of a company), it is not beyond the powers of such agent (director).  The 
transaction would therefore be binding on the principal (company).  Where the 
contracting third party has, however, notice of the fact that the transaction was 
concluded for an improper purpose, such contract would be voidable at the 
instance of the principal (company).400 
 
Support for the first theory can be found in court cases401 like Paddon and Brock 
Ltd v Nathan,402  Harcourt v Eastman,403  Contemporary Refrigeration (Pty) Ltd (In 
Liquidation) v Leites and Sonpoll Investments (Pty) Ltd,404 Jones v John Barr & Co 
(Pty) Ltd405 and AL Underwood Limited v Bank of Liverpool and Martins.406 
 
The reasons why Blackman407 supports the second theory, save for the fact that 
the great weigth of authority supports it,408 are that it provides an acceptable 
justification for bona fide third parties to be unaffected by improper purposes of 
directors, that it leads to a more fair result to the effect that male fide third parties 
cannot rely on invalidity of transactions unless avoided by the company and that it 
places the duty of directors to act for the purpose of the company’s business within 
the fiduciary duties of directors.  Blackman et al409 are of the opinion that an 
objective test should be used to determine whether the directors acted within the 
scope of their authority.  The subjective motive of the directors (for example the 
purposes for which they intend to use the money that they are borrowing on behalf 
of the company) does not detract from the fact that it is within their powers to 
borrow money on behalf of the company. 
 
                                                          
400
  Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 11. 
401
  In the majority of these cases the courts were of the view that the basis upon which the 
company could be bound under these circumstances would be on estoppel. One or two of 
the cases also referred to the Turquand rule. 
402
  1906 TS 158 at 164. 
403
  1953 2 SA 424 (N) at 429. 
404
  1967 2 SA 388 (D) at 391-393. 
405
  1967 3 SA 292 (W) at 302-303. 
406
  [1924] 1 KB 775 at 785-787 per Bankes LJ, at 791-792 per Scrutton LJ, and at 796 per 
Atkin LJ. 
407
  Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 16. 
408
  For a list of cases that supports this view, see Blackman 1990 SA Merc LJ 1 at 15 fn 80. 
409
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 51. 
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3.2.2.4 Forgeries410 
 
Since the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 1906 in Ruben v Great Fingall 
Consolidated411 it is accepted that the Turquand rule does not find application in 
cases of forgery.412  If someone therefore forged the signature of the director or 
secretary on company documents, the company cannot be held bound by a third 
party relying on the Turquand rule.413 
 
No definition has been given for “forgery”.  The circumstances of the case where 
Lord Loreburn stated that the Turquand rule could not be applied were where the 
signatures of the directors were counterfeited by the secretary.  The English courts 
have, however, extended the application of the term “forgery” to more than just 
where a person would be guilty of the crime forgery, and used it in a wider sense 
than just the forgery of another person’s signature by accepting the instance 
where the signature of the representative is authentic (genuine) but was affixed 
without authority and for a fraudulent purpose (genuine but fraudulent cases) as 
well as where the signature of the representative is genuine and innocently affixed 
but without actual authority (genuine and innocent cases).414 
 
I question whether forgery can be so widely interpreted.  It would mean that most 
unauthorised acts where documents are involved, would amount to a forgery and 
take away the protection of the third party.  Some English writers are of the view 
that it would be a misuse of the word “forgery” to regard it as a forgery where the 
representative attached his own signature to a document although he did not have 
                                                          
410
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.2, boundary (v) above. 
411
  [1906] AC 439 (HL). 
412
  Accepted with approval in Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA) 
831 and confirmed in Uxbridge Permanent Benefit Building Society v Pickard [1939] 2 All 
ER 344 at 350.  Also see Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 41; Rabie Verteenwoordiging 
173; Thompson (1959) UTLJ 248 at 274. 
413
  It is possible that the company may be bound on grounds of estoppel. In the present case, 
however, the company did not hold out the secretary as having authority to do anything 
more than the mere delivering of a share certificate, which was properly executed. Also see 
Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 187-188 and Millett et al Gore-Browne on 
Companies at 8-26. 
414
  Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 (CA); South London 
Greyhound Racecourses Ltd v Wake [1931] 1 Ch 496. Also see Blackman Commentary ch 
4 41. 
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authority to do so and thereby characterise this (his own) signature as a forgery.415  
They are further of the opinion that forgeries should not be treated as a special 
rule but that the normal principles of agency should be applied (ie lack of either 
actual or ostensible authority).416  According to the general principles of agency, 
fraudulent acts (including forgeries)417 may bind the principal if the agent acts 
within his ostensible authority.418 
 
To regard it as a forgery in all cases where a representative, without the necessary 
authority, places his signature on a document and to exclude the applicability of 
the Turquand rule in such a case would, according Oosthuizen419 be a ludicrous 
and an unnecessary interference on the worthiness of the outsider to be protected.  
It is in these cases where the third party needs the protection most.  The matter 
should therefore be dealt with in a more acceptable manner within the existing 
boundaries of the Turquand rule, without adding forgery as a further exception.420 
 
Other South African writers421 are of the opinion that the Turquand rule should only 
be excluded in the instance where someone else’s signature is forged and not 
when a person without authority attaches his own signature to a document in 
accordance with the decision in the Ruben’s case.422  This is also the position in 
                                                          
415
  Pennnington Pennington’s Company Law 139;  Birds et at Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 
188  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-26. 
416
  Birds et al Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 188; Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-
26; Pennington Penningston’s Company Law 139-140. According to Thompson 1959 UTJL 
248 at 273 and further, a company may be held bound by estoppel in cases of forgeries, 
but the Turquand rule cannot apply in such cases. 
417
  Forgeries are not treated differently from other fraudulent acts – Uxbridge Building Society 
v Pickard [1939] 2 All ER 344 (CA). 
418
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-26. Also see Northside Developments Pty Ltd v 
Registrar-General [1990] HCA 32 [17] per Mason CJ:   
It may be, as Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, 4
th
 ed. (1979), suggests (at pp204-
205), that forgery is not a true exception to the rule in Turquand’s Case and that the cases are 
capable of explanation on the footing either that the forged document was not put forward as 
genuine by an officer acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority or that the third 
party was put upon inquiry … . For purposes of the present case it is not necessary to resolve 
this question because it is possible to decide the case on the basis that forgery is not an 
exception to the rule. However, it will become apparent from what follows later in these reasons 
that, if there is a forgery exception, it has a limited area of operation. 
419
  Oosthuizen Turquand-Reël 285. 
420
  Oosthuizen Turquand-Reël 285. 
421
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 at 42. 
422
  Ruben v Great Fingall Consolidated [1906] AC 439 (HL). 
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Australia where the proposition in the Kredit Bank and South London cases were 
considered, but rejected.423 
 
It appears that this aspect has not yet been considered by South Africa courts and 
if it should, the South African courts would most probably follow the English courts, 
which would lead to similar confusion.424  
 
I submit that the view of Oosthuizen should be followed.  In other words, forgeries 
should not exclude the operation of the Turquand rule.  The established 
boundaries within which the Turquand rule operates would sufficiently provide a 
balance between the third party on the one hand and the company and its 
shareholders on the other.  Should the courts not approve of such a view, it is 
hoped that the court would then at least follow the view of Blackman425 and limit 
the exclusion of the Turquand rule only to those instances where there was a 
counterfeit signature by the agent. 
 
3.2.2.5 Turquand v estoppel 
 
The English courts have confused the Turquand rule and estoppel, regarding the 
former as merely a form of estoppel.  This intermingling of the Turquand rule and 
estoppel also affected South African writers426 and courts.427  The Turquand rule 
                                                          
423
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 at 42. 
424
  Oosthuizen Turquand-Reël 282; Rabie Verteenwoordiging 174 mentions Oranje Benefit 
Society v Central Merchant Bank Ltd 1976 4 SA 659 (A) as a South African case where it 
appears at first glance to involve a forgery.  The secretary, who was the principal executive 
officer, and the chairman of the executive committee of the Oranje Benefit Society wrote a 
letter to the bank and signed the letter with their own signatures, quoting the resolution of 
the society to stand surety for the debt of one Grundling, when in fact such resolution had 
been rescinded by a subsequent resolution of the executive committee of the society.  In 
the same letter they also confirmed that they had the power, as chairman and secretary of 
the society to sign documents on behalf of the society. They subsequently also signed a 
document in terms of which the society stood surety for the indebtedness of Grundling to 
the bank. In this instance, however, the Bank sued the society for damages in delict 
because it was misled and induced by the misrepresentation of the secretary and chairman 
and the Turquand rule was not mentioned.  The facts can in any event not be seen as 
representing a “forgery” in the narrow sense as discussed above. 
425
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 42. 
426
  Du Plessis Grondslae 203 fn 115; According to Fourie the position in South Africa 
regarding estoppel and the Turquand rule is not clear. See Fourie 1992 TSAR 1 at 3 and 
his references to the court cases. 
427
  See for example the comment of Claassen J in Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 
2 SA 257 (W) 264. 
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should, however, be seen as an independent rule.  Support for this is found in 
England428 and South Africa.429  Although the appeal court in South Africa 
confirmed that the Turquand rule is an independent rule,430 the risk exists that 
South African courts would apply the rule as an appearance form of estoppel.  In a 
recent constitutional court decision the minority, for example, referred with 
approval to One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings 
(Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as intervening creditor),431 where it is stated that “[i]t has 
been said that the Turquand rule of company law is merely an application of 
estoppel.”432   This risk is not far-fetched at all in light of the recent majority 
decision of the highest court of South Africa where the court confused principles of 
representation where there had not even been confusion about it before.433  To 
avoid this risk and to create certainty regarding the boundaries within which the 
Turquand rule finds application, Rabie suggested, before the promulgation of the 
Companies Act of 2008, that the repeal of the common-law doctrines of estoppel 
and the Turquand rule and its replacement with statutory counterparts in South 
Africa can resolve this problem.434   Although section 20(7) of the Companies Act 
2008 introduced, what appears to be a statutory Turquand rule, it differs from the 
common-law rule. The rule was not repealed and this only adds to the confusion 
regarding its interpretation and its integration with the common-law Turquand 
rule.435  Furthermore, the Companies Act of 2008 does not deal with estoppel, with 
the result that the common law also still applies in this regard. 
 
It is imperative that these two rules should be distinguished from one another, 
although they complement each other.  There are far more requirements to prove 
                                                          
428
  Millett et al Gore-Browne on Companies 8-14; Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 
130. 
429
  Farren v Sun Service SA Photo Trip Management (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 146 (C) 157; The 
Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A); Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade 
Corporate Law 192; Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 at 47; Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1; Du 
Plessis 1997 SA Merc LJ 281 at 295-306; Rabie Verteenwoordiging 164. 
430
  The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A). 
431
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [25]. 
432
  See, for example, Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [110], referring to One 
Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as 
intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [25], where it is stated that 
[i]t has been said that the Turquand rule of company law is merely an application of estoppel.
 
 
433
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC). See para 3.2.3.7 below for a discussion 
of the confusion regarding ostensible authority and estoppel. 
434
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 167.   
435
  See para 3.3.4 below. 
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for a successful plea of estoppel than when relying on the Turquand rule.  There 
may, however, be instances where both the Turquand rule and the doctrine of 
estoppel may find application.  In such instance the two principles should not be 
seen as being in conflict with one another, but rather as two doctrines 
complementing/supplementing each other.436  The third party would in other words 
have a choice between relying on the Turquand rule or proving the requirements 
of estoppel in holding a company bound to a contract.  It would be easier for the 
third party to comply with the fewer requirements of theTurquand rule in such a 
case. Should the third party not be able to comply with the requirements and 
boundaries of the Turquand rule, he would still be able to rely on estoppel if he is 
able to comply with all its requirements.   
 
3.2.2.6 Extension of the Turquand rule to other bodies 
 
The application of the Turquand rule has been extended to bodies, other than 
companies, for example municipalities and unions.437 
 
3.2.3 Estoppel 
 
As the field of estoppel is very wide, the focus in this study is limited to the 
circumstances where a company representative (agent) has exceeded his 
authority.  Although the estoppel doctrine is not limited to company law, only its 
effect on company law will be discussed. 
 
The earliest decisions in South Africa in this regard were based on the Roman law, 
although the courts acknowledged that the application of English law on estoppel 
would have had the same result.438  In later decisions, the appeal court of South 
Africa applied the principles of English law regarding estoppel in South Africa.439  
In Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen the court found that the doctrine of 
estoppel in South Africa and in England is not the same and that the English 
                                                          
436
  Du Plessis Grondslae 175-176. 
437
  For an indepth discussion of the extension of the Turquand rule, see Oosthuizen 
Turquand-reël 318-341. 
438
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 200.  
439
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 202. 
- 72 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
“estoppel by representation” could not merely be taken over from England, 
although it may be used as an aid.440  Its development in South Africa has taken 
place against the background of our own legal system.441  Although English case 
law must therefore be treated with great caution, use may be made of English 
judgments. 
 
Estoppel is a fairness principle that operates when it would be unreasonable if the 
principal (estoppel denier) would be permitted to rely on the true situation which 
does not correspond with the representation that he has made, if the third party 
(estoppel raiser) relied on such representation to his detriment.442  It is said that a 
person has ostensible authority (also known as agency by estoppel or estoppel by 
representation or the holding out of authority) where that person does not have 
actual authority to bind the company but the company is prevented (estopped) 
from denying the authority.443  Being a fairness principle, its aim is to prevent 
unreasonable unfairness.444 
 
In certain instances, ostensible authority may overlap with implied authority and 
may be applicable to the same set of facts,445 but these concepts must be clearly 
distinguished from one another.446  In the case of implied authority, the agent has 
actual authority to act on behalf of the company whilst in the case of ostensible 
authority, no actual authority exists, but the company holds the representative out 
                                                          
440
  1964 3 SA 402 (A). For a full discussion on the origin of estoppel, see Rabie 
Verteenwoordiging 199-206. 
441
  Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 2 
SA 47 (T) 49. 
442
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 3. 
443
  Big Dutchman (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1979 3 SA 267 (W) 
284; Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 
503. 
444
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 3. 
445
  NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) at 411; Glofinco v ABSA 
Bank Ltd t/a United Bank 2002 6 SA 470 (SCA) 481 and the minority judgment at 492);  
Randcoal Services Ltd v Randgold and Exploration Co Ltd 1998 4 SA 825 (SCA) 841; 
Coetzer v Mosenthals Ltd [1963] 3 All SA 484 (A) 486-487; 1963 4 SA 22 (AD) at 23-24; 
Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14-15; 
Inter-Continental Finance and Leasing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Stands 56 and 57 Industria 
Ltd 1979 3 SA 740 (W) 747-749; Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) 
Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 502-506; [1964] 1 All ER 630 at 644-646. 
446
  Coetzer v Mosenthals Ltd [1963] 3 All SA 484 (A) 486-487; Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14-15; Inter-Continental 
Finance and Leasing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Stands 56 and 57 Industria Ltd 1979 3 SA 
740 (W) 747-749. 
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as having actual authority. 447  Unfortunately Van Zÿl J in Zelpy 1780 (Proprietary) 
Limited v Mudaly 448 makes the same error as that made in Wolpert v Uitzigt 
Properties (Pty) Ltd449 on this point by stating: 
 
[t]he implied authority of an agent ..., may be inferred in circumstances where he 
purports to exercise authority of the type which such a director usually has, even 
though he was exceeding his actual authority. 
 
It is also important to make a distinction between estoppel and the Turquand rule 
and regard them as two separate rules.450  Although these two doctrines are 
independent and distinct from one another, the courts and writers sometimes 
confused the two and regarded the Turquand rule as just an appearance form of 
estoppel.451  This resulted in the transplantation of the requirements of estoppel 
onto the Turquand rule. 
 
Two further concepts which are often distinguished but should not be, are 
ostensible authority and estoppel.  According to Oosthuizen452 the stance was 
taken that ostensible authority was not based on estoppel but on independent 
contractual principles.  Although this has led to heated differences of opinion, 
Oosthuizen contends that today it is generally accepted that ostensible authority 
and estoppel are one and the same.  Although Kerr453 still makes a distinction 
between ostensible authority and estoppel by representation, he has to admit that 
there is not yet 
 
… conclusive South African authority on the question whether or not agreement 
between the third person and the person who apparently has authority gives rise to 
a contract under which the apparent principal can both sue and be sued.454  
  
                                                          
447
  Coetzer v Mosenthals Ltd [1963] 3 All SA 484 (A) 486-487; Kerr Agency 67. 
448
  2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [49]. 
449
  1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266E. 
450
  Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 151. See par 3.2.2.5 above. 
451
  See the references in Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 8-9. Also see Northside Developments 
Pty Ltd v Registrar General [1990] HCA 32 [22]; McLennan 1979 SALJ 329 and 2009 
Obiter 144 at 147; Thompson 1959 UTLJ 248 at 255 where this view is supported. Even in 
a recent constitutional court decision, namely Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 
(CC) [110], the court refers, albeit obiter, to One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 
88 (WCC) [25], where the following is stated:  “It has been said that the Turquand Rule of 
company law is merely an application of estoppel.”  
452
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 70. 
453
  Kerr Agency 25-29. 
454
  Kerr Agency 26. 
- 74 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
This distinction has featured prominently in the recent constitutional court case of 
Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd.455  
 
This case is discussed below456 where I agree with the minority judgment in this 
case in that ostensible authority is just an appearance form of estoppel.  The 
discussion that follows therefore emanates from the view that ostensible authority 
and estoppel are the same concept. 
 
The leading case in England regarding estoppel is Freeman & Lockyer v 
Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd.457  
 
The requirements that the third contracting party must prove to be successful 
when relying on estoppel have been laid down by the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal in NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd,458 with approval of 
the Freeman case.  These requirements are:459 
a) The company must have represented (by words or conduct), that the agent 
had the necessary authority to represent the company; 
b) The representation must have been made by the company and not by the 
agent; 
c) The representation must have been in a form that the company should 
reasonably have expected that an outsider would act on the strength of it; 
d) The third party should have been induced to deal with the agent because of 
the representation (in other words, reliance on the representation by the 
third party); 
e) the reliance of the third party should have been reasonable; and 
f) the third party should have been prejudiced by the representation. 
 
                                                          
455
  2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
456
  Para 3.2.3.7 below. 
457
  [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 499. The aspects that have to be proved before a party can rely on 
estoppel by representation as set out by Diplock LJ are listed and discussed in Ch 2 para 
2.2.3.  These requirements are similar to those set out in the South African judgment in 
Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266-267. Also see Big Dutchman 
(South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd 1979 3 SA 267 (W) 282. 
458
  2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) [26]. 
459
  These essentials were also stated by Navsa JA in South African Broadcasting Corporation 
v Coop 2006 2 SA 217 (SCA) 233-234. Also see Northern Metropolitan Local Council v 
Company Unique Finance (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 SA 323 (SCA) 334. 
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When comparing the requirements laid down in the Freeman case460 with those 
listed in the NBS case,461 it seems as though the NBS case462 requires three 
further elements to be proved, namely the requirements set out under the NBS 
case463 above in (c), (e) and (f).  The Freeman case464 has a further requirement 
that is not listed in the NBS case, being the fourth requirement regarding the role 
of the memorandum and articles of association of the company.  The requirements 
under English law have been discussed in Chapter 2 above.465  Only the 
differences between the requirements laid down by the two courts will be 
discussed here. 
 
3.2.3.1 Representation of authority466 
 
In South African law it was held that although the position that the representative 
holds in the company should be taken into consideration, it is not sufficient to 
establish an estoppel.467  All the other surrounding circumstances (“trappings”) 
must also be considered.468 
 
3.2.3.2 Representation made by person with actual authority to manage the 
business469 
 
In a recent South African judgment,470 Wallis AJ, in his minority decision, 
confirmed that the representations by the agent alone, in whatever form, can never 
be sufficient to establish an estoppel.  However, he extended this statement by 
stating that:  
 
                                                          
460
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) 506 
per Diplock LJ. 
461
  NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 2002 1 SA 396 (SCA). 
462
  NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 2002 1 SA 396 (SCA). 
463
  NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 2002 1 SA 396 (SCA). 
464
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA). 
465
  Ch 2 para 2.2.3 above. 
466
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.3.1 above. 
467
  In NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) [32]; South African 
Broadcasting Corporation v Coop 2006 2 SA 217 (SCA) 236; Northern Metropolitan Local 
Council v Company Unique Finance (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 SA 323 (SCA) 339 and 340; Delport 
and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 98. 
468
  South African Broadcasting Corporation v Coop 2006 2 SA 217 (SCA) 236-237. 
469
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.3.2 above. 
470
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
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… the conduct and statements relied upon may be those of the agent, provided the 
conduct or statements are themselves within the actual or ostensible authority of 
the agent.471 
 
In other words, an agent of a company (principal) who does not have actual 
authority to make representations that another person (second agent) has 
authority, may have ostensible authority (through, for example, the conduct of the 
company placing that person in a particular position where a person in that 
position would usually have authority to make such representations) to make such 
a representation, in which event the company will be bound by the acts of the 
second agent, even though that second agent did not have actual authority to do 
the act on behalf of the company.472 
 
The approach followed by Wallis AJ is in line with the development of ostensible 
authority in England in cases such as Ebeed (trading as Egyptian International 
Foreign Trading Co) v Soplex Wholesale Supplies Ltd and P S Refson and Co Ltd 
(The Raffaella)473 and ING Re (UK) Ltd v R&V Versicherung AG referred to 
above.474 
 
This line of thought is to be welcomed.  If an agent has ostensible authority to act 
on behalf of a company and binds the company through that act, there is no 
reason why such an agent cannot have ostensible authority to make a 
representation through words or conduct that another person (second agent) has 
authority to bind the company and thereby clothing the second agent with 
ostensible authority.475 
 
  
                                                          
471
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [165] per Wallis AJ. 
472
  Wallis AJ was of the view that the Director Product Development (second agent) had 
ostensible authority to conclude the contract with the third party on behalf of Vodacom 
through a representation of the Group CEO of the holding company of Vodacom and 
Executive Chairman of the operating company, who was also clothed with ostensible 
authority to make such a representation. 
473
  [1985] BCLC 404 (CA) 
474
  [2006] EWHC 1544 (Comm). Also see AfrAsia Special Opportunities Fund (Pty) Ltd v 
Royal Anthem Investments 130 (Pty) Ltd [2016] 4 All SA 16 (WCC) [42]. 
475
  Oosthuizen 1978 TSAR 172 at 175 also shares this view. His reasoning is that as a 
managing director may on grounds of ostensible authority bind a company, he should on 
the same principle be in a position to create the appearance that some other person is 
authorised to bind the company in respect of a particular contract.  
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3.2.3.3 Culpability476 
 
This was not listed as a requirement of estoppel in the Freeman case.  In 
Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy 
Bpk477 the court stated that although estoppel has “migrated” to South Africa from 
England and guidance should be sought from English decisions, once the 
principles of estoppel had been permanently absorbed here, they tended to 
develop along lines that are specific to South Africa against the background of our 
own law.478  In Strachan v Blackbeard and Son479 one element to be complied with 
before estoppel can be founded has been stated to be that the representation had 
to be “of such nature that it could reasonably have been expected to mislead”.480  
Although this was stated obiter dictum, the court accepted it in Monzali v Smith.481 
 
The “reasonable expectation by the principal that the representation will mislead” 
was thereafter also adopted in Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike 
Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk482 and several prior cases.483  When the court 
assessed whether the representor should reasonably have expected that his 
conduct would mislead the representee, it was stated that the court should take 
into account the representor’s knowledge or ignorance of any facts that gave his 
conduct a particular significance attached to it by the representee.484  If the 
representor were ignorant of certain facts it might mean that he could not 
reasonably have expected that his conduct would mislead the representee.485 
 
                                                          
476
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.3.6 above. 
477
  1964 2 SA 47 (T) at 49 per Trollip J. 
478
  Since the first formulation of estoppel, the doctrine has undergone constant development 
even in England, according to Trollip J ‒ Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal 
Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 2 SA 47 (T) 49. 
479
  1910 AD 282. 
480
  Strachan v Blackbeard and Son 1910 AD 282 at 289. 
481
  Monzali v Smith 1929 AD 382 at 386, per Stratford JA. 
482
  1964 2 SA 47 (T) at 49. 
483
  These cases are listed in Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-
operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 2 SA 47 (T) 51. 
484
  Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 2 
SA 47 (T) 51. 
485
  Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 2 
SA 47 (T) 51. 
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In Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd486 the majority of the Court of 
Appeal found that negligence by the representor needs to be proved by the 
representee.487  Only one appeal court judge mentioned in his minority judgment 
that the appeal court did not, in the Stachan and Monzali cases, require 
negligence as an indispensable requirement for estoppel, but that the court in the 
two cases referred only to the expectation in the sense of an element of estoppel 
in the case of omission.488 
 
In NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce (Pty) Ltd489 the court applied the dictum in Hely-
Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd 490 as follows: 
 
Although an intention to mislead is not a requirement of estoppel, where such an 
intention is lacking and a course of conduct is relied on as constituting the 
representation,491 the conduct must be of such a kind as could reasonably have 
been expected by the person responsible for it, to mislead.  Regard is had to the 
position in which he is placed and the knowledge he possesses.492 
 
Sonnekus493 is of the opinion that the reasonable expectation of the representor 
requirement, as discussed above, does not constitute a requirement of negligence 
in relation to estoppel in a setting of representation.   According to him the well-
known test for negligence, as used in the law of delict, is two-fold:  Firstly it is 
asked whether the reasonable person in the position of the perpetrator of the delict 
could foresee prejudice to others due to his unlawful conduct; and secondly, if he, 
as a reasonable person would have taken steps to prevent the foreseeable 
prejudice.494  Sonnekus495 refers to the above quotation from the NBS case and 
states that the quoted test is not a two-fold test as required for negligence, as the 
second part of the test is absent.  He is of the opinion that the above quotation 
does not require that negligence by the principal should be proved in all cases of 
                                                          
486
  1970 1 SA 394 (A) per Steyn JA and supported by three of the other appeal court judges.. 
487
  According to Steyn (presiding), the reasonable expectation requirement as laid down in 
Strachan v Blackbeard and Son 1910 AD 282 and Monzali v Smith 1929 AD 382 cannot 
really be distinguished from negligence. 
488
  Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 1 SA 394 (A) 412-413 per Rumpff JA. 
489
  2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) per Schutz JA. 
490
  [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583A-G. 
491
  As opposed to a representation by words. 
492
  At [25]. 
493
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 301. 
494
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 265. 
495
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 301. 
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estoppel by representation.  According to Sonnekus496 proof of the increased risk 
of prejudice for third parties due to the use by a principal of a representative 
whose boundaries of authority to represent the principal are not clearly shown to 
outsiders, would be sufficient.  The third party will, however, so Sonnekus497 
contends, only be able to hold the principal liable if the representative acted within 
his usual authority, that is, within the authority that a person in the position of the 
representative would normally have with the principal. 
 
Certain writers498 require guilt as one of the essential elements of estoppel.  Other 
writers499 do not require guilt as an essential requirement in all instances of 
estoppel.  It seems as though the guilt requirement in an agency setting has not 
been finally settled in our law. 
 
I agree with Sonnekus that the cases, although not expressly requiring guilt when 
estoppel is pleaded, do require that the representation that the agent had the 
required authority to bind his principal (the company), should have been in a form 
that the principal (company) should reasonably have expected that an outsider 
would act on the strength of such representation.500 
 
3.2.3.4 Reasonable reliance by the third party  
 
One of the factors that is taken into consideration when determining whether the 
reliance of the third party was reasonable is to look at the position that the 
                                                          
496
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 301 and 302. 
497
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 301 and 303. 
498
  See Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 271-273 where he sets out the viewpionts of different 
academic writers; Lewis 1986 SALJ 69 at 73; Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate 
Law 193. 
499
  See the opinions of writers set out in Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 273-276. Also see 
McLennan 1979 SALJ 329 at 367: 
Although it is apparently settled law that a defendant seeking to set up an estoppel to defeat an 
owner’s vindicatory action must prove negligence or fault of some kind on the owner’s part, … it 
has never been definitely established whether the fault requirement applies to this branch of 
law. 
   McLennan at 367 suggests that it should not be required from the third party to prove 
negligence: 
Setting up an estoppel against a company which is governed by organs whose membership 
often changes is inherently more difficult than proving an estoppel against a natural person; to 
add the fault requirement to the third party’s difficulties would weigh the balance too heavily in 
favour of the company. 
500
  Also see Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 98. 
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representative holds in the company.  If the representative does not act within the 
powers that would usually be conferred on an official in the same capacity as him, 
then a third party will not be reasonable in his reliance on the fact that such a 
representative did have the necessary authority to perform that particular act.501  
 
In the instance where there were suspicious or extraordinary circumstances that 
placed the third party on inquiry502 (for example, where the representative used 
money due to the company for his own personal benefit),503 the third party cannot 
make use of estoppel against the company, as it cannot be said that the third party 
reasonably relied on a misrepresentation by the company.  It should be noted that 
a third party can also not estop a company by relying on a lack of authority in 
instances where that third party was aware of such lack of authority.504  The third 
party should therefore be bona fide. 
 
3.2.3.5 Prejudice suffered by third party 
 
The third party raising the estoppel must not only prove that the principal 
(company) had made a representation, but also that the third party had been 
moved to act on the representation so as to alter his own previous position to his 
detriment.505  A mere change in position is not determinant if the third party cannot 
prove prejudice.506 
 
  
                                                          
501
  Zelpy 1780 (Proprietary) Limited v Mudaly 2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [50]. 
502
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 46. 
503
  Contemporary Refrigeration (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Leites and Sonpoll Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 1967 2 SA 388 (D) 393. 
504
  Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 46.  Also see Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK 
Properties LLC [2004] 1 WLR 1846 (HL) [31]. 
505
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 210. 
506
  Sonnekus Estoppelleerstuk 210. 
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3.2.3.6 Fourth requirement in Freeman-case507 (that under its memorandum or 
articles of association the company was not deprived of the capacity either 
to enter into a contract of the kind sought to be enforced or to delegate 
authority to the agent to enter into a contract of that kind508) 
 
In the instance where the Memorandum of Incorporation limits or restricts the 
authority of the board as provided for in section 66(1), or the authority of any 
director, officer or other agent, due to the non-applicability of the doctrine of 
constructive notice, the third party will still succeed in raising estoppel as a 
defence.  Obviously in the instance where the doctrine of constructive notice still 
operates in respect of such restrictive condition, (as the limitation can be regarded 
as a restrictive condition to which attention has been drawn in the Notice of 
Incorporation or further Notice of Amendment of an “RF” Company509) the third 
party would be deemed to know of those restrictions.  The third party would not be 
able to rely on estoppel.  Due to the existence of the restrictive condition, for 
example that a certain director may not act on behalf of the company, there could 
not have been a representation regarding the agent’s authority as such agent 
could never have any authority.510 
 
In the event that the third party had actual knowledge of the restriction on the 
powers of the board to authorise a particular person or restrictions on the powers 
that may be delegated to a particular person, estoppel can also not come to the 
aid of the third party.511 
 
3.2.3.7 Ostensible (apparent) authority and estoppel 
 
In a recent case, Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd512 the majority judgment of the 
Constitutional Court made a distinction between ostensible (apparent) authority 
and estoppel and indicated that ostensible authority is now a type of actual 
                                                          
507
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA). 
508
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.3.4. 
509
  Section 19(5)(a).  See para 3.3.2 below. 
510
  Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 191; Du Plessis Grondslae 205; 
Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 5. 
511
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 190. 
512
  2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
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authority, not based on estoppel.513  In this case Makate, an employee of 
Vodacom, invented the “Please call me” idea.   
 
Makate and Geissler, the Director of Product Development (and a member of the 
board of directors of Vodacom) negotiated and orally agreed that Vodacom would 
use the idea of Makate in developing a new product.  The new product would then 
be put on trial to ascertain its commercial viability.  Should the product prove to be 
a success, Makate would be compensated by sharing in the revenue generated by 
the product resulting from his idea.  No agreement was, however, reached on the 
amount or percentage of remuneration and the negotiations in this regard were 
postponed to a later stage, after the product had been tested for commercial 
viability.  They did, however, agree that if they fail to agree on compensation, the 
Chief Executive Officer of Vodacom, Knott-Craig, would determine the 
remuneration. 
 
After developing and launching the product “Please call me”, the product proved to 
be an instant success which generated billions of rand for Vodacom.  This product 
was launched before Vodacom received formal approval for it from its board of 
directors.  This business decision and its implementation without board approval 
were, however, customary practice at Vodacom.  
 
Although the product was a success, Vodacom did not negotiate any remuneration 
with Makate for the use of his idea.  Instead, Knott-Craig (the CEO) and Geissler 
falsely credited the origin of the idea to Knott-Craig. 
 
Makate instituted action against Vodacom in the South Gauteng High Court to 
enforce his rights regarding the use of his idea by Vodacom.514  After ruling that 
Makate did, on a balance of probabilities, prove that he entered into an agreement 
with Geissler on the terms that he testified to, the court had to determine whether 
Makate had proved on a balance of probabilities that Vodacom was bound by the 
agreement. 
 
                                                          
513
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 98. 
514
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Limited [2015] JOL 34657 (GJ). 
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The High Court rejected Makate’s claim for compensation because he had failed 
to plead estoppel in replication.  According to the court, instead of pleading 
estoppel in his particulars of claim, Makate should have pleaded estoppel in his 
replication. 
 
The court also found that Makate would in any event not have been successful 
upon a plea of ostensible authority, as he could not prove the requirements for 
estoppel as laid down in515 Northern Metropolitan Local Council v Company 
Unique Finance (Pty) Ltd516 and NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd.517  
The High Court dismissed the claim of the plaintiff (Makate).  The High Court and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to appeal and Makate 
appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
 
The one issue of relevance for this dissertation that the Constitutional Court had to 
decide was whether Makate had proved all the requirements for estoppel and 
whether he pleaded estoppel correctly.518 
 
The majority519 of the court held that although estoppel is a shield and not a sword 
and could therefore only be pleaded in replication, the High Court confused 
estoppel with ostensible authority and that the correct concept to be used in the 
matter was the latter.  According to the court, estoppel and ostensible authority are 
two different things, although it conceded that in the past it has been treated by the 
courts as the same thing.520  It distinguished the two by stating that ostensible 
authority is authority but estoppel is no authority at all.521  The court held the view 
that, as it was stated in Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd,522 ostensible authority 
                                                          
515
  Note that in both of these Supreme Court of Appeal cases, the courts, when listing the 
requirements, indicated that they were the requirements for “ostensible authority”.  In other 
words, these courts did not make use of the concept “estoppel”. 
516
  2012 5 SA 323 (SCA) [28]. 
517
  2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) [26]. 
518
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [1]. 
519
  Per Jafta J. 
520
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [44]. 
521
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [45] – [47]. 
522
  [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583A-G per Lord Denning. Note that in this case Lord Denning  at 
583 accepted the law as was laid down in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) and did not find it necessary to consider it at length. It 
is interesting to note that the court found liability on implied authority in this case and not on 
ostensible authority. 
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(apparent authority) is authority as it appears to others, which means that only the 
creation of an appearance by the principal needs to be proved, whereas many 
more elements have to be proved if estoppel is to be relied upon.523 
 
The majority judgment criticised the minority decision and insisted that: 
 
… there is not a single case referred to in our law that holds that apparent 
[ostensible] authority is estoppel, except NBS Bank and subsequent decisions that 
followed it.524   
 
The court concluded that Vodacom could be held bound to the agreement on 
grounds of ostensible authority (as opposed to estoppel).  According to 
Henochsberg525 the facts of the case would appear to indicate implied authority 
rather than ostensible authority. 
 
I cannot, with respect, agree with the view of the majority that ostensible authority 
is authority and that estoppel is not. Neither ostensible authority nor estoppel 
constitutes authority. 
 
The minority decision of the Constitutional Court,526 also found in favour of 
Makate.  They, however, disagreed that ostensible authority and estoppel are two 
different concepts. 
 
In terms of the minority judgment, it is settled law that ostensible authority is a form 
of estoppel, commonly referred to as agency by estoppel.527   Wallis AJ accepted 
that estoppel has a wide range of application in other fields and listed a few that 
occurred to him.528  He then concluded that on both principle and authority he was 
                                                          
523
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [49]. 
524
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [70]. 
525
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(2). 
526
  Per Wallis AJ with Cameron J, Madlanga J, Van der Westhuizen J concurring. 
527
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [109]. 
528
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [110].  Examples that he listed are motor 
dealer cases, share dealing transactions and vindicatory actions. Unfortunately he directly 
thereafter stated, referring to One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan 
Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) 
[25],  that 
[i]t has been said that the Turquand Rule of company law is merely an application of estoppel. 
The Turquand rule is an independent rule and this statement cannot be accepted. See in 
this regard the discussion of Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 7-9. 
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convinced that ostensible authority is merely one more instance of estoppel.529  He 
stated that ostensible authority is no authority at all, express or implied and that 
takes it into the realm of estoppel.530  In reacting to the majority judgment, Wallis 
AJ stated that they based their understanding of English law on a single sentence 
in a judgment of Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal,531 which is inconsistent with 
the authoritative judgments of English courts.532  The approach of the majority is 
also inconsistent with the judgments of our courts since the early twentieth 
century, as well as the views of our textbook writers.533  Further, the majority only 
tried to make a distinction because of the erroneous approach of the trial court to 
the proper pleading of ostensible authority.534 
 
On grounds of the unbroken line of authorities in English and South African law, 
Wallis AJ asserts that ostensible authority was squarely placed within the 
framework of estoppel by the appeal court decision of NBS Bank Ltd v Cape 
Produce (Pty) Ltd535 as follows: 
 
As Denning MR points out,536 ostensible authority flows from the appearances of 
authority created by the principal. Actual authority may be important, as it is in this 
case, in sketching the framework of the image presented, but the overall 
impression received by the viewer from the principal may be much more detailed. 
Our law has borrowed an expression, estoppel, to describe a situation where a 
representor may be held accountable when he has created an impression in 
another’s mind, even though he may not have intended to do so and even though 
the impression is in fact wrong. Where a principal is held liable because of the 
ostensible authority of an agent, agency by estoppel is said to arise.537 
 
Wallis AJ thereafter came to the conclusion that: 
 
… in English law ostensible authority is an estoppel by representation and that the 
earlier decisions of our courts that say that ostensible or apparent authority is a 
                                                          
529
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [110]. 
530
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [110]. Also see Reynolds Bowstead and 
Reynolds Agency 106 para 3-005. 
531
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA). 
532
  Wallis AJ referred to inter alia Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) 
Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) and Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA, The Ocean Frost [1986] 2 All 
ER 385 (HL).  
533
  See Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [140]-[153] and the authorities listed 
there. 
534
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [109]. 
535
  2002 1 SA 396 (SCA), per Schutz JA. 
536
  Schutz JA referred here to the judgment of Denning MR in Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd 
[1968] 1 QB 549 (CA) 583A-G. 
537
  NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce (Pty) Ltd and Others 2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) [25]. 
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form of estoppel are correct. That is also the view of the academic commentators 
both here and overseas.538 
 
From the line of decisions, both in England and later in South Africa, I, with 
respect, agree with the minority decision of the Constitutional Court per Wallis AJ, 
that ostensible authority and estoppel are the same thing. 
 
According to the majority the only requirement for holding a company bound on 
grounds of ostensible authority is that the principal (company) created an 
appearance that the agent has authority to act on its behalf.  If this were so it 
would result in an unfair balance of rights and interests between the company and 
the third party.  It might, for example, happen that the third party is not even aware 
of the representation, so it would be impossible for him to rely on such 
representation when he enters into the contract.  It would be unfair if the company 
is to be held bound under these circumstances.  If the third party is not aware of 
the representation he can therefore not rely on the representation.  The 
requirement that the third party should have relied on the representation is 
therefore essential and was listed as a requirement in both the Freeman case and 
subsequent cases such as the NBS case.539 
 
Wallis AJ further also stated in this regard that a representation alone was not 
sufficient.  The contracting third party should have reasonably acted upon the 
representation to his prejudice.  If the latter requirement was not met as well, it 
would again have the unfair result that a contracting third party could hold a 
company liable on grounds of ostensible authority in cases where he had actual 
knowledge that the authority of the agent who acts on behalf of the company had 
been restricted, although it appeared that he had authority.540 
                                                          
538
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [154]. 
539
  See for example Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 
QB 480 (CA) 504, 506 and 508.  On page 508 the following is stipulated: 
Since … the representation on which he in fact relied as inducing him to enter into the contract 
comprised the articles of association of the company as well as the conduct of the board, it 
would be necessary for him to establish first, that he knew the contents of the articles … and 
secondly, that the conduct of the board in the light of that knowledge would be understood by a 
reasonable man as a representation that the agent had authority to enter into the contract to be 
enforced, ... . 
Also see Insurance Trust and Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mudaliar 1943 NPD 45 at 55 and 57: 
It is for the plaintiff to plead and prove the estoppel he relies on. If he relies on the contents of 
the articles as constituting a representation, he must prove that he knew the contents. 
540
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [139]. 
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The viewpoint of the minority in the Makate case, as per Wallis AJ regarding the 
fact that ostensible authority is a form of estoppel is to be preferred and is 
supported over the decision of the majority.541 
 
In light of the uncertainty created in the recent constitutional court judgement in 
Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd542 regarding the concept of ostensible (apparent) 
authority and estoppel and the confusion that these are different concepts with 
different requirements, it is recommended that estoppel and the application and 
requirements thereof in a company environment should be codified in the form of 
legislation.543 
 
3.3 Companies Act of 2008 
 
3.3.1 Directors to manage the business and affairs of the company - section 66(1) 
 
The two primary organs in a company are the board of directors and the 
shareholders in general meeting.544  The Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter 
called the Companies Act of 1973) did not prescribe the manner in which power 
had to be divided between these two organs and the company could decide on 
this by making provision for the division of power in its constitution. 
 
According to Cassim et al545 the Companies Act of 2008 follows the approach of 
the United States of America by allocating the powers of the directors in the Act 
itself.  In this regard, section 66(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides that the 
business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of 
the board of directors.546 
                                                          
541
  Also find support for the viewpoint of Wallis AJ in Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 
98 and Cassim and Cassim 2017 SALJ 639 at 647.  Further, see the critical discussions of 
this case by Sharrock 2016 PELJ 1-21 and Sonnekus 2016 TSAR 538-563.  
542
  2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
543
  Rabie pleaded for the repeal and replacement of the doctrine of estoppel by a statutory 
equivalent. The reason he gives is that the South African courts have dealt with the 
application of estoppel in a haphazard way and that the estoppel doctrine is in conflict with 
several academic viewpoints in South Africa (Rabie Verteenwoordiging 217-218). 
544
  Katz 2010 Acta Juridica 248 at 258. 
545
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 123. 
546
  The powers of the board are, however, subject to the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation and the Companies Act of 2008.  See s 66(1). 
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A distinction should be drawn, when this section is read, between the acts of the 
board of directors on the one hand and acts of individuals who act under the 
authority that was conferred on them by the board of directors. 
 
3.3.1.1 Acts of the board of directors 
 
The differences of opinion under the Companies Act of 1973 on whether the power 
of management conferred on the board of directors was original or delegated547 
have been removed by the Companies Act of 2008 in that the power conferred on 
the board by the Act can without a doubt be described as original.548  The ultimate 
power in the company now lies with the board of directors.549  According to 
Henochsberg550 it will not be necessary for a third party to prove actual authority if 
the board of directors acts in terms of section 66. 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 has provided balances and measures to ensure that 
the directors do not misuse these wide powers that have been granted to the 
board.551 The 2008 Act still requires shareholder approval where the board 
exercises its powers in respect of certain fundamental transactions.552  It is, 
however, not the purpose of this dissertation to investigate these checks and 
balances.  It should be noted that it is the board who must act, which means that it 
should act as a unit.553  In other words, the board must still exercise its powers 
collectively as a board.554 
 
                                                          
547
  In this regard, see Du Plessis Grondslae 47 and the authorities cited there.   
548
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 250(3); Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Limited [2016] 
JOL 35367 (WCC) [25]; Coetzee Business and Affairs 42. In other words, the power of the 
directors is not derived from an agreement through the machinery of the articles as under 
the Companies Act of 1973.  In England, however, the board derives its powers from the 
articles of the company – see Ch 2 para 2.2.1. 
549
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 250(3); Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Limited [2016] 
JOL 35367 (WCC) [25]; Navigator Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Silver Lakes Crossing 
Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd [2014] JOL 32101 (WCC) [31].   
550
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 95-96. 
551
  See for example s 76 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
552
  Katz 2010 Acta Juridica 248 at 259. In this regard see for example s 112 of the Act 
pertaining to the alienation of all or the greater part of the assets or undertaking by the 
company. 
553
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 250(2). 
554
  Navigator Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Silver Lakes Crossing Shopping Centre (Pty) 
Ltd [2014] JOL 32101 (WCC) [31]. 
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The powers of the directors are defined by what is meant by “business and 
affairs”.  As these two words are not defined in the 2008 Act, their interpretation 
can be sought in, among other things, judgments and older legislation. 
 
When comparing section 66 with, for example, article 59 of Table A555 of the 
Companies Act of 1973, it is clear that the board of directors has wider powers 
under section 66 than under the Companies Act of 1973 if the company adopted 
Table A of that Act.  Not only are the directors empowered to manage the 
business of the company but also its affairs.  Although the dictum in Ex Parte 
Russlyn Construction (Pty) Ltd556 pertains to Article 59 of Table A of the 1973 
Companies Act, I agree with Henochsberg557 that the interpretation of the word 
“affairs” in that case should also be applied to the use of the word “affairs” as set 
out in section 66 of the 2008 Act.  In this case the question that the court had to 
consider was whether the directors had the power to liquidate the company of 
which they were directors, without the approval of the shareholders in general 
meeting.  The court regarded “affairs” as being a concept wider than “business” 
and that the power to manage the business of a company most probably includes 
the power to stop the trading activities of the company.558  However, it would not 
include the power to liquidate the company.559  Henochsberg560 supports the view 
taken in the Russlyn case that “affairs” has a broader meaning than “business”. 
 
The board of directors further has the authority to exercise all of the powers of the 
company and to perform all of the functions of the company.  This wording was not 
part of article 59 of Table A under the 1973 Act. 561 
 
  
                                                          
555
  Article 59 of Table A under the Companies Act of 1973 provides inter alia that: 
The business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may … exercise all such 
powers of the company as are not by the Act, or by these articles, required to be exercised by 
the company in general meeting, … . 
556
  1987 1 SA 33 (D). 
557
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 250(2). 
558
  Ex Parte Russlyn Construction (Pty) Ltd 1987 1 SA 33 (D) 36-37, approved and followed in 
Ex Parte New Seasons Auto Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 4 SA 341 (W). 
559
  At 36H-J to 37A-B. 
560
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 250(2). 
561
  Coetzee Business and Affairs 47. 
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3.3.1.2 Agent acts under direction of the board 
 
From the above it is clear that the board of directors has, save for having the 
power to manage, direct and supervise the business and affairs of the company, 
the right to delegate one or more of these powers to a board committee, managing 
director, director or other agent.  Although the standard Memorandum of 
Incorporation in the regulations to the Companies Act of 2008 does not expressly 
authorise the board to appoint a managing director,562 and does not provide that 
the board may from time to time entrust to or confer upon a managing director or 
manager, for the time being, such of the powers and authorities vested in them as 
they may think fit, as the standard articles under the Companies Act of 1973 did,563 
I agree with Henochsberg564 that even if the board was not authorised to delegate 
its authority in section 66(1), it would still be entitled to do so, as its authority is 
original and not delegated and therefore the rule delegatus delegare non potest 
does not apply.565  The board will therefore be entitled to, for example, appoint a 
managing director. 
 
The board may appoint any number of committees of directors and may delegate 
any of its authority, subject to the Memorandum of Incorporation, to such board 
committees.566 
 
The common-law principles of agency will therefore continue to be applicable 
where the board has delegated its authority.567 
 
A company will be bound to a contract entered into on its behalf by its managing 
director, where such managing director had actual (either express or implied) 
authority conferred upon him by the board of directors to conclude that contract.568  
                                                          
562
  See for example CoR15.1E (although it refers to the appointment of officers) and 
CoR15.1B. 
563
  See for example Article 62 of Table A. If the articles did not make provision for a managing 
director to be appointed by the board, a person could not be appointed as a managing 
director – Moresby White v Rangeland Ltd 1952 4 SA 285 (SR) 287. 
564
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 250(5). 
565
  Also see Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 417. 
566
  S 72(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
567
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 187. 
568
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 251; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
188. 
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If the managing director did not have actual authority the company will 
nevertheless be bound where the company ratifies such contract.569 
 
The managing director would have implied authority if he acted within the scope of 
his office as managing director.  In other words all those powers that usually relate 
to or are incidental to the position of a managing director of a company that carries 
on the kind of business that the company carries on would fall within the implied 
authority of the managing director.570  The implied authority of the managing 
director may, however, have been restricted by the board of directors in which 
event it cannot be said that the managing director had implied actual authority to 
act on behalf of the company.571  In such event, the company may still be held 
bound to the contract if the third party can successfully rely on the Turquand 
rule572 or section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008 or if he is able to prove all 
the essential requirements for estoppel.573 
 
It is submitted that the board has the power to appoint any other official and confer 
some of its powers on such official in the same way as it can appoint a managing 
director.  It is submitted that the usual authority of an agent is still a helpful tool in 
establishing whether a particular officer had implied authority to act on behalf of 
the company.574  As usual authority was used by the courts in the past and as the 
common law in this regard has not been expressly excluded by the Act, the 
common law still applies to the extent that it has not been altered by legislation.575  
If the usual authority of the officer has not been restricted by the board, his usual 
authority will be his implied authority.576  In these instances, the application of the 
                                                          
569
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 251. 
570
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 251.  See Ch 2 par 2.2.1 above. 
571
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 416-417. 
572
  Obviously the third party would only be successful in relying on the Turquand rule if the 
particular set of facts fall under the application of the rule and the relief is not excluded 
under the exceptions applicable to the rule. 
573
  Legg & Co v Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 132 at 139-144; Wolpert v Uitzicht Properties 
(Pty) Ltd 1961 (3) SA 257 (W) 266-267; Contemporary Refrigeration (Pty) Ltd (In 
Liquidation) v Leites and Sonpoll Investments (Pty) Ltd 1967 2 SA 388 (D) 392; Tuckers 
Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14. 
574
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.1 and para 3.2.1 above. 
575
  This is subject thereto that such interpretation does not conflict with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 and that statutory rights and remedies more advantageous 
to those who stand to benefit from them will take precedence over common-law rights and 
remedies.  See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 177-181. 
576
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.1 above in this regard. 
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Turquand rule would be limited,577 but the third party would still be able to hold the 
company bound if the requirements for estoppel can be proved. 
 
Section 20 of the Companies Act of 2008 also deals with persons acting on behalf 
of a company.  The organisation of the subsections in section 20 is rather chaotic.  
Whereas section 20(1), 20(2) and 20(5) pertains to contraventions of limitations, 
restrictions and qualifications in the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company, 
section 20(4) pertains to restrictions in the Act.  Further, it takes a great effort on 
the part of the reader to ascertain whether a particular subsection relates to the 
capacity of the company (an act of the company) or only to a representation by the 
directors (act by directors) or to both capacity and representation. 
 
I submit that only subsections (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) pertain to the authority of 
directors. Some of these subsections also relate to the capacity of the company.  
Subsections (2) and (3), pertaining to ratification and subsection (6) dealing with 
the internal consequences (as opposed to external consenquences) do not form 
part of the focus of this dissertation and are therefore not discussed.  Subsection 
(5) is also not discussed.578  Only subsections (7) and (8) 579 are discussed insofar 
as they relate to the authority of directors. 
 
3.3.1.3 Powers of the board restricted by its Memorandum of Incorporation or by 
the 2008 Act 
 
Section 66(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 further provides that the board has 
the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the 
company, except to the extent that the Act itself or the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of the company provides to the contrary. 
 
                                                          
577
  Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 15. 
578
  S 20(5) provides that certain interested parties may apply to the High Court for an interdict 
restraining inter alia the directors from doing anything inconsistent with a limitation, 
restriction or qualification in the Memorandum of Incorporation.  Any such proceedings will, 
however, not prejudice the right of a third party to damages, if such third party obtained 
those rights in good faith and did not have actual knowledge of such limitation etc.
  
579
  Ss (7) and (8) are discussed under paragraph 3.3.4 below. 
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In the event that the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation places a total 
restriction on one of the powers of the board, for example, that the board may not 
borrow money in excess of R50 million and the board exceeds such restriction, the 
third party cannot simply hold the company to the loan agreement, by averring that 
he is not deemed to know of this restriction due to the abolition of the doctrine of 
constructive notice.580  The fact that the third party is not deemed to know of this 
restriction, does not constitute a legal ground on which the company can be held 
liable.  If, however, the third party is able to prove all the essential requirements for 
estoppel, he may be successful in holding the company to the contract on these 
grounds.  The doctrine of constructive notice previously deprived a third party of 
the right to rely on estoppel.581  
 
If an authority or power of the board is made dependent on compliance with some 
or other internal formality or formal or procedural requirement, for example, the 
board may only borrow money in excess of R10 million, subject to prior 
shareholder approval, again, the third party cannot use the fact that he is not 
deemed to know about this requirement as the legal basis to hold the company to 
the contract where the board entered into a loan agreement in excess of R10 
million without prior shareholder approval.  In this instance the third party may be 
able to hold the company to the contract if he is able to bring the transaction within 
the scope of application of either the Turquand rule or section 20(7) of the 
Companies Act of 2008.582 
 
                                                          
580
  See para 3.3.2 below for a discussion on the abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice. 
581
  See para 2.2.3.4 of Ch 2 above and para 3.2.3.6 of this chapter above. One or more 
shareholders, directors or prescribed officers of the company may apply to the High Court 
for an order to restrain the directors from doing anything inconsistent with such a restriction 
but this would not prejudice the right to damages of a bona fide third party – s 20(5).  It is 
difficult to see how a third party could have acquired rights if the company has not yet 
entered into the contract because it is being restrained from entering into the contract. It 
might be that this section refers to the situation where the contract has already been 
concluded by the company, in other words the third party has acquired rights in terms of 
the contract, but the company is then restrained from complying with its obligations in 
terms of the contract. The chances that a third party would have suffered damages before 
any contract had been concluded are very slim (Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 838). As 
the third party is only entitled to damages, the benefit (for the shareholder, director, 
prescribed officer) lies in the fact that the third party cannot claim specific performance 
under the contract but will only be entitled to damages. 
582
        Section 20(7) is discussed in para 3.3.4 below. 
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Where the third party has actual knowledge of the total restriction or where he is 
deemed to have knowledge thereof due to the operation of the doctrine of 
constructive notice in the case where he deals with an “RF” company,583 the third 
party would not be successful in relying on estoppel.  In such an instance the 
Turquand rule also finds no application.584  The restriction is absolute and not an 
authority that is granted but made dependent on compliance with some or other 
internal formality that can be made good by the Turquand rule.  Section 20(7) of 
the Companies Act would also not be available to the third party.585  
 
Where the third party has actual knowledge or deemed knowledge586 of a 
limitation on the powers of the board, but which limitation may be overridden by 
compliance with an internal procedure, for example a requirement that a 
shareholders’ resolution should be obtained before the board can do a particular 
act, then the third party may still be able to hold the company liable on grounds of 
the Turquand rule587 or section 20(7),588 if he complies with the parameters within 
which these who rules operate. 
 
A third party will not be able to hold the company bound to a contract on grounds 
of the Turquand rule if the board of directors exceeded its authority, as restricted 
by the Companies Act itself.589  If the restriction or limitation in the Act is of a 
substantive nature and cannot be said to be of a formal or procedural nature, the 
third party would also not be able to rely on section 20(7).590  
 
I submit that the third party would also not be able to hold the company liable on 
grounds of estoppel under these circumstances. 
 
  
                                                          
583
  See para 3.3.2 below for a discussion on “RF” companies. 
584
  Van Dorsten Company Directors 157. 
585
  Similar to the Turquand rule, s 20(7) only operates to make good failure to comply with 
formal or procedural requirements laid down by the Memorandum of Incorporation, rules or 
the Act.  For a discussion on s 20(7), see para 3.3.4 below. 
586
  In terms of the doctrine of constructive notice, in the case where the third party deals with 
an “RF” company. 
587
  See para 2.2.2 of Ch 2 above and para 3.2.2 of this chapter above. 
588
  See para 3.3.4 below. 
589
  See para 3.3.4.5 below. 
590
  See para 3.3.4.5 below. 
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3.3.1.4 Prescribed minimum number of directors 
 
Section 66(2) prescribes a minimum number of directors to be in office in respect 
of different types of companies.  Section 66(3) further provides that the 
Memorandum of Incorporation may specify a higher minimum number of directors.  
Any failure by a company at any time to have the prescribed minimum number of 
directors  does not, however,  limit or negate the authority of the board or 
invalidate anything done by the board of the company.591  
 
3.3.2 Abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice and “RF” companies 
 
Section 19(4) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides that a person must not be 
regarded as having received notice or knowledge of the contents of a company 
document just because it has been filed or is accessible for inspection at the 
company’s office.  This provision is, however, subject to the provisions of section 
19(5). 
 
Section 19(4) of the Companies Act of 2008 expressly abolishes the doctrine of 
constructive notice.592  A company can no longer deny liability on grounds of a 
contract entered into with a third party by reason of the fact that the entering into of 
the contract is in excess of a limitation on the authority of the representative, which 
the third party is presumed to know about. 
 
In today’s world, contracts are concluded electronically and on a global scale 
which would place a very onerous task on a third contracting party dealing with a 
company, requiring the third party to inspect documents filed at that company’s 
office or at the companies office where such documents are to be filed in terms of 
the particular Act applicable to that company, as that third party might not even be 
in the same country as the company.  Adherence to such inspection would be very 
time consuming and a delay in the conclusion of a contract might even lead to the 
forfeiture of that contract for the third party.  Furthermore, in practice, inspections 
are not often carried out: “In the ordinary course of commercial dealings they 
                                                          
591
  S 66(11). 
592
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 92. 
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[inspections] simply are not feasible”.593  The abolition of the doctrine of 
constructive notice is commendable as it provides third contracting parties with 
greater security in dealing with companies. 
 
The fact that a person must not be regarded as having notice or knowledge of the 
contents of a company’s public documents will, however, not apply where the third 
party had actual knowledge of the content of the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation.594  It would also not be the case where the limitation can be 
regarded as a restrictive condition to which attention has been drawn in the Notice 
of Incorporation or further Notice of Amendment of an “RF” company.595  
 
Section 15(2) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides inter alia that the 
Memorandum of Incorporation of any company may contain any restrictive 
conditions applicable to the company, and any requirement for the amendment of 
any such condition in addition to the requirements set out in section 16.  Section 
19(5) of the Companies Act makes the doctrine of constructive notice applicable to 
these restrictive conditions by providing that a person must be regarded as having 
notice and knowledge of any provision of a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation contemplated in section 15(2)(b) or (c) if the company’s name 
includes the element “RF” as contemplated in section 11(3)(b),596 and the 
company’s Notice of Incorporation or a subsequent Notice of Amendment draws 
attention to the relevant provision, as contemplated in section 13(3).597 
 
No definition is provided in the Act for “restrictive conditions” as contemplated in 
section 15(2)(b) and there exists uncertainty about the kind of conditions which 
would a constitute restrictive condition. 
 
                                                          
593
  McLennan 1985 SALJ 322 at 324. 
594
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 92. 
595
  S19(5)(a). 
596
  This section stipulates that if the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation includes any 
provision contemplated in s 15(2)(b) or (c) restricting or prohibiting the amendment of any 
particular provision of the Memorandum, the name must be immediately followed by the 
expression “RF”. 
597
  S 13(3) provides that if a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation includes any provision 
contemplated in s 15(2)(b) or (c), the Notice of Incorporation filed by the company must 
include a prominent statement drawing attention to each such provision, and its location in 
the Memorandum of Incorporation. 
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First, uncertainty exists, for example, whether it only pertains to the capacity of the 
company or to the authority of the directors (and other agents) to act on behalf of 
the company or to both.598 It is submitted that it pertains to both.599  
 
Secondly, it is uncertain whether it is only required that the condition itself should 
be restrictive, or whether it should also be coupled with a requirement regarding its 
amendment which is more stringent than the requirements for a usual amendment 
of the Memorandum of Incorporation.600  Some writers601 do not find the former 
proposition problematic while other writers602 view the distinguishing feature of a 
section 15(2)(b) restrictive condition that it is coupled with a requirement for its 
amendment that is more onerous than the usual amendment requirements.  The 
latter view is to be preferred.603  
 
                                                          
598
  In this regard, see Katz 2010 Acta Juridica 248 at 250-253;  Descroizilles March 2010 De 
Rebus 39 at 44; Stein and Everingham Companies Act 72;  McLennan 2009 Obiter 144 at 
150-151; Van der Linde 2015 TSAR  833 at 837; Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 182, 185-188. 
599
  It would not make much sense for the legislature to enact s 15(2)(b) and (c) and make the 
doctrine of constructive notice applicable to it, if it has so little effect if it is assumed that 
these restrictive conditions only pertain to limitations on the capacity of the company. 
Where a company transgresses a limitation, restriction or qualification of its purposes, 
powers or activities as contemplated in s 19(1)(b)(ii), s 20(1) counters the consequences 
thereof in relation to a third party by providing that such an act will not be void due to the 
transgression (although internal consequences will still flow from such transgression). If 
restrictive conditions pertain to the capacity of the company, s 20(1) makes the provision 
for restrictive conditions pertaining to the capacity, to which the doctrine of constructive 
notice applies, pointless. Bona fides is not a requirement for the application of s 20(1). In 
the event that the third contracting party knew that the capacity has been exceeded or 
where he had constructive knowledge thereof (due to the operation of s 19(5)), the act 
would still be valid. 
600
  S 16 generally requires a special resolution by the shareholders to amend the 
Memorandum of Incorporation. 
601
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 72: 
Paragraph (2)(b) of this section therefore enables a company to include in its Memorandum of 
Incorporation any restrictive conditions.  It may also include requirements for the alteration of 
any such conditions in addition to those prescribed by s 16. 
Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 131.  Also see the non-binding opinion dated 12 
December 2011 and issued in terms of s 188(2)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008 titled 
Interpretation of section 11(3)(b) read with section 65(12) and 15(2)(a)(iii) of the 
Companies Act, 2008 in relation to the use of “(RF)” in the name of a company. 
602
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 837; Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 167. 
603
  When reading s 15(2)(b) it would seem that what is meant is not only that the conditions 
should be restrictive but also that the condition should contain additional amendment 
requirements. This is supported by the wording of s 11(3)(b) which refers to the instance 
where the company’s Memorandum includes any provision contemplated in s 15(2)(b) or 
(c) restricting or prohibiting the amendment of any provision of the Memorandum.  It would 
seem that the emphasis here pertains to restrictions on the amendment of provisions and 
not to the restrictive conditions itself.It would have been easy for the legislature to follow 
the wording of s 53(a) of the Companies Act of 1973 if it intended for the restrictive 
condition to stand on its own, as it is very clearly stipulated in that section. The legislature, 
however, did not do so. 
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It is important to know what “restrictive conditions” entail as a company must draw 
attention to these conditions in its Notice of Incorporation or subsequent Notice of 
Amendment and it must add the suffix “RF” to the name of the company.604  If 
these two requirements have been complied with, the doctrine of constructive 
notice shall operate in respect of these conditions as provided for by section 19(5) 
of the Companies Act of 2008. 
 
The abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice has been advocated by many 
writers.605  This doctrine has been abolished in other jurisdictions.606  Furthermore, 
the original reason for the creation of this doctrine, that directors were regarded as 
having the same powers as partners in a partnership, has fallen away.607  The 
doctrine may also be regarded as unconstitutional.608  If this is taken into account, 
together with the the fact that it will not always be practical or economical to 
inspect the public documents of an “RF” company and the uncertainties regarding 
what types of conditions would qualify as restrictive conditions pertaining to “RF” 
companies (which may open the door for companies to abuse its use), it is 
recommended that the doctrine of constructive notice should be abolished in toto. 
 
3.3.3 Common-law Turquand rule and Companies Act of 2008 
 
With the abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice,609 except in the cases of 
an “RF” company and personal liability company, the question arises whether 
there is still a need for the Turquand rule. 
 
It is obvious that the Turquand rule will still operate in respect of “RF” 
companies,610  as the doctrine of constructive notice has been retained in that 
                                                          
604
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 73. 
605
  Du Plessis 1997 SA Merc LJ 281 at 284; Grobler Toegerekende kennis 41-46; McLennan  
1986 SALJ 558 at 560; Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 14; Rabie Verteenwoordiging 108.   
606
  See in this regard the discussion of s 40 of the Companies Act of 2006 of England in para 
2.3 of Ch 2 above. The doctrine has also been abolished in Australia by section 165 of the 
Corporations Law of 1989 which was perpetuated in section 130 of the Corporations Act of 
2001  The doctrine was never adopted in the USA (Rabie Verteenwoordiging 105). 
607
  Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 5. 
608
  See the discussion in Rabie Verteenwoordiging 99-105. 
609
  S 19(4) of the 2008 Companies Act. 
610
  Katz 2010 Acta Juridica 248 at 252 to 253; Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 138. 
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respect.611  It has been concluded above612 that the restrictive conditions as 
contained in section 15(2)(b) include not only restrictions on the capacity of the 
company but also on the authority of directors and other representatives.  The 
Turquand rule only applies in situations where the authority of the directors is 
defective and not where the company acts ultra vires its capacity.  
 
The Turquand rule would also still operate in the instance where the third party did 
have actual knowledge of the content of the Memorandum of Incorporation (or the 
rules of the company) where restrictions are placed on the authority of the board of 
directors and other representatives of the company, and which relate to internal 
requirements upon which the authority of the representative is dependent.613 
 
Where the Companies Act of 2008 itself imposes approval by the shareholders in 
addition to a resolution by the board of directors in, for example, sections 41, 44, 
45 and 112, the only consideration is not whether the internal requirements 
relating to the board of directors’ resolution have been complied with, but also the 
intention of the legislature in requiring approval by the shareholders.614  Initially 
there was uncertainty as to whether the Turquand rule may be relied upon under 
these circumstances.615  The Supreme Court of Appeal removed this uncertainty in 
2011 when ruling that the Turquand rule does not apply.616  
 
If a contracting third party does not have any knowledge of the public documents 
of the company and no knowledge of the public documents is attributed to the third 
                                                          
611
  Katz 2010 Acta Juridica 248 at 253. 
612
  Par 3.3.2 above. 
613
  Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 138. 
614
  The purpose of shareholder authorisation is to protect the shareholders who have given 
general control of the company to its directors.  The application of the Turquand rule would 
deprive the shareholders of such protection in which event the section of the Act requiring 
shareholder approval would serve no purpose.  See Stand 242 Hendrik Potgieter Road 
Ruimsig (Pty) Ltd v Göbel [2011] 3 All SA 549 (SCA). 
615
  Levy v Zalrut Investments (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 479 (W) 485; Farren v Sun Service SA 
Photo Trip Management (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 146 (C) 156. 
616
  Stand 242 Hendrik Potgieter Road Ruimsig (Pty) Ltd v Göbel [2011] 3 All SA 549 (SCA).  
The court, at 555, also found that estoppel could not operate to allow a contravention of a 
statute. 
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party (because of the doctrine of constructive notice) it would appear as though 
the need for the Turquand rule vanishes.  This is, however, not the case.617 
 
First, from a thorough analysis of the Turquand rule it is apparent that the rule is 
not necessarily tied to the doctrine of constructive notice.  The rule is not only 
available where the third party is prejudiced due to the attribution of knowledge 
regarding the internal limitations on authority stipulated in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation.  It also serves to clear other irregularities that do not relate to the 
doctrine of constructive notice, for example, a defective appointment of directors, 
defective notice of meetings or the absence of the required quorum.618  Under 
these circumstances, the third party’s position is usually619 not prejudiced by the 
doctrine of constructive notice.  The third party indeed knows that directors must 
be duly appointed and that meetings should be preceded by due notice and, 
above all, that no publicity is given to these irregularities.  The third party’s need 
for protection does therefore not emanate from the operation of the doctrine of 
constructive notice.  He is, however, not deprived of the protection of the Turquand 
rule. 
 
If it is accepted that the Turquand rule can also exist in respect of irregularities of 
this nature apart from the doctrine of constructive notice, the same should apply in 
situations where internal limitations on authority have been laid down.  It is true 
that the third party would be able to rely on estoppel, but that should not exclude 
the availability of the Turquand rule, especially as the Turquand rule may be more 
advantageous to the third party, as he needs prove fewer requirements in such a 
case.620 
 
Secondly, the averment that, in the absence of the doctrine of constructive notice, 
the third party can rely on implied or ostensible authority oversimplifies the matter.  
There can be no question of implied authority where the company restricted the 
authority of the representative by means of an internal arrangement.  If the third 
                                                          
617
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210 at 215-216 gives three reasons for the need for the Turquand 
rule in the absence of the doctrine of constructive notice, as set out above. 
618
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210 at 215. 
619
  Except perhaps in exceptional instances where the articles stipulate extraordinary 
requirements. 
620
  Farren v Sun Service SA Photo Trip Management (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 146 (C) 157. 
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party knows of the internal requirement that has been laid down, it would be 
almost impossible to prove estoppel on the side of the company.  Not only will he 
have to prove that the company has made a representation that a particular 
person is clothed with the necessary authority, but also that a representation has 
been made that the required internal requirements have indeed been complied 
with.  As the third party does not have access to the internal administration and 
management of the company, it is clear that it would be impossible for him to 
ascertain the true state of affairs.  Under these circumstances621 there is still a 
need for the protection of the Turquand rule.622  If the third party is not permitted to 
rely on the Turquand rule, he will have no choice but to refrain from any 
negotiations. 
 
Thirdly, the conclusion that the need for the Turquand rule will lapse in the 
absence of the doctrine of constructive notice, will have unacceptable 
consequences.  Over and above the objections listed above, it would mean that 
the abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice will lead to the abolition of the 
Turquand rule from company law.  To deprive a third party from the protection of 
the rule even where he has no access to the internal management of the 
company, is not acceptable.623  The rule would indeed provide optimal protection 
under circumstances where the third party is not restricted by the doctrine of 
constructive notice.624  The doctrine of constructive notice has an unnecessary 
restricting effect on the fair operation of the Turquand rule.625  Third parties may 
only make use of the Turquand rule if the acts of the company representatives are 
in line with the public documents.626  If that is not the case, the doctrine of 
constructive notice deprives the third party of the protection which he would 
otherwise have had. 
 
                                                          
621
  In other words where the third party knows that internal requirements have been set down. 
622
  Naudé 1972 Codicillus 62 at 63. 
623
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 331. Compare, however, Potchefstroom se Stadsraad v Kotze 
[1960] 3 All SA 402 (A). 
624
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 331.   
625
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 147. 
626
  In re The Athenaeum Life Assurance Society; Ex Parte The Eagle Insurance Company 70 
ER 229 at 234.  This will be the position even if the company clearly represented that the 
relevant company representative had the necessary authority. See Naudé 1971 SALJ 505 
at 505-506. 
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According to Oosthuizen627 the need for the Turquand rule is based on the fact 
that negotiations take place with a company where the members do not have 
individual authority to represent the company.  The company therefore must 
participate through one or other management organ.  The third party’s need for 
protection stems from this and from the fact that third parties do not have access 
to the internal management of such entities. 
 
Rabie628 is also of the opinion that the Turquand rule can find application in the 
absence of the doctrine of constructive notice.  In Australia, where the doctrine of 
constructive notice has also been abolished,629 section 164 of the Corporations 
Law630 made provision for a statutory Turquand rule.631  This section has been 
taken over by section 129 of the Corporations Act of 2001.632  A need for 
something akin to the Turquand rule has also been experienced in the USA where 
the doctrine of constructive notice has never found any application.633  
 
Cassim et al634 state that the Turquand rule, in its development, came to serve 
functions additional to the original function of mitigating the effect of the doctrine of 
constructive notice.  If this were not the case, the Turquand rule would have been 
abandoned together with the doctrine of constructive notice. 
 
From this, it is clear that although the doctrine of constructive notice has been 
abolished, there is still room for the application of the Turquand rule to enable a 
third party to hold a company to a contract.  Otherwise it would impede business 
dealings with companies, as the risk to the third contracting party of being unable 
to hold a company bound under circumstances where he has no way of knowing 
of a defect relating to the internal management of the company, would be too 
great. 
 
                                                          
627
  Oosthuizen 1977 TSAR 210 at 217. 
628
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 178 and 244. 
629
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 187: 
Die leerstuk van toegerekende kennis is in die Australiese reg afgeskaf as gevolg van die 
negatiewe uitwerking wat hierdie leerstuk op die ‘indoor management rule’ gehad het. 
630
  1989. 
631
  Morrison 1996 QUTLJ 28 at 28. 
632
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 185. 
633
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 244. 
634
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 181. 
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3.3.4  Statutory regulation of non-compliance with formal and procedural 
requirements 
 
The heading of section 20 (of which section 20(7) forms a subsection), refers to 
the “[v]alidity of company actions”.  As section 20(7) does not pertain to the validity 
of company actions but to the authority of representatives to act on behalf of the 
company, this subsection should not have been inserted under this heading.  It 
appears that the legislature failed to distinguish between these two vitally different 
concepts throughout section 20 which leads to confusion in the interpretation of 
the subsections in section 20.635 
 
At first glance, it seems as though section 20(7) of the 2008 Companies Act is the 
statutory counterpart of the common-law Turquand rule.636  On a more careful 
reading, however, it transpires that what appears to be a codified  common-law 
Turquand rule is not that at all, for two reasons:  First section 20(8) provides that 
section 20(7) should be construed concurrently with and not in substitution for any 
relevant common-law principle relating to the presumed validity of the actions of a 
company in the exercise of its powers.  Secondly, on close examination there are 
differences between section 20(7) and the common-law Turquand rule.637 
 
Section 20(7) provides as follows: 
 
A person dealing with a company in good faith, other than a director, prescribed 
officer or shareholder of the company, is entitled to presume that the company, in 
making any decision in the exercise of its powers, has complied with all of the 
formal and procedural requirements in terms of this Act, its Memorandum of 
Incorporation and any rules of the company unless, in the circumstances, the 
person knew or reasonably ought to have known of any failure by the company to 
comply with any such requirement. 
 
                                                          
635
  Also see Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 834. 
636
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(3). Also see Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 184; Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 841; Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 469; 
McLennan 2009 Obiter 144 at 152. 
637
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 170. 
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Both these rules prohibit a company from relying on the non-compliance of certain 
requirements to evade liability and only bona fide third parties who have no 
knowledge of non-compliance are protected by these rules.638 
 
3.3.4.1 Insiders v outsiders 
 
Section 20(7) excludes directors, prescribed officers and shareholders from the 
benefit of this section.639  There are differences of opinion in respect of the 
application of the common-law Turquand rule where the third party is an insider.640 
 
These differences of opinion regarding the common-law Turquand rule, is not a 
problem in the application of section 20(7), as directors (and prescribed officers) 
are regarded as insiders, who cannot invoke the protection of section 20(7).  In 
this sense the operation of section 20(7) is more restrictive than the common-law 
Turquand rule in its availability to these categories of persons.641 
 
In terms of regulation 38 issued under the 2008 Companies Act, a prescribed 
officer, although not a director, exercises general executive control over and 
management of the whole, or a significant part of the business and activities of the 
company.  From these prescribed functions can be determined that a prescribed 
officer should be treated in the same manner as a director. 
 
The position of shareholders is, however, different under the common-law 
Turquand rule and section 20(7).  The courts do not seem to have any difficulty 
granting the protection of the Turquand rule to shareholders.642  Some writers also 
agree with this approach,643 at least in respect of resolutions required to be taken 
at a board meeting.644 
                                                          
638
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 841. 
639
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 841; Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 471.   
640
  In this regard, see para 3.2.2.2 above. 
641
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 171. 
642
  George Bargate v Richard Shortridge (1855) 5 HL Cas 297; In re Fireproof Doors Ltd 
(Umney v The Company) [1916] 2 Ch 142.   
643
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(3); Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 179. 
644
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 471. The position is, for example different in the instance where 
the internal requirement that has to be complied with involves the granting of authority by 
the general meeting of shareholders. In such an instance, the shareholder should have 
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Baiketlile,645 in comparing the company legislation of Botswana and South Africa, 
states that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to exclude insiders 
from the protection of the Turquand rule where they are clearly “outsiders”.  It 
would be unfair to exclude shareholders who do not have inside information 
regarding management decisions of the board of directors from the benefit of 
section 20(7).  I agree that in this sense (especially in relation to board 
resolutions), section 20(7) cannot be supported.646 
 
3.3.4.2 Presumption that requirements have been met 
 
Section 20(7) states that the third contracting party is “entitled to presume”647 that 
the formal and procedural requirements have been met.  According to the 
common-law Turquand rule, the contracting third party is entitled to assume 
compliance with internal requirements.  It is unfortunate that the word “presume” 
has been used in section 20(7) as a presumption can be rebutted.648  This may 
imply that when the third party relies on section 20(7), the company can rebut the 
presumption that all the internal requirements have been complied with, leaving 
the third party with no remedy.649  If the intention of the legislature was that this is 
a presumption that can be rebutted, section 20(7) would not serve any purpose 
and would be rendered nugatory.  As there is a presumption when interpreting 
statutes that the legislature does not intend to make futile, pointless and ineffectual 
provisions,650 I cannot agree with the interpretation of section 20(7) as providing 
for a rebutable presumption.  
 
Further, the Companies Act of 2008 in the Afrikaans language does not speak 
about a presumption (“vermoede”) but provides that the bona fide third party is 
“geregtig om te veronderstel…”, which, when translated into English can mean 
                                                                                                                                                                                
knowledge that the required authority has not been granted and would not under these 
circumstances be in a position to rely on the Turquand rule. 
645
  Baiketlile Corporate Capacity 28-29. 
646
  Also see Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 471; Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 171. For a contrary view 
in respect of shareholders, see Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 185. 
647
  My emphasis. 
648
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(3). 
649
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 473. 
650
  Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 189-191. 
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“suppose; assume; conjecture; believe; imply; presume; hypothesise, 
(pre)suppose; take for granted; expect;”.651   
 
The Turquand rule has been described as only being an application of the 
rebuttable presumption omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta.652  As this 
presumption is rebuttable and a characteristic of the Turquand rule is indeed that it 
would not assist the company to prove that the internal requirements were not 
complied with, this presumption cannot serve as explanation for the Turquand 
rule.653  The courts have, when formulating the Turquand rule in the past used the 
word “presume” in stead of, for example, assume.654  They have, however, not 
discussed it in the context of a presumption made by the third contracting party 
being capable of rebuttal by the company.  It is therefore submitted that when the 
courts used the word “presume”, they did not use it in the context of a presumption 
that may be rebutted, but merely meant that a third party could assume, suppose, 
believe and take for granted that the internal requirements had been observed. 
 
A further presumption in the interpretation of statutes is that unless the contrary is 
clearly indicated, the intention of the legislature is not to amend the existing law 
more than is necessary.655  As section 20(7) would be ineffective if it means a 
                                                          
651
  Du Plessis et al Pharos Dictionary. 
652
  This means that all things are presumed to have been done correctly and solemnly, unless 
it is proved to the contrary.  See Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 7 where he criticises this 
opinion and refers to sources where this opinion is supported. Also see Blackman et al 
Commentary ch 4 34; Wunsh 1992 TSAR 545 at 546 for authorities who support the view 
that the basis for the Turquand rule is the application of the presumption omnia 
praesumuntur rite ac solemniter esse acta. 
653
  Oosthuizen 1979 TSAR 1 at 7. Also see Blackman et al Commentary ch 4 34 who 
recommend not using the word “presumption” but to simply view the Turquand rule as that 
the third party acting in good faith may assume that all internal formalities have been met. 
654
  In Potchefstroom se Stadsraad v Kotze [1960] 3 All SA 402 (A) 414-415, where Malan AJA 
words the Turquand rule, he uses the word “presume”.  Also see, for example, Legg & Co v 
Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 132 at 144; Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf, Limited [1896] 2 
Ch 93 (CA) 106 and per Wessels J in SA Securities Ltd v Nicholas 1911 TPD 450 at 460. 
 
In The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 (3) SA 831 (A) 847 where Greenberg JA 
discusses the Turquand rule he also uses the word “presume”.  Greenberg JA, however, 
also uses the words “presumed” and “assume” in the same breath at 849: 
It seems to me that the true position is that the necessary acts of internal management are 
presumed to have been performed and not that a particular person is entitled to assume that 
they have. 
655
  This is subject thereto that such interpretation does not conflict with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 and that statutory rights and remedies more advantageous 
to those who stand to benefit from them will take precedence over common-law rights and 
remedies.  See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 177-181. 
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rebuttable presumption, and as the Afrikaans translation does not speak of a 
presumption but of a “veronderstelling”, and as the court in discussing the 
common-law Turquand rule (with similarities to section 20(7)) used the word 
“presumption” but with a meaning akin to assumption (and not a legal 
presumption), it is submitted that “presume” in the context of section 20(7) does 
not refer to a rebuttable presumption but should be interpreted to mean “suppose”, 
“assume”, “believe” and “take for granted”.  Where section 20(7) is discussed in 
One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The 
CRL Trust as intervening creditor 656 Rogers J used the word “assume” and not 
“presume”.657 
 
3.3.4.3 Capacity of the company v authority of the directors 
 
Henochsberg658 suggests that it could be argued that section 20(7) pertains to the 
capacity of the company rather than the authority of the directors to act on behalf 
of the company.  When reading the part of section 20(7) stating that a third party is 
entitled to presume that “… the company, in making any decision in the exercise of 
its powers …”659 has complied with all the requirements, it seems, so 
Henochberg660 contends, as though section 20(7) will only find application where 
the capacity of the company is concerned.   When reference to “powers” is made 
in the Act, generally it relates to the capacity of the company, for example in 
section 20(1).661  What makes this inference even stronger, according to 
Henochsberg, is that section 20(7) is organised under the same section as section 
20(1), dealing with the capacity of the company. 
 
As already alluded to above, the organisation of the subsections in section 20 
causes confusion regarding whether the section relates to the capacity of the 
company, or the authority of the directors or to both.  It cannot therefore be said 
that because section 20(7) falls under the heading “[v]alidity of company actions” 
that it pertains to the capacity of the company.  If section 20(7) is intended to deal 
                                                          
656
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC). 
657
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. 
658
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(4). 
659
  My emphasis. 
660
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(4). 
661
  Also see for example section 76. 
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with the capacity of the company, it would mean that the principles of section 20(1) 
would apply in terms whereof knowledge on the part of the third party is irrelevant 
to hold the company to the contract, while knowledge on the part of the third party 
is very relevant in the application of section 20(7).662  When the principles of 
section 20(1) are applied, those principles would make section 20(7) ineffective 
and useless, as the company would be bound to the contract irrespective of 
whether the contracting third party had knowledge of non-compliance with 
requirements.663  As it is presumed that the legislature does not intend making 
useless or purposeless provisions,664 it could not have been the intention of the 
legislature that section 20(7) provides relief in the event of the capacity of the 
company being exceeded.  
 
Van der Linde665 comments on the possibility that section 20(7) pertains to 
irregularities relating to the capacity of the company as discussed by Henochsberg 
above.  She states that this interpretation does not take into account the other 
important wording in this respect in the section.  The third party is entitled to 
presume that “… the company, in making any decision666 in the exercise of its 
powers …” means that the formal and procedural requirements relate to those that 
are required for a decision (resolution) of the company.667  Van der Linde668 further 
contends that for the decision to be in the exercise of the company’s powers, such 
decision must be intra vires.  I agree that this wording is capable of such an 
interpretation.  This also holds true of the common-law Turquand rule.669 
 
3.3.4.4 Meaning and scope of “formal and procedural” requirements 
 
According to Van der Linde, 670 the most important feature of section 20(7), in 
distinguishing this section from the common-law Turquand rule, is the nature of the 
                                                          
662
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(4). 
663
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(4). 
664
  Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 189-191. 
665
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
666
  My emphasis. 
667
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. See, however, the critique in Delport and Vorster 
Henochsberg 2008 106(4). 
668
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
669
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(1). 
670
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 841. 
- 109 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
requirements that can be presumed to have been complied with.  In a recent 
South African decision, One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan 
Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as intervening creditor) 671 the court, 
however, expressed the view that “formal and procedural requirements” as 
contemplated in section 20(7) should be interpreted consistently with “… the 
conventional scope of Turquand”.672  The court expressed the view that where the 
prior approval of shareholders is a prerequisite for the authority of the board, such 
shareholders’ approval would amount to a formal or procedural requirement.673  
The court further stated that the restrictions placed on the authority delegated to a 
managing director should also be regarded as formal or procedural 
requirements.674  The judge, however, did not view the granting of authority to an 
ordinary director as falling within a formal or procedural requirement.675 
 
The wording “… that the company, in making any decision 676 in the exercise of its 
power, has complied …” indicates, according to Delport,677 that there should have 
been a decision that was actually taken and that it is presumed that that decision 
was properly taken.  It is not presumed that a decision was taken.  Van der 
Linde678 believes that the choice of wording in section 20(7) (“decision” instead of 
“resolution” and “making” instead of “adopting”) indicates that section 20(7) applies 
to “technically defective resolutions.”  She then concludes that where a resolution 
or decision itself is required for a particular act, the requirement for such a 
                                                          
671
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) per Rogers J. 
672
  One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL 
Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. He therefore followed the 
approach in the interpretation of statutes that there is a presumption that the legislature 
does not intend to amend the existing law more than what it clearly indicates.  See Du 
Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 177-181. 
673
  One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL 
Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. 
674
  One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL 
Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. In other words, where the 
managing director acts within the usual authority of a managing director, he would, the 
same as under the common-law Turquand rule, be able to rely on section 20(7). 
675
  One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL 
Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. In other words, he applied the 
common-law restriction to the Turquand rule, that it would only find application if the act of 
the representative can usually be associated with a person in his position in the company 
and that it is outside the usual authority of a single director to conclude a contract on behalf 
of a company, to s 20(7). In this regard, see Ch 2 para 2.2.1. Also see the discussion under 
para 3.3.4.6 below. 
676
  My emphasis. 
677
  Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 137. 
678
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
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resolution or decision cannot be brought within the meaning of “formal and 
procedural requirements”.  Requirements for the adoption of these resolutions, 
would, however, be regarded as formal and procedural requirements in terms of 
section 20(7).679 
 
I agree with both authors on this aspect.  It means that the application of the 
common-law Turquand rule is wider than section 20(7) in this respect.  Where the 
powers of the directors to perform a particular act are made subject to 
shareholders’ approval in the constitution of the company, a third party is entitled 
to assume that the shareholders’ approval was obtained.680  This appears not to 
be the case under section 20(7).  Only irregularities in the taking of the 
shareholders’ resolution would be covered by section 20(7). 
 
After determining requirements for decisions that may fall under the application of 
section 20(7), it should further be ascertained whether these requirements have a 
“formal and procedural” nature.681  Van der Linde682 believes a distinction should 
be drawn between substantive requirements and formal and procedural 
requirements. 
 
According to Locke683 “formal and procedural requirements” are not known under 
the common law.  She opinions that “internal formalities” as contemplated in the 
common-lawTurquand rule will fall under “formal and procedural requirements” as 
contemplated in section 20(7),684 which means that the application of section 20(7) 
is wider in this regard.  Examples of internal irregularities under the common-law 
Turquand rule are defective notice of board meetings685 and shareholders’ 
                                                          
679
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. Requirements set out in the Companies Act would 
include notification and quorum requirements, requirements relating to the appointment of 
proxies, the manner of voting and the counting of votes, identification of shareholders, and 
the requirements for electronic participation in meetings. Many of these requirements may 
be amended and additional requirements added in the Memorandum of Incorporation. 
There may even be extra requirements set out in the rules of the company. 
680
  The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327 at 332; The Mine Workers’ Union v 
Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A). 
681
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
682
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
683
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 171. 
684
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 171. 
685
  Sugden v Beaconhurst Dairies (Pty) Ltd 1963 2 SA 174 (E); Burstein v Yale 1958 1 SA 768 
(W). 
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meetings,686 that the required quorum was not present,687 deficient appointment of 
officers, absence of a shareholders’ resolution prescribed by the constitution of the 
company authorising the particular act.688  In this last mentioned internal 
irregularity, there was, however, no decision that was taken, and it would not fall 
under section 20(7) in terms of the reasoning above. 
 
3.3.4.5 Formal and procedural requirements in terms of the Companies Act of 
2008 
 
Section 20(7) provides for presumed compliance with internal requirements set out 
inter alia in the Companies Act of 2008 itself.689  In this sense section 20(7) has a 
wider application than the common-law Turquand rule in that requirements laid 
down in various documents may be presumed to have been met. 
 
Traditionally the common-law Turquand rule makes provision only for the 
assumption of compliance with internal requirements as found in the public 
documents (articles of association) of the company. The common-law Turquand 
rule does not find application in respect of statutory requirements that have been 
laid down, at least not regarding the statutory requirements in section 228 of the 
1973 Companies Act.690  
 
According to Jooste,691 when looking at the reason for the decision of our courts 
with regard to the non-applicability of the Turquand rule in respect of statutory 
requirements laid down by section 228 of the 1973 Companies Act,692 the reason 
being the protection of the shareholders, the question arises whether this reason 
                                                          
686
  In re Hampshire Land Company [1896] 2 Ch 743; Pacific Coast Coal Mines Ltd v Arbuthnot 
[1917] AC 607 (PC). 
687
  In re Fireproof Doors Ltd (Umney v The Company) [1916] 2 Ch 142; Welgedacht 
Exploration Co Ltd v Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Investment Co Ltd 1909 TH 90; County of 
Gloucester Bank v Rudry Merthyr Steam & House Coal Colliery Co [1895] 1 Ch 629 (CA). 
688
  The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327. 
689
  My emphasis. 
690
  A special resolution of the members of the company was required for the disposal of the 
whole or the greater part of the assets or undertaking of the company. In this regard, see 
Farren v Sun Service SA Photo Trip Management (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 146 (C) and Stand 
242 Hendrik Potgieter Road Ruimsig v Göbel [2011] 3 All SA 549 (SCA). Also see Jooste 
2013 SALJ 464 at 470 and Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 841. 
691
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 470. 
692
  See Stand 242 Hendrik Potgieter Road Ruimsig (Pty) Ltd v Göbel [2011] 3 All SA 549 
(SCA). 
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can be extended to other instances where the 2008 Companies Act requires a 
special resolution.693  It seems that the requirement of a special resolution in many 
of these sections694 is aimed at the protection of the shareholders, in which event 
the common-law Turquand rule may not find application.  If it does find application, 
it would render the special resolution requirement useless.  Seeing that section 
20(7) condones lack of compliance with formal and procedural requirements 
contained in the Act itself, it seems at first glance as though section 20(7) renders 
the special resolution requirement useless.  There is a presumption that the 
intention of the legislature is not to make ineffective and useless provisions.695  It 
must therefore be presumed that the requirement of a special resolution in the 
Companies Act of 2008 under particular circumstances was not intended to be 
nullified by the application of section 20(7). 
 
Furthermore, in some of these sections (for example sections 44 and 45) setting 
down a special resolution as requirement, a transaction in contravention of the 
section is visited with voidness if there is non-compliance with such 
requirement.696  Section 20(7) may, however, be construed that the third party may 
use section 20(7) to hold the company to such a void act.  There is therefore a 
conflict between the provisions of, for example, sections 44 and 45 and section 
20(7) under these circumstances.697 
 
Some authors698 state that a distinction should be drawn between substantive 
provisions of the Companies Act of 2008 (which would not be covered by section 
                                                          
693
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 470 lists the following sections of the 2008 Companies Act: 
… the issue of shares (s 41); the issue of securities convertible into shares (s 41); the granting 
of options or other rights exercisable for securities (ss 41 and 42); financial assistance for the 
subscription for, or purchase of, securities (s 44); loans or other financial assistantce to the 
‘outsiders’ referred to in s 45; ‘repurchases’ of shares from the ‘outsiders’ referred to in section 
48(8); the disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or undertaking of a company (s 112); 
and the fundamental transactions referred to in s 115(1). 
694
  See the sections referred to in the previous footnote. 
695
  Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 189-191. 
696
  To make these sections even more confusing, s 218(1) provides that an agreement or 
resolution that is void in terms of the Act is not void unless the court declares it void. 
697
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 470; Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 841. 
698
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 171; Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
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20(7))699 and formal and procedural requirements as contemplated in section 
20(7). 
 
According to this view, all acts which require a special resolution from the 
shareholders would be substantive and non-compliance with those would not 
entitle a third party to the protection of section 20(7).700  This answers the concern 
raised by Jooste701 above in respect of special resolutions and that the basis of the 
decision in Stand 242 Hendrik Potgieter Road Ruimsig (Pty) Ltd v Göbel,702 
namely the protection of the shareholders, should be extended to all instances 
where shareholders’ approval by means of a special resolution is required by the 
Companies Act of 2008.703 
 
I agree with the contention that the reference to “formal and procedural” 
requirements denotes that there must at least be an attempted resolution and that 
no resolution at all, will not be covered by section 20(7).704  Where a decision is 
required705 (irrespective of whether it is a decision of the board of directors or the 
shareholders), such requirement can never be regarded as a “formal or 
procedural” requirement as covered by section 20(7).706  The requirements to 
which the resolutions are subject should also be tested to ascertain whether they 
are “formal and procedural” rather than substantive in nature.707 
 
                                                          
699
  Ratification by the company will also not be possible if the act whereby the authority of the 
directors is exceeded amounts to a contravention of the Companies Act of 2008 itself - s 
20(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
700
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 171. 
701
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 470. 
702
  [2011] 3 All SA 549 (SCA). 
703
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 171-172. S 65(11) lists the instances where a special resolution 
by the shareholders is required. 
704
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
705
  Either in the Act or the Memorandum of Incorporation or the rules. There are several 
requirements laid down by the Act regarding the taking of resolutions which includes notice 
of shareholders’ meetings (s62), the quorum required at such meetings (s64), the 
appointment of proxies (s58), resolutions taken other than at a shareholders’ meeting 
(s60), conducting of meetings (s63), board meetings (s73), directors acting other than at a 
meeting (s74) etc.  Many of these requirements may be amended by the Memorandum of 
Incorporation and further requirements may also be laid down in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation. 
706
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
707
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
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I therefore agree with Van der Linde708 that not only the wording “in making any 
decision” (as discussed above) but also the words “formal and procedural 
requirements” confirm that to pass a special resolution, even if it is required for the 
taking of another decision by, for example, the board, in itself cannot be regarded 
as a formal or procedural requirement.  She further unequivocally states that; 
 
… [s]hareholder approval, whether by special or ordinary resolution or for that 
matter by unanimous assent cannot be relegated to the status of a formality or 
procedural step.709 
 
Van der Linde710 and Locke711 (although their reasoning differs) agree that the 
taking of a special resolution cannot be seen as a formal or procedural 
requirement.  I agree with them.  
 
Locke,712 however, goes further and asks what the position would be in the 
instance where a shareholder resolution was taken but there was non-compliance 
with the procedure of such meeting, for example the notice period, quorum 
requirement etcetera.  From the wording of section 62(6) she avers that an 
inference can be drawn that where there was a material (rather than an 
immaterial) defect in the form or manner of giving notice or an intentional (as 
opposed to an unintentional) failure to give notice, this would affect the validity of 
the actions taken by the shareholders at that meeting.  Although the other sections 
relating to requirements for the meetings of shareholders do not have a similar 
provision pertaining to the validity of resolutions upon non-compliance, Locke713 
states that these requirements are worded in a preremptory manner and could 
therefore also affect the validity of resolutions taken at such meetings.  Whether 
non-compliance with these requirements would affect a contracting third party 
should, according to her, be considered by looking at the circumstances of each 
case and she suggests that the materiality of the defect and intentional failure as 
contemplated in section 62(6) should be taken into account when a court 
considers the validity of a resolution or to state it in her words, “… whether the 
                                                          
708
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
709
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842-843. 
710
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842. 
711
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 172. 
712
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 172. 
713
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 172. 
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meeting could be said to have voiced a valid opinion”.714  She voices the hope that 
the courts would also consider the extent of the defect and the potential prejudice 
to a contracting third party where the action of the company is invalid due to non- 
compliance with formal or procedural requirements.  She goes on to state that 
under certain circumstances the third party would succeed in relying on section 
20(7).715  She further contends that in instances where the Act expressly renders 
non-compliance with, for example a special resolution, void,716 non-compliance 
with an internal formality regarding such special resolution cannot be made good 
by section 20(7).717 
 
Generally speaking, the position in respect of the requirement for an ordinary 
resolution laid down by the Act should be the same as for the requirement of a 
special resolution.718  In other words, the absence of such a resolution cannot be 
made good by section 20(7).  If requirements with a formal or procedural nature 
were, however, not complied with in the taking of the ordinary resolution, section 
20(7) may come to the aid of the contracting third party.719  
 
3.3.4.6 Person(s) representing the company:  Formal or procedural requirements 
set out in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules 
 
As the court in One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings 
(Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as intervening creditor)720 held that the restrictions in the 
application of the common-law Turquand rule in relation to the interpretation of 
“formal and procedural requirements” should be retained,721  it viewed the 
restrictions placed on the authority of a managing director to act on behalf of a 
                                                          
714
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 173. If understood correctly, this would mean that there is a valid 
resolution and section 20(7) would not be needed. 
715
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 173. 
716
  See ss 44 and 45. 
717
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 175-176. 
718
  I agree with Locke (2016 SALJ 160 at 173) that the purpose of an ordinary resolution is 
also the protection of shareholders. 
719
  Van der Linde 2015 TSAR 833 at 842-843: 
   Shareholder approval, whether by special or ordinary resolution or for that matter by 
unanimous assent cannot be relegated to the status of a formality or procedural step.  
See Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 174-175 for an analysis of all the situations in the Companies 
Act where an ordinary resolution is required. 
720
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC). 
721
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. 
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company as falling under the concept of formal and procedural requirements, 
which would have the effect that the third party could rely on the protection 
afforded by section 20(7).  The court, however, did not regard the granting of 
authority to an ordinary director to fall under “procedural or formal 
requirements”.722 
 
Unfortunately, the court, in its judgment, intermingled estoppel and the Turquand 
rule and saw the Turquand rule (and section 20(7)) as a sub-component of 
estoppel.723  According to this view the contracting third party must firstly establish 
ostensible authority (if he cannot prove actual authority) to hold the company 
bound to the contract.  Then, the third party, it was held: 
  
… cannot be non-suited because of non-compliance on the part of the company 
with some formal or procedural requirement which would have been necessary to 
make the ostensible agent’s authority complete.724 
 
I can, with respect, not agree with the above reasoning regarding the conflation of 
estoppel and section 20(7).  I do, however, agree with the view of the court that 
the common-law principles should still be applied in the interpretation of 
legislation, unless the legislature specifically provided to the contrary.725  It is 
therefore submitted that the application of section 20(7) should also be restricted 
to those instances where the act that a representative performs on behalf of a 
company is usually associated with the position that that representative holds in 
the company.  In other words, if a representative acts outside his usual authority a 
contracting third party should not be able to hold the company to that contract in 
terms of section 20(7) in the same way that he would not be able to hold the 
company liable under the common-law Turquand rule.  If the usual authority of an 
                                                          
722
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. 
723
  The Turquand rule is a rule independent of estoppel. See paras 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above in 
this regard. It is submitted that section 20(7), as with the common-law Turquand rule, 
should not be seen as a component or appearance form of estoppel, but as functioning on 
its own. 
724
  One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL 
Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [56]. 
725
  Unless the contrary appears, it is presumed that the legislature does not want to change 
the existing law more than is necessary – This is subject thereto that such interpretation 
does not conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and that 
statutory rights and remedies more advantageous to those who stand to benefit from them 
will take precedence over common-law rights and remedies.  See Du Plessis Re-
Interpretation of Statutes 177-181. 
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officer is exceeded, that constitutes suspicious circumstances that should place a 
contracting third party on guard.  Under these circumstances the third party cannot 
be said to be bona fide, which is a requirement of section 20(7).726 
 
Where the restriction on the authority (for example prior approval of the 
shareholders 727 for particular acts) of the board or other representative is set out 
in the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company (rather than in the 
Companies Act of 2008 itself), it can be agreed with Locke728 that both section 
20(7) and the Turquand rule may come to the rescue of the third contracting party.  
It is, however, submitted that the protection of the common-law Turquand rule will 
stretch further than that of section 20(7).  As already discussed above, for section 
20(7) to apply, there must at least be an attempt at the taking of a resolution (in 
other words, for example, a shareholders’ resolution, which was the prerequisite, 
must exist although it may be defective due to non-compliance of some or other 
procedural requirement), whereas the common-law Turquand rule can also make 
good the total absence of such shareholders’ resolution.729 
 
Only internal requirements set out in the Act, the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation and the company’s rules may be presumed to be regular under 
section 20(7).  Section 20(7) does not provide for internal requirements that may 
be contained in an agreement between the shareholders and the company and the 
directors730 or a resolution by shareholders restricting the authority of the 
directors.731 
 
  
                                                          
726
  This is also the view of Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 177. She voices the hope at 178 that 
section 20(7) would be interpreted by the court bearing in mind the boundaries within which 
the Turquand rule finds application. 
727
  Irrespective of whether a special or ordinary resolution is required. 
728
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 178: 
Since these requirements are contained only in the MOI and not in the Act, third parties cannot 
be deemed to be aware of them. But even if third parties become aware of these requirements, 
they will not be able to ascertain from the public documents alone whether these requirements 
have been met.  This is the typical scenario where the common-law Turquand rule intervened to 
promote efficient business, and it must arguably be the intention that s 20(7) would apply, too. 
729
  See for example The Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327. 
730
  Such an agreement does not fall under the definition of a shareholders’ agreement as 
contemplated in section 15(7) of the Act. 
731
  Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 137. 
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3.3.4.7 Good faith and knowledge of third contracting party 
 
Reliance on the common-law Turquand rule is excluded if the third party knows of 
the irregularity or where the circumstances are suspicious and the third party has 
therefore been placed on his guard and in cases of fraud.732  The bona fides of the 
third party is excluded under these circumstances 733 and the Turquand rule is only 
available to a bona fide third party. 
 
Section 20(7) will not be available if the third party did not act in good faith and 
knew or reasonably ought to have known of any failure to comply with a 
procedural requirement. 
 
Some authors734 are of the view that “reasonably ought to have known” stretches 
much wider than the exclusion relating to knowledge under the common-law 
Turquand rule.  According to this view the common-law Turquand rule will not be 
available to a third party who knew or suspected that an internal formality or 
procedure had not been observed, resulting in a subjective test.  Against this, 
section 20(7) requires an objective test by denying a third party who reasonably 
ought to have known of non-compliance with a formality, its protection.735  As the 
test is objective, as opposed to a subjective test used in applying the common-law 
Turquand rule, section 20(7) is narrower than the common-law rule in this regard. 
 
Although I agree with these authors that an objective test is to be used in 
determining whether the third contracting party reasonably ought to have known of 
the non-compliance with an internal requirement as contemplated in section 20(7), 
I do not agree that the inquiry requirement is purely subjective under the common-
law Turquand rule.  Although the bona fides of a third party would be excluded if 
he subjectively suspected that there was an internal irregularity, suspicious 
circumstances that are objectively present would also deprive a third party from 
                                                          
732
  Morse et al Palmer’s Company Law 3053. 
733
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 256 and 264. 
734
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 472; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 185. 
735
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 185-186. This view is also shared by Jooste 
2013 SALJ 464 at 472; Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 137 and Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
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relying on the common-law Turquand rule.736  Some of these authors737 use the 
words “suspects” and “suspected”.  There is a difference between when a third 
party suspects an irregularity and where there are suspicious circumstances when 
it could have been expected from the third party to investigate further.  It is 
submitted that the suspicious circumstances and therefore due inquiry exclusion 
was already a subjective but also an objective test.  The question is not whether 
the third party found the particular circumstances suspicious subjectively, but 
whether there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the representative of 
the company did not have the necessary authority to act on behalf of the company.  
The due inquiry exception has been linked with the requirement of a reasonable 
man, in other words, where the circumstances were such as to put a reasonable 
man on inquiry, which indicates an objective test.738 
 
Locke739 submits that when a third contracting party deals with an “RF” company 
whose constitution contains restrictive conditions, such third party should not be 
entitled to the protection afforded by section 20(7) if he did not investigate whether 
these restrictive conditions have been complied with.  Such third party, so Locke740 
contends, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.  As the doctrine of 
constructive notice applies to these restrictive conditions, so her argument goes, 
third parties dealing with such a company is deemed to have knowledge of these 
restrictive conditions which is bolstered by the suffix “RF” that is added to the 
name of such companies and which should put a third contracting party who deals 
with an “RF” company on inquiry.741  According to Locke742 this would mean that a 
third contracting party 
                                                          
736
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 272. The judgment in AL Underwood Limited v Bank of 
Liverpool and Martins [1924] 1 KB 775 indicates such an objective approach. Also see Big 
Dutchman (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1979 3 SA 267 (W) 284. 
737
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 185-186; Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
738
  See for example Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 135; McLennan 1979 SALJ 329 at 345; 
Rabie Verteenwoordiging 173; Kunst et al Henochsberg 1973 131; Millet et al Gore-
Browne on Companies at 8-13; Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 149-150; Griffin 
Company Law 123. 
739
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
740
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
741
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
742
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
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… would reasonably be expected to gain actual knowledge of the content of the 
relevant clauses [restrictive conditions]743 in the MOI as well as of compliance with 
those clauses …  
 
before they would be able to rely on the protection of section 20(7). 
 
This argument can, with respect, only partly be supported.  I agree that if the 
condition requires, for example, shareholders’ approval, the third party should 
enquire whether such resolution was taken.  That the resolution was taken, cannot 
be presumed.744  If, however, compliance with formal or procedural requirements 
in the taking of the shareholders’ resolution are lacking, the third party should still 
be able to make use of section 20(7). 
 
If a third party is compelled to obtain actual knowledge of compliance with 
procedural and formal requirements pertaining to a restrictive condition of an “RF” 
company, section 20(7) can never be used when the third party contracts with an 
“RF” company.  If the third party did not obtain actual knowledge of compliance 
with the restrictive condition (for example shareholder approval or debenture 
holders’ approval), so Locke avers, he will not be able to rely on section 20(7), as 
there were suspicious circumstances (the “RF” added to the end of the name of 
the company).  If the third party did obtain actual knowledge of compliance with 
the restrictive conditions (shareholder approval or consent of debenture holders) 
section 20(7) would be redundant, but Locke argues that the third party would then 
be entitled to rely on section 20(7).  The reason why Locke745 comes to this 
conclusion is because the suspicious circumstances would defeat the good faith of 
the third party. 
 
As the common-law Turquand rule is also only available to bona fide third parties 
where there are no suspicious cicumstances that put the third party on inquiry, 
then the common-law Turquand rule should, by analogy to Locke’s reasoning 
similarly not be able to come to the rescue of a contracting third party dealing with 
an “RF” company. 
 
                                                          
743
  See in this regard the definition of “knowing”, “knowlingly” and “knows” in section 1 of the 
Companies Act of 2008. 
744
  See in this regard para 3.3.4.4 above. 
745
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
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There is a presumption that unless the contrary is indicated the legislature does 
not intend to amend existing law more than is necessary.746  Therefore the 
common law regarding the Turquand rule and the reasoning of its function and 
creation should still be relevant when interpreting section 20(7).  The common-law 
Turquand rule was developed by the courts for the very reason that a third party is 
not compelled to investigate compliance with the internal management of a 
company, simply because it is not practically possible to do so. 
 
If one follows Locke’s reasoning, it would mean that under all circumstances, when 
a contracting third party deals with an “RF” company, it would constitute 
suspicious circumstances which would negate the good faith of such contracting 
third party.  If that were the case, the legislature could easily have made express 
provision therefor.  Furthermore, if that were the case, a third party could never 
safely contract with an “RF” company, as he would be expected to investigate 
whether the formal and procedural requirements, to which he has no access and 
to which he also does not have a right to access, have been met.  To expect this 
from a third contracting party would make business dealings with “RF” companies 
impossible.747 This would also inhibit the dealings by “RF” companies as no 
contracting third parties would want to risk doing business with them. 
 
It is submitted that the default position is that the doctrine of constructive notice 
does not apply to the public documents of a company that is filed at the CIPC or is 
accessible for inspection at the office of a company.748  The legislature is aware 
that the abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice has been advocated by 
many writers and that it has indeed been abolished in many jurisdictions including 
by the legislature itself in the Companies Act of 2008.  In certain limited instances, 
however, the legislature decided to retain this doctrine, but to counter its severe 
effects and thereby bringing a better balance between the company and the third 
                                                          
746
  This is subject thereto that such interpretation does not conflict with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 and that statutory rights and remedies more advantageous 
to those who stand to benefit from them will take precedence over common-law rights and 
remedies.  See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 177-181. 
747
  See for example Legg & Co v Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 132 per Solomon JA at 143-
144:   
And, indeed, unless some such principle were accepted, no one would be safe in dealing with 
joint stock companies. 
748
  S 19(4) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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contracting party.  The legislature therefore provided that third parties should be 
alerted when this default position changes and consequently does not apply, in 
other words when the doctrine of constructive notice does apply to provisions in 
the Memorandum of Incorporation.  This approach was also suggested by 
Benade.749  It is therefore submitted that this is the function of the requirements 
that the name of the company should end with “RF” and that the notice of 
incorporation should draw attention to restrictive conditions contained in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation as contemplated in section 15(2)(b) or (c) contained 
in the Memorandum of Incorporation. 750  I agree that the requirement of good faith 
in section 20(7), would be excluded if there are suspicious circumstances that 
would objectively place the contracting third party on his guard or on inquiry 
regarding the compliance with formal or procedural requirements in the taking of, 
example, a shareholders’ or debenture holders’ resolution where such resolution is 
required in the restrictive condition.  The “RF” suffixed to the name of a company, 
however, cannot constitute that suspicious circumstance. 
 
Suspicious circumstances relate to something out of the ordinary that indicates 
that the formal or procedural requirement has not been complied with, for 
example, a representative of the company that acts outside the usual authority of a 
person in his position at the company or where he performs an extraordinary act.  
In other words, it refers to suspicious circumstances that the formal or procedural 
requirement has not been complied with. I cannot see how “RF” alone can make a 
person suspicious about the fact that a formal or procedural requirement has not 
been observed. 
 
3.3.4.8 Consequences of presumed compliance with formal and procedural 
requirements 
 
Under the common-law Turquand rule, the company will be bound to a contract if 
the director did not have authority to represent the company in the conclusion of 
that particular contract due to non-compliance with an internal requirement.  
Section 20(7) does, however, not spell out the consequences of the presumed 
                                                          
749
  Benade Ultra Vires 45. 
750
  Ss 11(3)(b), 13(3) and 19(5) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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compliance with formalities and procedures in relation to the bona fide third party.  
A company’s invalid decision or conduct does not suddenly become valid just 
because one person may presume that it is valid.751 
 
3.3.4.9 Section 20(8) 
 
Section 20(8) provides that section 20(7) should be construed concurrently with 
and not in substitution of any relevant common-law principle relating to the 
presumed validity of the actions of a company in the exercise of its powers. 
 
Section 20(8) retains “relevant” common-law principles, which would aparrently 
include the common-law Turquand rule.752  It would therefore seem that a third 
party would have a choice of alternatives, as it is stated that the common-law 
principles apply concurrently with (along with753) section 20(7).754 
 
I agree with Jooste755 that section 20(8) does not refer to the common-law 
principle of estoppel.  Section 20(8) refers to a “common law principle relating to 
the presumed validity of the actions of a company in the exercise of its powers”.  
The effect of raising an estoppel is that the company is prevented from raising the 
defence of invalidity of the contract.  It does not operate to presume that the 
contract is indeed valid.756 
 
According to Cassim et al,757 the overlap between the common-law Turquand rule 
and section 20(7) could present difficulties in practice.  In certain respects, section 
20(7) can be applied more widely than the common-law Turquand rule and vice 
versa (see in this regard the comparison between the two above).  Delport758 is 
                                                          
751
  Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 137. 
752
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 185. 
753
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 469. 
754
  Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 138. Also see Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 469 where he also 
states: 
It does not appear to be a case of the common law continuing to apply but subject to s 20(7), or 
vice versa – the wording does not appear to permit such a meaning. 
755
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 474. 
756
  Jooste 2013 SALJ 464 at 474. 
757
  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 185. 
758
  Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 138. 
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also of the view that this overlap can lead to “legal arbitrage”.  Henochsberg759 is 
of the opinion that it would be an extremely challenging task to develop the 
common-law Turquand rule in line with section 20(7) and that the different 
circumstances under which either one of the two may be relied upon, are unclear.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
 
In terms of section 66(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 the board of directors has 
original authority to bind the company,760 except to the extent that its powers are 
limited by the Act itself or the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company.761   
 
Where the board has acted (by acting itself or by delegating authority to an agent) 
in contravention of a total restriction on its powers set out in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, the third party may still be able to hold the company bound if he can 
prove all the essential elements of estoppel. Because the doctrine of constructive 
notice has been abolished, save for a limited number of instances,762 the third 
party cannot be deemed to have had knowledge of this restriction, which would 
have prevented him from relying on estoppel.763  Where the power of the board 
has been made subject to compliance with some or other internal formality, the 
third party would still be able to hold the company to the contract if he can bring 
the transaction within the scope of application of either the Turquand rule or 
section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2006. 
 
The board also has the power to delegate one or more of its powers to a board 
committee, managing director, director or other agent.764  Where such an agent 
acts on behalf of a company, the question whether the company may be bound 
                                                          
759
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(5). 
760
  See para 3.3.1.1 above. 
761
  See para 3.3.1.3 above.   
762
  See par 3.3.2 above. 
763
  Only actual knowledge of the restriction can now disqualify the third party from relying on 
estoppel. 
764
  Section 66(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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must still be answered by applying the common-law principles of agency.765  If the 
agent has express or implied actual authority to act on behalf of the company, the 
company will be bound.  Although express authority usually does not present any 
problem, it is not always easy to determine whether an agent was clothed with 
implied authority.  The courts have in the past confused implied authority with 
estoppel, which impacts on the requirements necessary to be proved by the third 
party to hold the company bound.766  A clear distinction should therefore always be 
made between implied authority, which constitutes actual authority, and estoppel, 
which is no authority at all.767 
 
If the company cannot be held bound on grounds of actual authority (express or 
implied) of its agent, the third party may still be able to enforce the contract against 
the company on the grounds of the common-law Turquand rule, section 20(7) of 
the Companies Act, or estoppel.  In relying on any of these grounds, the third party 
will, except if he dealt with an “RF” company, not be deemed to have knowledge of 
any restriction on the powers of the board, the powers of the board to delegate, or 
on the powers of the particular agent contained in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation on the powers of the board, the powers of the board to delegate or 
on the powers of the particular agent. 
 
3.4.2 Problem areas 
 
The law of representation in company law in South Africa is in a totally 
unsatisfactory state, from the common law through to the Companies Act of 2008. 
 
First, at common law, the courts confused implied authority with estoppel.768  Not 
only the courts in England confused these two concepts, but also those in South 
                                                          
765
  See par 3.3.1.2 above. 
766
  See for example Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 1961 (2) SA 257 (W) 
266E;  Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 (2) SA 11 
(T) 14;  Zelpy 1780 (Proprietary) Limited v Mudaly 2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [47] 
767
  See par 3.2.1 above. 
768
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.1 and this chapter para 3.2.1. 
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Africa.769  Implied authority constitutes actual authority whereas estoppel is no 
authority at all.  There cannot be authority present and absent at the same time.770 
 
Secondly, an unsatisfactory state exists in respect of the persons who are entitled 
to rely on the Turquand rule.771  There are conflicting decisions by the English 
courts about the nature of an insider who does not have the benefit of the 
Turquand rule.772  The latest decision of the English court 773  has been criticised 
by South African writers.774  The applicability of the Turquand rule should not be 
determined by labelling the third party as an insider or an outsider. Preferably, the 
usual boundary of determining whether there existed circumstances where the 
third party was placed on inquiry and therefore should have investigated further 
whether the internal requirement was met, and whether he did indeed investigate 
further, should be applied. 
 
Thirdly, there is not yet certainty under what circumstances the application of the 
Turquand rule will be excluded in cases of forgery.775 The English courts have 
extended the initial meaning of a forgery, being a counterfeit signature, to 
instances where the signature of the representative is authentic but was affixed 
without authority and for a fraudulent purpose or genuine and innocently affixed 
without actual authority.776  This extension is unacceptable.  It would mean that the 
Turquand rule would in most cases never find application.   The suggestion from 
South African authors777 that cases of forgery should be dealt with within the 
existing boundaries of the Turquand rule, without adding forgery as a further 
exception at all, is supported.  It is hoped that the South African courts, when an 
opportunity arises to decide on this matter, will not follow the English courts. 
                                                          
769
  Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 2 SA 257 (W) 266E and confirmed with approval 
in Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Perpellief 1978 2 SA 11 (T) 14, 
also followed in Zelpy 1780 (Proprietary) Limited v Mudaly 2015 JDR 0187 (KZP) [47]. 
770
  See para 3.2.3 above. 
771
  See para 3.2.2.2 above. 
772
  See Howard v Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co (1888) LR 38 Ch D 156 and Morris v 
Kanssen [1946] 1 All ER 586 (HL) against Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 Q B 
549 (CA). 
773
  Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA). 
774
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 176; McLennan 1979 SALJ 329 at 354; Du Plessis Grondslae 
70. 
775
  See para 3.2.2.4 above. 
776
  Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Ltd [1927] 1 KB 826 CA; South London Greyhound 
Racecourses Ltd v Wake [1931] 1 Ch 496. 
777
  Oosthuizen Turquand-reël 285. 
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Fourthly, although the Turquand rule and estoppel are two different principles, the 
English courts have confused the two and regarded the Turquand rule as merely 
an appearance form of estoppel.778  Although the South African courts initially 
applied the two principles as separate doctrines, the concern that they would fall 
into the same trap as the English courts, has materialised.779  The intermingling of 
the Turquand rule with estoppel should be rejected outright.  It is much more 
onerous for a third party to rely on estoppel than on the Turquand rule, as more 
requirements need to be proved when relying on estoppel.780 
 
Fifthly, in the application of estoppel, it is uncertain whether negligence is a 
necessary requirement to be proved by the third party.  It appears that the 
requirement of fault as an essential element of estoppel has not been finally 
settled in our law.  It is suggested in this regard that the third party should simply 
need to prove that the principal (company) should reasonably have expected that 
an outsider would act on its representation.781 
 
Sixthly, as if the confusion between estoppel and the Turquand rule is not enough, 
the constitutional court recently managed to confuse estoppel with estoppel itself 
and made a distinction in estoppel where none is called for.  In Makate v Vodacom 
(Pty) Ltd 782 the constitutional court distinguished estoppel and ostensible authority 
from one another by averring that ostensible authority is actual authority whereas 
estoppel is not.  This judgment is against a long line of South African authorities 
and is objectionable in the strongest terms. 783  It simply added more fuel to the fire 
of confusion in the field of corporate representation. 
 
All the errors in the application of the common law and the uncertainties that exist, 
presented a great opportunity for the legislature to dispel with these problems.  
However, the reaction of the legislature as embodied in the Companies Act of 
2008 was, to say the least, very disappointing. 
                                                          
778
  See Ch 2 para 2.2.2 above. 
779
  One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Onwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust 
as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [25]; Also see Makate v Vodacom (Pty) 
Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) [110]. 
780
  See para 3.2.2.5 above. 
781
  See para 3.2.3.3 above. 
782
  2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
783
  See para 3.2.3.7 above. 
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One thing that the legislature can be commended for, is the abolition of the 
doctrine of constructive notice.784  The legislature has, however, countered this 
initiative by retaining the doctrine of constructive notice in respect of so-called ring-
fenced companies and personal liability companies.  This gives companies the 
opportunity to ensure that the company becomes an “RF” company whereby the 
doctrine of constructive notice is again resurrected shortly after its execution by 
the Companies Act of 2008.  This time round the Companies Act of 2008 
complicates the application of the doctrine of constructive notice by providing that 
it shall apply to restrictive conditions and any requirement for the amendment of 
any such condition in addition to the normal amendment requirements, if the name 
of the company includes the element “RF”and the Notice of Incorporation has 
drawn attention to these conditions.  It is uncertain what kind of conditions would 
constitute “restrictive conditions” and whether it pertains to conditions only 
restricting the capacity of the company, the authority of the directors to act on 
behalf of the company or both.  It is further uncertain whether a restrictive 
condition on its own would qualify as such or whether such condition must be 
coupled with a condition restricting its amendment.  It is very unfortunate indeed 
that the commendable effort of abolishing the doctrine of constructive notice was 
spoilt by its retention under certain circumstances.785 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 introduced a novel provision, namely section 20(7).  
The interpretation of section 20(7) is, however, littered with uncertainties.  At first 
glace this section appears to be the statutory enactment of the common-law 
Turquand rule.  However, on closer examination, section 20(7) differs from the 
Turquand rule, and its application is in certain instances wider and in other cases 
narrower than that of the Turquand rule.  The application and scope of section 
20(7) are full of uncertainties. 
 
First, this section is arranged under section 20, with the heading “[v]alidity of 
company actions”.  It is uncertain whether section 20(7) finds application in respect 
of actions of the company relating to the capacity of the company, or to the 
                                                          
784
  See para 3.3.2 above. 
785
  See para 3.3.2 above. 
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authority of the directors representing the company, or to both.786  It is imperative 
that these two concepts are clearly distinguished from one another. However, the 
legislature found it appropriate to mix them throughout section 20, so that it is not 
clear whether a particular subsection relates to the one or the other or to both. 
 
Secondly, the legislature has excluded shareholders from the protection of section 
20(7).  Whether a person may rely on section 20(7) should be determined by 
enquiring whether the person had access to the internal management of the 
company to establish whether the formal and procedural requirements of the 
company have been complied with.  Shareholders do not have access to the 
internal management of the company, at least not as far as resolutions of directors 
are concerned.  It is suggested that in respect of directors, prescribed officers and 
shareholders, it should first be determined whether they had access to the internal 
management of the company and secondly whether they had taken all reasonable 
steps to ensure that the internal requirements were observed.  If they did not have 
access or if they did, but they had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the 
requirements had been met, they should not be deprived of the protection of 
section 20(7).787 
 
Thirdly, the unfortunate use of the word “presume” in section 20(7) causes 
difficulties.  A presumption can be rebutted and where the company proves that 
the formal and procedural requirements have not been complied with, a third party 
may not presume that they have to enable him to rely on section 20(7).  This 
renders section 20(7) nugatory and it could just as well not have been enacted.788  
It would be better to replace “presume” with “assume”. 
 
Fourthly, there is uncertainty as to what “formal and procedural” requirements 
entail.  Many writers are of the view that it only relates to requirements in respect 
of a resolution or attempted resolution that was taken by the company and not 
where there was no resolution taken at all.789  In other words, where, for example, 
a resolution of shareholders is required for the particular act over and above the 
                                                          
786
  See para 3.3.4.3 above. 
787
  See paras 3.2.2.2 and 3.3.4.1 above. 
788
  See par 3.3.4.2 above. 
789
  See par 3.3.4.4 above. 
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resolution of the board, such shareholders’ resolution cannot be seen as a formal 
and procedural requirement that may be made good by section 20(7).  The 
application of section 20(7) in this regard is too narrow as this is an internal 
requirement of the company and a contracting third party would not be in a 
position to ascertain whether the shareholders’ resolution was taken or not. 
 
Fifthly, it is unclear how section 20(7) should be applied in respect of formal and 
procedural requirements laid down by the Companies Act itself, for example where 
the Act requires a a special resolution from the shareholders.790  Clarity in this 
regard is called for. 
 
Sixthly, some authors791 interpret the good faith requirement of section 20(7) as 
excluding third parties dealing with “RF” companies where the doctrine of 
constructive notice finds application.  The third party would, according to this view, 
be reasonably expected to gain actual knowledge of the content of the restrictive 
conditions in the Memorandum of Incorporation as well as of compliance with 
those clauses.  This view cannot be supported and section 20(7) should be 
clarified so as to exclude this interpretation.792 
 
Seventhly, section 20(7) does not spell out the consenquences of the presumed 
compliance with formalities and procedures in relation to bona fide third parties.  A 
company’s invalid decision or conduct will not suddenly become valid just because 
a third party may presume that it is valid.793 
 
Lastly, there exists uncertainty regarding the manner of integration of the common-
law Turquand rule with section 20(7).794  It is uncertain how these two rules should 
be applied in relation to one another.  Due to the uncertainties in the interpretation 
of section 20(7), common law will have to be applied by the court in its 
interpretation and application of this section.  As the Turquand rule is seen as a 
rule on its own and as it is retained by the Companies Act, it might happen that the 
                                                          
790
  See para 3.3.4.5 above. 
791
  Locke 2016 SALJ 160 at 180. 
792
  See para 3.3.4.7 above. 
793
  See para 3.3.4.8 above. 
794
  See section 20(8) of the Companies Act of 2008 and para 3.3.4.9 above. 
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principles of this rule are used by the courts in interpretaing section 20(7).795  The 
risk exists that the uncertainties and incorrect application of the common-law 
Turquand rule will by implication then be imported into the interpretation of section 
20(7).  This may lead to a further watering down of the Turquand rule and 
conflation with section 20(7).  It remains to be seen how the Turquand rule will 
continue to be used as an alternative to section 20(7).  I agree with Delport796 that 
the overlap between these two rules may lead to “legal arbitrage”. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
795
  This already occurred in One stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Onwikkelings 
(Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC). 
796
  Delport 2011 THRHR 132 at 138. 
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CHAPTER 4  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As a company is a juristic person it can only act through human agency.  A 
concern that arises because of this fact relates to the authority of the board of 
directors to represent the company externally and the protection of the company 
and its shareholders against possible transgressions of authority.  The protection 
of a bona fide third party contracting with the company against the possibility that 
the representative of the company has exceeded his or her authority also 
becomes relevant and the question of the weighing and balancing of the interests 
of the shareholders and the company on the one hand and the contracting third 
party on the other needs to be considered.  It is important to have certainty on the 
validity and enforceability of contracts concluded by and with companies as the 
absence of certainty can hamper transactions with companies and impact on the 
economy. 
 
In this study an examination of the current legal position regarding representation 
of a company in South Africa was undertaken.  The history and development of 
the common-law principles of agency and doctrines that are unique to 
representation in a company law context797 were analysed.  The integration of the 
common-law principles with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act of 2008 
was considered.  The study was limited to the external consequences in instances 
where the directors exceeded their authority in contracting with a third party and 
did not include the instances where a company exceeded its capacity to act.  The 
study also did not focus on the internal consequences of transgression of authority 
by directors. 
 
In support of the analysis, a comparative study was undertaken of the history and 
development of this subject matter in England.  Although the company law of 
England is gradually moving away from South African company law, the origin of 
many of the common-law principles that have been taken over into South African 
                                                          
797
  Doctrine of constructive notice and the Turquand rule. 
- 133 - 
 
 © Frantzen, Erinda, University of South Africa 2019  
law is derived from England.  The reason for the creation of these doctrines must 
therefore be sought in English law and an assessment must be done whether 
these original reasons still exist.  It was considered whether it would be advisable 
to use the current situation in England as a model for South African company law 
or not.  It was concluded that the law in England is even more unsatisfactory than 
the current position in South Africa. 
 
The state of affairs regarding the application by the courts of the common law in 
South African law is all but acceptable and the introduction of the Companies Act 
of 2008 did not address this problem but rather added to the confusion and 
complicated the legal position even further.  In this chapter an overview of the 
position in England and South Africa is given and the problem areas in the two 
systems are identified.  Thereafter, a comparison between the two systems are 
undertaken, followed by suggested recommendations and solutions in that regard.  
 
4.2 English law 
 
In order to determine whether a company will be bound by the acts of its 
representatives in accordance with English law it should still be determined 
whether the board of directors or an agent acting with delegated authority of the 
board had the necessary authority, but for a limitation on the authority of such 
company agent set out in the company’s constitution, resolutions by the company 
or its shareholders or in shareholders’ agreements.798   
 
To determine whether the representative had the necessary authority the 
common-law principles relating to agency must still be applied, which includes 
actual authority, ostensible authority and a specific common-law principle 
developed by the courts in a company law context, being the Turquand rule.799  
                                                          
798
  See Ch 2 para 2.3 above. 
799
  See Ch 2 para 2.2 above. It first needs to be determined whether the representative had 
actual (express or implied) authority to enter into the contract. If so, the company (principal) 
will be bound thereto.  In both England and South Africa the usual authority of an agent or 
representative, being the authority to execute those legal acts that are normally attributable 
to the position of representatives or officers of that class, can assist to determine whether 
the representative had (implied) actual or ostensible authority. 
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 The actual authority of the board of directors in England can be ascertained from 
the articles of the company which usually grant the authority to the board to 
manage the business of the company.800  To this intent, it should be ensured that 
the articles do grant authority to the board.  Alternatively, if no such authority has 
been granted in the articles (which would be very rare), it should still be 
determined whether the board had authority by applying the normal principles of 
agency, and in particular by looking at “usual authority” as a tool to assist in 
applying agency principles.  Where an agent acts on behalf of the company, it 
should be determined whether the board was authorised to delegate authority to 
such an agent.  That would only be the case if the board is duly empowered to do 
so by the articles of the company.801  In the event of a single director or other 
agent acting on behalf of the company, his authority should therefore first be 
established in terms of the common-law principles of agency. 
 
If a representative does not have the necessary authority or if he exceeds his 
authority, or if his authority is deficient, the principal (company) would normally not 
be bound.  It would only be possible to hold the principal (company) bound on 
common-law principles if the principal ratified the act of the representative or 
through applying the principles of ostensible authority or the Turquand rule,802 
bearing in mind that under such circumstances the objectionable doctrine of 
constructive notice still applies.803 
 
The application of these common-law principles presents a problem as the courts 
confuse the different principles with one another, using the one principle for 
explaining liability of the company but terming it as another principle.804  The 
English courts have further confused the Turquand rule with estoppel, seeing the 
former as an appearance form of estoppel.805  This has led to a lot of confusion 
                                                          
800
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.1 above. 
801
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.1 above. 
802
  The Turquand rule was created by the courts to temper the unfair operation of the doctrine 
of constructive notice. The Turquand rule, however, only finds application within certain 
boundaries and cannot come to the aid of the third party in all instances.  See Ch 2, para 
2.2.2 above. 
803
  See Ch 2, para 2.3.7 above for the effect of section 40 on the Turquand rule. 
804
  The courts, for example, have reached a conclusion that there is implied authority, terming 
it as such, but where it is clear that the argument of the court is rather based on ostensible 
authority.  See Ch 2, para 2.2.1 above. 
805
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.2 above.  
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and the requirements to be successful with an estoppel have been supplanted to 
the application of the Turquand rule.806 
 
As a creation by the courts, it was also left to the courts to develop the Turquand 
rule.  Rather than to obtain clarity on the precise content of this fairness rule and 
the area within which it finds application, each case has been considered in a 
casuistic manner which led to irreconcilable judgements.  The courts tried to 
reconcile these judgements for a uniform approach,807 but it led to a darkness of 
subtle distinctions and qualifications to the Turquand rule.  The result was 
uncertainty which brought the protection that the rule provided to third contracting 
parties in danger.  Some reasons why this happened are firstly the failure of the 
courts to regard the Turquand rule as an independent rule with the result that it 
was confused with other legal rules, and especially estoppel.  This confusion led 
thereto that the courts applied estoppel, and the success of a third party when 
relying on the Turquand rule, is made dependant on compliance with the 
requirements laid down for estoppel.808  In applying the many rules and 
qualifications that have been laid down, the courts sometimes lose sight of the real 
underlying principle of the Turquand rule, namely reasonableness in favour of third 
parties who contract bona fide with a company.  In English law, especially, the 
Turquand rule is seen as a mere appearance form of estoppel. 
 
The problem in the incorrect application of the common-law principles of agency 
was not efficiently addressed in English law with the enactment of section 40 of 
the Companies Act 2006.  First, this section does not address the problem where 
the board or another agent acted on behalf of the company without the necessary 
authority.  Whether a company may be bound to a contract entered into on its 
behalf should therefore still be determined by applying the common-law principles 
of agency, which, as has been seen above, is in a state of uncertainty and 
confusion.  Secondly, instead of abolishing the challengeable doctrine of 
constructive notice outright, it is still retained if the transaction cannot be brought 
within the scope of application of section 40.  Thirdly, the confusion created by the 
                                                          
806
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.2 above. 
807
  See for example Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 
QB 480, CA. 
808
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.2 above. 
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courts between ostensible authority and the Turquand rule has not been resolved 
as the common-law Turquand rule has been retained alongside section 40.809   
 
After it has been ascertained that an agent of the company would have had 
authority if it were not for a particular limitation in the constitution of the company, 
the contracting third party might be successful in relying on section 40 or the 
common-law Turquand rule.   
 
According to section 40 of the Companies Act of 2006 the power of the directors to 
bind the company, or authorise others to do so, is deemed to be free of any 
limitation under the company’s constitution, in a resolution of the company or of 
any class of shareholders, or in any agreement between the shareholders or any 
class of them.  This deemed provision is in favour of a person dealing with a 
company in good faith. 
 
Over and above the shortcomings of section 40 alluded to above, section 40 
creates interpretational problems.  The third party must still ensure that the person 
who acts on behalf of the company was authorised by the board to act, but for a 
limitation in the constitution.810  If not, the third party would not be able to rely on 
section 40.  There exists uncertainty as to what kind of limitations would be 
covered by section 40,811 whether reference to directors would include a single 
director 812 and what good faith entails.813 
 
The scope of application of section 40 is further limited and might not always come 
to the rescue of a third contracting party acting on good faith.814 
 
                                                          
809
  A third contracting party therefore has a choice between relying on the Turquand rule or 
section 40. Although circumstances where under both these two principles may be used 
may overlap, there are also circumstances where under the third party would not be able to 
bring the transaction within the application of section 40, but indeed under the application 
of the Turquand rule and vice versa. See Ch 2, para 2.3.7 above. 
810
  Ch 2, para 2.3 above. 
811
  Ch 2, para 2.3.2 above. 
812
  Ch 2, para 2.3.2 above. 
813
  Ch 2, para 2.3.5 above. 
814
  See Ch 2, paras 2.3.1-2.3.6 above. 
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Section 41 of the Companies Act of 2006 applies if a director (or connected 
person) is the third party dealing with his company and the directors have 
transgressed a limitation set out in the constitution of such company.  It provides 
that where the validity of a transaction that has been entered into by a company 
depends on section 40 and the third party to that transaction is a director of the 
company or of its holding company or a person connected to such director, such 
transaction is voidable at the instance of the company. 
 
There are different views regarding the interaction between sections 35A and 
322A815 (now sections 40 and 41 of the Companies Act of 2006) and how they 
should be applied.816 This situation is criticised as being unnecessarily confusing 
and regrettable that the 2006 Companies Act did not clear up this confusion. 
 
From the different views the outcome of a transaction by the company with one of 
its directors can differ depending on which view is followed.  This creates yet 
another uncertainty in the application of section 40 and 41.  There is also 
uncertainty regarding the position of a shareholder as a third party.817 
 
4.3 South African law 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
The normal common-law principles of agency form the foundation for 
representation in South African company law.818  The point of departure in 
determining whether a company can be held bound by the acts of its 
representative is therefore to ascertain whether the representative of the company 
had actual (express or implied) authority to bind the principal (company).819   
 
  
                                                          
815
  These are sections of the previous Companies Act of 1985. 
816
  See Ch 2, para 2.3.6 above. 
817
  See Ch 2, para 2.3.6 above. 
818
  See Ch 3, para 3.1 above. 
819
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.1 and Ch 3, para 3.2.1 above. 
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These principles could, however, not in all cases provide a fair solution to 
problems that arise in the case where the principal is a company that cannot act 
on its own.  A specific branch of the law of agency therefore developed which was 
used in instances where a company was the principal.820  Specific common-law 
principles akin to company law should be taken into account when determining 
whether a company may be held bound to the acts of its agent.  Where actual 
authority of the representative is therefore lacking, the common-law doctrines that 
have developed due to the fact that a company is not a natural person should be 
considered to ascertain in what way they ought to affect the result.  In particular 
the question should be asked whether the company can be held bound on 
grounds of the Turquand rule or estoppel.  A common-law principle specific to 
company law that affects these two doctrines is the doctrine of constructive notice. 
 
4.3.2 Doctrine of constructive notice 
 
The doctrine of constructive notice was developed by the courts to temper the 
unfair effect that the partnership analogy in company law originally had.  According 
to the doctrine of constructive notice the limitations on authority in the public 
documents (which include inter alia the memorandum and articles of association) 
of a company are enforceable against third parties even if they did not have any 
knowledge of these restrictions.  Due to the publicity given to these public 
documents notice of the content thereof is attributed to third parties.  The third 
party can therefore not rely on the implied or ostensible authority that is in conflict 
with the public documents. This greater protection that the doctrine of constructive 
notice gave to the company and ultimately its shareholders, however, prejudiced 
the position of a third party who contracted with the company.  A third party could 
only contract with safety with a company if he made sure what restrictions there 
were in the constitution of the company and to make sure that any requirements 
stated in the constitution have been complied with, including any internal 
requirements where the authority of a particular representative has been made 
dependant on compliance with some or other internal requirement.  This is 
impossible for a third party as he does not have access to the minute book of the 
                                                          
820
  See Ch 3, para 3.1 above. 
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company to determine whether the internal management of the company has been 
done properly.  If he contracts with the company and it later transpires that the 
internal requirements were not complied with, the company will not be bound on 
grounds of the normal principles of agency. 
 
The abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice in the Companies Act of 2008 is 
to be welcomed.  Its abrogation was long overdue.  However, there is some 
concern regarding the remnants of the doctrine where it still applies in respect of, 
inter alia, the so-called “RF” companies.  Companies can decide to incorporate 
limitations on the authority of directors in its Memorandum of Incorporation, refer to 
these in the notice of incorporation (or subsequent notice of amendment, if the 
company has already been incorporated), add “RF” behind its name, and the 
unsatisfactory position as it existed under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 will then 
still apply. 
 
The uncertainty created in section 15(2)(b)821 of the Companies Act  of 2008 by 
the vague wording “restrictive conditions”, which is not defined in the Act, also 
leaves room for a wide interpretation thereof which may not only include limitations 
on the capacity of the company, but also on the authority of directors to act on 
behalf of a company.  Although certain authors are of the view that a restrictive 
condition alone cannot qualify as a restrictive condition, but should be coupled with 
a requirement regarding the amendment thereof that is more stringent than the 
requirements for a usual amendment of the Memorandum of Incorporation, other 
authors regard a restrictive condition on its owns as qualifying as such.822  This is 
also the view expressed in the non-binding opinion issued by the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission.823 
 
What is even more disconcerting is the suggestion of certain authors824 that the 
addition of “RF” to the name of the company and the drawing of attention to a 
                                                          
821
  Although the doctrine of constructive notice has been abolished by section 19(4) of the 
Companies Act of 2008, this doctrine has been retained in respect of inter alia provisions in 
a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation contemplated in section 15(2)(b) or (c). 
822
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.2 above. 
823
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.2 above. 
824
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.7 above. 
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restrictive condition in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation825 create 
suspicious circumstances in terms of which it would be expected from a third party 
to obtain actual knowledge of these restrictions as well as ensuring compliance 
therewith and consequently robbing a third party from the protection of the 
Turquand rule as well as section 20(7) of the Companies Act 2006.  This 
reasoning places a third party in an untenable position.  It imports the doctrine of 
constructive notice without tempering its severe effect on third parties by the 
Turquand rule or section 20(7), leaving the third party in an even more vulnerable 
position than was the case under the Companies Act of 1973. 
 
Many writers have advocated for the abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice 
and the fact that this doctrine is still retained with regard to companies of which the 
Memorandum of Incorporation contains restrictive conditions (the co-called ring 
fenced companies), just brings new uncertainties to the front to an otherwise 
commendable innovation, namely the abolition of this doctrine in instances other 
than in respect of ring-fenced companies.826 These uncertainties result therein that 
it would not be safe for a third party to deal with such a company at all.  Legal 
certainty to promote economic business dealings are hampered by these 
provisions of the Act. 
 
4.3.3 Turquand rule 
 
In an effort to establish a better balance between the shareholders and third 
parties, the English courts formulated the Turquand rule.  The Turquand rule is a 
fairness rule primarily aimed to strengthen the position of bona fide third parties 
who contract with a company by eliminating some of the unfair consequences of 
the doctrine of constructive notice.  It would be unfair to expect from an outsider 
third party to study the internal aspects of a company.  According to this rule the 
examination by third parties are restricted to those aspects to which publicity is 
given.  Provided he acts bona fide, a third party can assume that the internal 
management, to which he does not have any access, has properly taken place.  
                                                          
825
  S 19(5) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
826
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.2 above. 
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The creation of the rule had the result of protecting a contracting third party and 
placed negotiations with companies on a firmer foundation. 
 
Although the English courts have confused the Turquand rule with estoppel, the 
South African law is fortunately a bit clearer.827  The appeal court, in The Mine 
Workers’ Union v Prinsloo,828 held that the Turquand rule is not a mere 
appearance form of estoppel and that the protection of the third contracting party 
should not be made dependent on the requirements laid down for estoppel.829  In 
later judgments, the South African courts have, however, made the same mistake 
as the English courts and intermingled the Turquand rule with estoppel.830  In such 
event the balance between the interests of the company and its shareholders on 
the one side and those of third parties dealing in good faith with the company on 
the other, is disturbed.  Overemphasis on the interests of the company and its 
shareholders would discourage third parties to contract with companies and as 
such the company as business vehicle would also be prejudiced. 
 
Due to this confusion and the existing uncertainty regarding the scope of its 
operation,831 it is critical that the exact extent of the scope and application of the 
Turquand rule is clearly established to provide legal certainty and to ensure a fair 
balance of the rights between the contracting third party on the one hand the 
company and its shareholders on the other hand. 
 
As the doctrine of constructive notice has been abolished (save for certain 
instances),832 it might seem as though there is no further need for the Turquand 
rule.  There is, however, still room for retaining the Turquand rule even if the 
doctrine of constructive notice has been abolished.833 
 
A need for the Turquand rule might still be required in the instance where the third 
contracting party did indeed have knowledge of the Memorandum of Incorporation 
                                                          
827
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.2.5 above. 
828
  1948 3 SA 831 (A). 
829
  The Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A) at 849. 
830
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.2.5 above. 
831
  See Ch 3, paras 3.2.2.2 and 3.2.2.4 above. 
832
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.2 above. 
833
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.3 above. 
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wherein the authority of the directors to act is dependent on the fulfilment of some 
or other procedural requirement.   
 
Obviously the Turquand rule would also find application in the event that the 
doctrine of constructive notice applies as provided for in section 19(5) of the 
Companies Act of 2008.  As the Turquand rule relates to the authority of a 
representative to bind a company, the Turquand rule would only find application in 
respect of a restrictive condition in an “RF” company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation, if such restriction relates to the authority of a representative and not 
where it relates to a restriction on the capacity of the company. 
 
Another instance where the Turquand rule may still find application is where the 
irregularity does not relate to any limitations as set out in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, for example defective notices of meetings, defective quorums and 
defective appointment of officials.834  The Turquand rule will also still find 
application where the powers of the board have been restricted in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation as contemplated in section 66(1).835 
 
To deprive a third contracting party of the Turquand rule would mean that the 
remedies of the contracting third party would be limited to implied and ostensible 
authority.  Where the authority of an agent has been restricted by some internal 
arrangement, it would mean that the third party would not be able to rely on 
implied authority.  In order to be successful with estoppel the third party would 
have to prove that the company has represented that a particular person had 
authority and has also represented that the required internal requirements have 
been complied with under circumstances where the third party had actual 
knowledge of the internal requirements that have been laid down.  The third party 
does, however, not have access to the internal affairs of the company and would 
therefore not be able to establish the true state of affairs.  The Turquand rule 
would have been the only avenue to follow for the third party in such an 
instance.836 
                                                          
834
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.3 above. 
835
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.1.3 above. 
836
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.3 above. 
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The boundaries wherein the Turquand rule finds application are not certain837 and 
as the Turquand rule has in the past been merged with estoppel838 it would have 
been a great opportunity for the legislature to expel any uncertainties in the field of 
its application by enacting a statutory Turquand rule, defining the boundaries 
within which it can find application.  Instead of clarifying the content and 
application of the Turquand rule in legislation, the opposite has happened with the 
enactment of section 20(7) and 20(8) of the Companies Act of 2008.  There are 
several conflicts between the Turquand rule and its statutory counterpart as set 
out in section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008.  This creates a problem in light 
of the wording of section 20(8) of the Companies Act, which allows the common-
law Turquand rule to also still operate.  The intention of the legislature in respect of 
section 20(8) is unclear and the content thereof is open to several interpretations 
which lead to uncertainty. 
 
4.3.4 Estoppel 
 
The requirements that the third contracting party must prove to be successful with 
reliance on estoppel have been laid down by the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal in NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd and others,839 which 
approved Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd.840   
 
Additional requirements that were not required in the English judgment of the 
Freeman case841 are that the representation must have been in a form that the 
company should reasonably have expected that an outsider would act on the 
strength of it, reliance on the representation by the third party and prejudice.842  It 
seems as though fault as an essential requirement for estoppel in a company law 
context has not been finally settled in our law.843 
 
                                                          
837
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.2 above. 
838
  Ch 2, para 2.2.2 and Ch 3,  para 3.2.2.5 above. 
839
  2002 1 SA 396 (SCA) [26].  For these requirements, see Ch 3, para 3.2.3 above. 
840
  [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA).   
841
  Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA).   
842
  See Ch 3, paras 3.2.3.3-3.2.3.5 above. 
843
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.3.3 above. 
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Estoppel has in the past been confused by the courts with implied authority.844  
Furthermore, the constitutional court has separated ostensible authority from 
estoppel and has determined them to be two different concepts, where 
substantially fewer requirements are necessary to be proved by a third party 
relying on ostensible authority than on estoppel and continuing to equate 
ostensible authority with actual authority.845  This deviation by the court from a 
long line of authorities846 could have been prevented by enacting a statutory 
estoppel to be used in a company law setting, which opportunity was not taken by 
the legislature. 
 
4.3.5 Original authority of the board of directors 
 
Section 66(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 confers original power on the board of 
directors to manage the business and affairs of the company.  These powers may, 
however, be restricted in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or the 
Companies Act itself. 
 
4.3.5.1 Restriction on the powers of the board in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation 
 
In the event that the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation places a total 
restriction on one of the powers of the board, for example, the board may not 
borrow money in excess of R50 million rand, and the board exceeds such 
restriction, the third party cannot simply assert that since he is not deemed to 
know of the restriction due to the abolition of the doctrine of constructive notice he 
may hold the company bound to the loan agreement.  The fact that the third party 
is not deemed to know of this restriction, does not constitute a legal ground on 
which the company can be held liable.  If, however, the third party is able to prove 
all the essential requirements for estoppel, he may be successful in holding the 
                                                          
844
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.1 above.   
845
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC).  See Ch 3, para 3.2.3.7 above. 
846
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.3.7 above. 
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company to the contract on grounds thereof.  The doctrine of constructive notice 
previously deprived such third party of the right to rely on estoppel.847  
 
If an authority or power of the board is made dependent on compliance with some 
or other internal formality or formal or procedural requirement, for example, the 
board may only borrow money in excess of R10 million subject to prior 
shareholder approval, again, the third party cannot use the fact that he is not 
deemed to know about this requirement as the legal basis to hold the company to 
the contract where the board entered into a loan agreement in excess of this 
amount without prior shareholder approval.  In this instance the third party may be 
able to hold the company to the contract if he is able to bring the transaction within 
the scope of application of either the Turquand rule or section 20(7) of the 
Companies Act of 2008. 
 
Where the third party has actual knowledge of the total restriction or where he is 
deemed  to have knowledge thereof due to the operation of the doctrine of 
constructive notice in the case where he deals with a “RF” company, the third 
party would not be successful in relying on estoppel.  He would, however, be able 
to hold the company bound if he can bring the transaction within the scope of 
either the Turquand rule or section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008, where the 
authority of the board was made dependent on compliance with certain internal 
formalities and procedures. 
 
4.3.5.2 Restriction or limitation in the Act itself 
 
A third party will not be able hold the company bound to a contract on grounds of 
the Turquand rule if the board of directors exceeded its authority, as restricted by 
the Companies Act itself.848  If the restriction or limitation in the Act is of a 
substantive nature and cannot be said to be of a formal or procedural nature, the 
third party would also not be able to rely on section 20(7).849  
 
                                                          
847
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.3.4 and Ch 3, para 3.2.3.6 above. 
848
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.5 above. 
849
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.5 above. 
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It is submitted that the third party would also not be able to hold the company 
liable on grounds of estoppel under these circumstances. 
 
4.3.5.3 Restriction on powers of the agent in the Memorandum of Incorporation or 
underlying document, where an individual acts 
 
The board of directors is also authorised to delegate its authority to one or more 
agents.850  Where delegation of authority has taken place, the authority of the 
agent to act on behalf of the company should still be determined by applying the 
common-law principles of agency.  If it cannot be proved that the agent had actual 
(express or implied) authority, the third party may still be successful in holding the 
company bound on grounds of the common-law principles of estoppel, the 
Turquand rule or section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
 
4.3.6 Section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008 
 
The subsections of section 20, under the heading “Validity of company actions” 
leave the impression that the section pertains to the capacity of the company.  It, 
however, deals with both the capacity of the company as well as the authority of 
the directors to act on behalf of the company.  These two aspects are two very 
distinctive concepts and should be kept apart from one another.851  In section 20 
these two concepts however, are so intermingled that it is difficult to distinguish the 
one from the other. 
 
Section 20(7) provides that a person dealing with a company in good faith is 
entitled to presume that the company, in making any decision in the exercise of its 
powers, has complied with all the formal and procedural requirements laid down in 
the Act itself, its Memorandum of Incorporation or rules of the company.  Where 
such third party knew or reasonably ought to have known of non-compliance of 
such requirement, he would not be able to rely on section 20(7).  Certain third 
parties, namely directors, prescribed officers and shareholders of the company are 
not entitled to rely on section 20(7).  This is very harsh in respect of shareholders, 
                                                          
850
  S 66(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
851
  See Ch 1, para 1.1 above. 
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at least in respect of decisions taken by the board of directors, as the shareholders 
would not have the means to ascertain whether the decisions of the board were 
regular.852  The unfortunate use of the word “presume” in section 20(7) may lead 
to confusion as a presumption may be rebutted in which event the third party 
cannot rely on section 20(7).853  There is further room for argument that section 
20(7) relates to the capacity of the company and not the authority of the directors 
to represent the company.854  There is also uncertainty as to what would fall under 
“formal and procedural requirements” as contemplated in section 20(7).855  Even 
formal and procedural irregularities in the Act itself can be condoned by section 
20(7).856  This is in contravention of the common-law Turquand rule and also 
certain sections of the Companies Act of 2008 in terms of which non-compliance 
with, for example, the requirement of a special resolution results in voidness of a 
company’s action.  It would seem as though a distinction should be drawn 
between substantive requirements in the Act, where section 20(7) would not find 
application as opposed to formal and procedural requirements.  There are also 
different views that can be held regarding the requirement that the third party 
should not have known or reasonably ought to have known of the defect in the 
compliance with the formality or procedure.857  Section 20(7) further does not spell 
out the consequences of the presumed compliance with formalities and 
procedures in relation to the bona fide third party.  A company’s invalid decision or 
conduct will not suddenly become valid just because one person may presume 
that it is valid.858 
 
4.3.7 Section 20(8) of the Companies Act of 2008 
 
According to section 20(8) of the Companies Act of 2008, section 20(7) must be 
construed concurrently with and not in substitution for any relevant common-law 
principle.  The common-law principle that comes to mind is the Turquand rule.  
This section can be interpreted in that the other contracting party has a choice 
                                                          
852
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.1 above. 
853
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.2 above. 
854
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.3 above. 
855
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.4 above. 
856
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.5 above. 
857
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.7 above. 
858
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.8 above. 
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between relying on the statutory rule formulated in section 20(7) or on the 
common-law Turquand rule thereby choosing the more favourable option.  On the 
other hand, this section can be interpreted that section 20(7) must be used, but to 
the extent that it does not alter the common-law principles of the Turquand rule as 
created and developed by the courts. 
 
In One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd 
(The CRL Trust as intervening creditor)859 the court expressed the view that 
“formal and procedural requirements” as contemplated in section 20(7) should be 
interpreted consistently with “… the conventional scope of Turquand.”860  The 
court also applied one of the restrictions applicable to the common-law Turquand 
rule, namely that it would only find application if the act of the representative can 
usually be associated with an act of a person in his position in the company, to 
section 20(7).861  If the common-law principles of the Turquand rule may only be 
used to interpret and create boundaries in the application of section 20(7), and not 
as a rule on its own, the third party would be deprived from holding a company to a 
contract which he could have done if the common-law Turquand rule still applied 
as a rule on its own, since the application of the Turquand rule is in certain 
respects wider than section 20(7).862 
 
If section 20(8) is interpreted to allow a contracting party to use either section 
20(7) or the common-law Turquand rule, a problem arises as they conflict in 
certain respects.863  The Companies Act does not indicate which one should take 
precedence in the event of a conflict as it does in respect of other possible 
conflicts that may arise.864  Henochsberg865 is of the opinion that it would be an 
extremely challenging task to develop the common-law Turquand rule in line with 
section 20(7) and that it is unclear under which circumstances which one of the 
two should be relied upon.866  Clarification regarding the application of section 
                                                          
859
  [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) per Rogers J. 
860
  One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (The CRL 
Trust as intervening creditor) [2015] 4 All SA 88 (WCC) [55]. 
861
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.4 above. 
862
  See the comparison between the Turquand rule and section 20(7) in Ch 3, para 3.3.4. 
863
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4 above. 
864
  See for example section 5(5) and 5(6) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
865
  Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 2008 106(5). 
866
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.9 above. 
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20(7) as well as its integration with the common-law principles of representation in 
a company law context is therefore necessary. 
 
4.4 Comparison of English position with the current position under South 
African law 
 
The approach of South Africa and England differs drastically.  In South Africa the 
board of directors has original authority to manage the company, and to delegate 
their powers to a board committee, managing director, director or other agent.867 
Where the board has delegated its authority, the common-law principles of agency 
will continue to apply.  A company will therefore be bound to a contract entered 
into on its behalf by its managing director or other agent, where such managing 
director (or other agent) had actual (either express or implied) authority conferred 
upon him by the board of directors to conclude that contract.  If the managing 
director (or other agent) did not have actual authority, the company will 
nevertheless be bound where the company ratifies such contract.868 
 
Where the agent did not have actual authority to conclude the relevant contract, 
the company may still be held bound to the contract if the third party is successful 
in relying on the Turquand rule869 or section 20(7) of the Companies Act of 2008 or 
if he is able to prove all the essential aspects of estoppel. 
 
Under English law the board of directors does not have original authority to act on 
behalf of the company, but its authority to bind a company must be granted in 
either the articles of association of the company or by delegation under a power 
contained in the articles.870  The board will also only have the power to delegate 
their authority if authorised in the articles.  To determine whether a contracting 
third party may hold a company to a contract concluded by the board of directors, 
the authority of the board should therefore firstly be ascertained from the articles of 
                                                          
867
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.1 above. 
868
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.1.2 above. 
869
  Obviously the third party would only be successful in relying on the Turquand rule if the 
particular facts fall under the application of the rule and the relief is not excluded due to the 
exceptions applicable to the rule, namely where the third party was not bona fide or where 
the third party was placed on inquiry as discussed in Ch 2, para 2.2.2 above. 
870
  See Ch 2, para 2.2.1 above. 
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the company, failing which it should be determined whether the board had 
authority by applying the normal principles of agency. 
 
Once such authority is established it should be determined whether there are any 
limitations placed on the board’s authority to act or to authorise others to do so.  If 
there are, section 40 of the Companies Act of 2006 may be applied to remedy this 
transgression.871 
 
In contrast to the position in South Africa where the doctrine of constructive notice 
has been abolished,872 the default position in England is that the doctrine of 
constructive notice still applies.  If, however, the transaction can be brought within 
the provisions of section 40 of the Companies Act 2006 the operation of this 
doctrine is negated. 
 
The approach in England is much more artificial than in South Africa where 
original power has been granted to the board to represent the company and where 
the doctrine of constructive notice has been abolished.  It is submitted that South 
Africa took a step in the right direction by giving original powers to manage the 
business and affairs of a company to the directors and by abolishing the doctrine 
of constructive notice, except in limited instances.  In that respect South Africa is 
ahead of the law of England where this doctrine has been retained, although the 
initial reason for its creation is no longer relevant.873   
 
4.5 Recommendations and solutions 
 
First, I recommend that the doctrine of constructive notice be abolished in toto, 
also with regard to companies where the Memorandum of Incorporation contains 
restrictive conditions.  The initial reason for introducing this doctrine in England 
was due thereto that the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 was largely influenced 
                                                          
871
  See Ch 2, para 2.3 above. 
872
  Except for certain limited instances. 
873
  The doctrine was originally created due thereto that the courts regarded a company the 
same as a partnership where any one is authorised to bind the partnership in respect of 
transactions that fall within the scope of the business of that partnership.  See Ch 2, para 
2.2.2 above. 
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by principles applicable to partnerships.874  This reason is not relevant today and 
the need for such a doctrine at all (even in respect of “RF” companies) should be 
reconsidered.  It is open for companies to abuse section 19(5) by adding “RF” to 
its name and by drawing attention to restrictive conditions in its notice of 
incorporation or subsequent notice of amendment and thereby resurrecting the 
doctrine of constructive notice. 
 
Alternatively, if the doctrine of constructive notice is to be retained in respect of 
“RF” companies, I suggest that a definition should be included in the Act, clearly 
spelling out what would constitute a “restrictive condition” to clear up the 
uncertainties that currently exist in this regard as discussed.875  Provision should 
also be made that where a company’s name ends with “RF” and notice is drawn to 
the restrictive condition, the doctrine will not apply if the condition does not qualify 
as a restrictive conditions as contemplated by the definition thereof. 
 
Due to the fact that the common-law Turquand rule has been confused with 
estoppel by the courts (in England and to some extent also in South Africa) it 
would provide legal certainty if the Turquand rule is abolished in respect of its 
application to companies.876  The retention of the common-law Turquand rule 
alongside section 20(7) as provided for in section 20(8) of the Companies Act only 
adds to the confusion as it is uncertain how these two rules should be integrated.  
Section 20(7), showing similarities with the common-law Turquand rule, is 
however also unclear in its application and its scope of operation.  I recommend 
that the existing section 20(7) should be revisited and its application be expanded 
in the areas where the scope of the Turquand rule is wider.877  The uncertainty 
regarding the application of the Turquand rule in cases of forgery and what would 
constitute forgery should also be addressed.878  It should be included that as part 
of the meaning of “reasonably ought to have known” that where organs, officers or 
agents of the company act outside the scope of those acts that are normally 
                                                          
874
  Ch 2, para 2.2.2 above. 
875
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.2 above. 
876
  It should, however, not be abolished as far as bodies, other than companies, are 
concerned, as the enactment of a statutory provision will only apply to companies, whereby 
other bodies would be left remediless in this regard.  See Ch 3, para 3.2.2.6 above. 
877
  The reason for this is that a third party would not be deprived of rights that he has under 
the common-law Turquand rule. 
878
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.2.1 above. 
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associated with their position or office in the company, the third party reasonably 
ought to have known that such organ  did not have authority.   
 
The uncertainties in section 20(7) should then also be dispelled with.  First the 
legislature should define what is meant by “formal and procedural” 
requirements.879  Secondly, the application thereof should not be excluded in the 
event where the third contracting party is a shareholder of the company.880  Thirdly 
the word “presume” in section 20(7) should be replaced with “assume”.  Fourthly, it 
should be made clear that the section can only be used in the instance where the 
directors (or other agent) of the company exceed their authority and not where the 
capacity of the company is concerned.  Fifthly clarity should be provided as to the 
good faith requirement in the current section 20(7).881  Lastly, the consequences of 
presumed compliance by a bona fide third party of formalities and procedures 
should be spelt out in the section.882 
 
It is therefore recommended that the Turquand rule be repealed in its totality as far 
as companies are concerned and that the statutory provision set out in section 
20(7) of the Companies Act be amended to provide for clarity in its field of 
application and operation.  It must be borne in mind that certain limitations must be 
built into this rule to provide for a fair balance between the interests of the 
company (and its shareholders) and bona fide third parties. 
 
Abolishing the doctrine of constructive notice in all cases (even in respect of “RF” 
companies) and enacting a clearly demarcated statutory Turquand rule will have 
the result of the company carrying the risk in circumstances where this rule is 
applied and not the third party.  I agree with Rabie883 that this arrangement would 
be fair, as the company has the authority to appoint its own company 
representatives and should therefore carry the risk of those representatives who 
exceed their authority.  There would be limitations on the operation of the statutory 
enactment which would limit its application for an equitable balance of rights.  An 
                                                          
879
  See the discussion in Ch 3, paras 3.3.4.4-3.3.4.6 above. 
880
  Except if the internal requirement pertains to authority to be granted at a general meeting 
of shareholders. 
881
  See the discussion in Ch 3, para 3.3.4.7 above. 
882
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.8 above. 
883
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 196. 
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unauthorised act by a representative should only be dealt with in the internal 
relationship between such representative and the company. 
 
I also agree with Rabie884 that the doctrine of estoppel, as applied in a company 
law environment should be codified, to ensure that no intermingling   takes place 
between this doctrine and the statutorily enacted Turquand rule.885  I do not 
recommend that estoppel should be abolished in its entirety without a statutory 
replacement, as there might be instances where the statutory Turquand rule 
cannot come to the rescue of a bona fide third contracting party and the doctrine of 
estoppel will supply the only remedy for the company to be bound by an act.  
Although the statutory Turquand rule and estoppel may overlap these two 
principles should be given separate operation and the third party should be 
allowed to use any one of the two, or the one as an alternative to the other to hold 
the company bound to a contract. 
 
A further reason why it is imperative for the enactment of a statutory estoppel is 
the danger of distinguishing estoppel from ostensible authority, regarding them as 
two distinct concepts as was incorrectly done by the constitutional court.886 
 
Without professing to have the specialised skills of a legislature, I suggest that the 
Companies Act of 2008 be amended as follows: 
 
First, there should be no retention of the doctrine of constructive notice and 
reference to “RF” companies and restrictive conditions should be removed where 
ever it appears in the Act.   
 
Second, section 20(7) should be afforded its own section number and should not 
be arranged as a subsection under section 20 pertaining to the validity of company 
actions.  Section 20(8) should be deleted.  I suggest the following concept in this 
regard: 
 
                                                          
884
  Rabie Verteenwoordiging 257. 
885
  The Botswana Companies Act 32 of 2003, s27(1)(c) and (d), for example, already codifies 
ostensible authority.  See Baiketlile Corporate Capacity 28-29. 
886
  Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
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20A Compliance with internal, formal and procedural requirements may be 
assumed. 
 
(1) For purposes of this section, the following words shall have the following 
meaning: 
 
(a) “representative” means the board of directors, a director, a prescribed 
officer, and any other person with an office or position in the company887 in 
respect of whom there was an actual appointment or election, or in respect 
of whom an act of appointment or election has been made, although there 
is one or other deficiency in the act of appointment or election:  Provided 
that any such deficiency may be made good by this section;888 
 
(b) “a person dealing with the company” does not include a person who has, by 
virtue of his or her position with or relationship to the company, access to 
the internal management and administration of the company, to such an 
extent that he or she would have been in a position to determine whether 
the relevant internal, formal and/or procedural requirements have been 
complied with and who did not take all reasonable steps to ensure that such 
requirements were observed.889 
 
(c) “internal requirements” includes resolutions  required in the documents 
contemplated in subsection (2)(b) to be adopted by the board of directors or 
the shareholders to authorise the particular transaction or act.890 
                                                          
887
  As the common-law Turquand rule is only available where it can be established that the 
representative acted within his usual authority in the company, the company would not be 
held bound where it has been represented by a normal representative who does not hold a 
position in the company. 
888
  There should be a nexus between the company and the representative of the company to 
prevent an imposter to purport to act on behalf of the company. If the representative was 
not appointed at all, the third party may still be able to hold the company bound if he can 
bring the transaction within the scope of application of the proposed section 20B below. 
889
  It is the third party’s inability to ascertain whether the internal procedures have been 
complied with that makes him worthy of protection.  The proposed section should not find 
application in favour of persons forming part of the management of the company who as 
such have access to the internal management matters of the company.  If, for example, the 
internal requirement relates to approval of shareholders, a shareholder of the company 
who will in a position to have access to the meeting of shareholders, will be regarded as an 
insider who would not be entitled to the protection of the section. 
890
  This internal requirement can also be made good by the application of the Turquand rule.  
When the formal or procedural requirement is not prescribed by the Act itself, the proposed 
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(d) “formal and procedural requirements” includes formalities and procedures 
required for the taking of a proper resolution by the board of directors or the 
shareholders, but excludes the taking of a resolution itself. 
 
(2) A person dealing with a representative of a company in good faith is entitled 
to make the following assumptions:891 
 
(a) that a company representative who is usually clothed with authority to 
represent the company is duly authorised to act on behalf of the 
company; and 
 
(b) that there was compliance with all the internal,892 formal and procedural 
requirements-  
(i) in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation and rules; 
(ii) in resolutions, other internal rules and powers of attorney of the 
company’s- 
(aa) board of directors; or 
(bb) shareholders or any class of shareholders 
(iii) in agreements between the company’s- 
(aa) directors of the board;  
(bb) the shareholders or any class of shareholders;  
(cc)  the board of directors and the shareholders or any 
class of shareholders; or 
(dd) board of directors or shareholders or class of 
shareholders and the representative of the company; 
and  
                                                                                                                                                                                
section 20A also finds application where no resolution was taken.  See subsection (2)(b) 
below. 
891
  The common-law Turquand rule could also find application if the potential authority of a 
representative was made subject to a condition, for example, the obtaining of a resolution.  
The wording here has therefore been widened (if compared to section 20(7)) to not require 
that there should at least have been a decision.  Note that this will not apply in respect of 
resolutions required by Act itself.  See subsection (2)(c) below in this regard. 
892
  This is added to cater for the instance where a directors’ or shareholders’ resolution is 
required.  Such resolution in itself cannot be said to be a formal or procedural requirement, 
but the Turquand rule allowed a third party to assume that such resolution was taken even 
if it was not.  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.4 above. 
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(iv) in any other documents in which the authority of a representative 
of the company has been made dependent on compliance with 
internal, formal or procedural requirements, 
on which such company representative’s authority was made 
dependent; and 
 
(c) that there was compliance with all the formal and procedural 
requirements in terms of this Act in respect of- 
(i) any893 resolution or other act894 required by this  Act;895 or 
(ii) any resolution or other act required by the documents referred to 
in subsection (2)(b).896 
 
(3) A person dealing with a company shall be entitled to make the assumptions 
contemplated in subsection (2) even if the representative of the company 
acts fraudulently, or forges a document, in connection with the dealings.897 
 
(4) The company shall not be entitled to assert in proceedings in relation to the 
dealings that any of the assumptions contemplated in subsection (2) are 
incorrect, but the company shall be bound by the transaction or other act 
concluded by its representative where such representative did not have 
authority due to non-compliance with an internal, formal or procedural 
requirement, on grounds of the said assumptions.898 
 
                                                          
893
  This would include special and ordinary resolutions by the shareholders. 
894
  An example would be where a person has been appointed or elected as director, and 
already acts as such, but has not formally in writing delivered his or her consent to the 
company as required by section 66(7)(b) of the Companies Act. 
895
  If a resolution is required by the Act itself, the third party cannot assume that the resolution 
has been duly adopted.  If the resolution has, however been made, but is deficient due to 
non-compliance with a formal or procedural matter prescribed by the Act, this subsection 
allows the third party to rely on the proposed section 20A. 
896
  It might, for example, happen that the Memorandum of Incorporation requires a 
shareholders’ resolution before the board may borrow money in access of R10 000 000.  
Although the shareholders’ resolution has been taken, the notice of the meeting as 
required by the Act itself (s 62 of the Companies Act of 2008) was deficient.  In such an 
instance the proposed section 20A(2)(c)(ii)) would come to the aid of the third party. 
897
  In the case of “forgery” the third party should still be able to rely on this section, within the 
boundaries as stipulated.  See Ch 3, para 3.2.2.4 in this regard. 
898
  See para 3.3.4.8 above. 
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(5) A person dealing with a company shall not be entitled to make the 
assumptions contemplated- 
 
(a) in subsection (2) if899 he or she knew900 or suspected901 that the 
assumption was incorrect; and 
 
(b) in subsection (2)(c)(i)902 if non-compliance with the formal and/or 
procedural requirements in the taking of the resolution- 
(i) is material or not accidental or inadvertent;903 or 
(ii) if the relevant section of the Act expressly visits non-compliance 
with an internal, formal or procedural requirement with 
voidness.904 
 
(6) For purposes of this section, 
(i) a person deals with a company if he or she is a party to any 
transaction or other act to which the company is a party.905 
(ii) a person dealing with a company shall be deemed to have 
known that the assumption as contemplated in subsection (2) 
was incorrect if- 
                                                          
899
  As this section strengthens the position of the third party dealing with the company at the 
expense of the company, it is necessary to guard against the indiscriminate extension 
thereof.  The application of the section should therefore be restricted to only find 
application in certain instances.  Further restrictions have been placed on the application of 
the section in the definitions of “representative” and “person dealing with the company”. 
900
  Included in the definition of “knowing”, “knowingly” or “knows” in the Companies Act is 
where a person was in a position in which he reasonably ought to have – 
i) had actual knowledge 
ii) investigated the matter to an extent that would have provided the person with 
actual knowledge; or 
iii) taken other measures which, if taken, would reasonably be expected to have 
provided the person with actual knowledge of the matter. 
901
  As the Turquand rule is a fairness rule, the third party should be bona fide. If the third party 
has subjectively been placed on his guard, then it would exclude his bona fides. 
902
  This subsection will only apply to instances where the requirement of, for example, a 
shareholders’ resolution itself is also set out in the Act itself.  Where the requirement of a 
prior approval by the shareholders is set out in, for example, the Memorandum of 
incorporation, the third party may assume that the procedures and formalities set out in the 
Act itself for the taking of the resolution was properly done, without the provisio that the 
deficiency may not be intentional or material.  
903
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.5 above. 
904
  See Ch 3, para 3.3.4.5 above. 
905
  This has been borrowed from s 40(2)(a) of the English Companies Act of 2006, which 
expelled the previous uncertainty as to what would constitute “dealing with”  a company.  
See Ch 2, para 2.2.4. 
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(aa) the transaction or act is so unusual in respect of the normal 
business of the company so as to put a reasonable man in the 
position of the person dealing with the company on inquiry; 
(bb) the act of the representative objectively falls outside the 
authority usually associated with the office that such 
representative holds in the company;906 or 
(cc) the company enters into a transaction or acts for purposes 
other than for purposes of its business.907 
(iii) where the person dealing with a company is a company itself, it 
would, for purposes of subsection (3)(i) be regarded that the 
company had knowledge of the non-compliance if an officer or 
other official of such company had knowledge thereof and had a 
duty to communicate that knowledge to the company of which he 
is an officer or other official. 
 
(7) The common-law Turquand rule, as applied to companies is hereby 
revoked. 
 
20B Company estopped from denying authority of representative 
 
(1) If a representation is made by words, acts or conduct or by silence, inaction 
or acquiesce to a representee that a representative has authority to act on 
behalf of a company or to enter into a particular transaction on behalf of a 
company, the company shall be estopped from denying the truth of such 
representation:  Provided that the representee is able to prove that-908 
 
(a) such representation was made or permitted to be made by a person or 
persons- 
                                                          
906
  This is a question of fact which should be answered with reference to the particular 
circumstances, including the nature of the business of the company, the trade usage and 
the position that the representative holds in the company.  Also see Ch 2, para 2.2.2 and 
Ch 3, para 3.3.4.6 above. 
907
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.2.3 above. 
908
  The requirements as laid down in NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce (Pty) Ltd 2002 1 SA 396 
[26] have been used here.  See Ch 3, para 3.2.3 above. 
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(i) with actual authority to manage the business of the company 
either generally or in respect of a matter to which the transaction 
or act relates; or 
(ii) whose authority to make such representation regarding the 
authority of a representative, the company is estopped from 
denying. 
 
(b) the representation was in a form that the company should reasonably 
have expected to be acted upon by the representee; 
 
(c) the representee was induced by the representation in relying thereon to 
deal with the representative; 
 
(d) the reliance by the representee was reasonable; and 
 
(e) as a consequence of such reliance, the representee has altered his or 
her position to his or her detriment. 
 
(2) The representee shall not be entitled to rely on subsection (1) if, at the time 
of the act or transaction- 
(a) the representee was actually aware909 of the fact that the representative 
did not have the necessary authority to act on behalf of the company or 
to conclude the transaction on behalf of the company;910 or 
(b) the representee had, by virtue of his or her position with or relationship 
to the company, knowledge911 of the fact that the representative did not 
have the necessary authority to act on behalf of the company or to 
conclude the transaction on behalf of the company. 
 
                                                          
909
  The word “knew” was purposely not used, as the definition of “knowing”, “knowingly” or 
“knows” in the Companies Act of 2006 is worded too widely.  Only actual knowledge is 
meant here. 
910
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.3.4 above. 
911
  Knowledge, as defined on the Companies Act of 2008 here again as a wider meaning than 
just actual knowledge.  This subsection disallows “insiders” to rely on estoppel where such 
insider had “knowledge”. 
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(3) In order to determine whether the reliance of the representee was 
reasonable as contemplated in subsection (1)(d), the following factors 
should be taken into account: 
(a) whether the act of the representative objectively falls outside the 
authority usually associated with the office or purported office912 that 
such representative holds in the company;913 
(b) whether the transaction or act is so unusual or extraordinary in respect 
of the normal business of the company so as to put a reasonable man in 
the position of the representee on inquiry;914 
(c) whether the company has entered into a transaction or acts for 
purposes other than for purposes of its business.915 
 
(4) The common-law doctrine of estoppel and ostensible or apparent authority 
as applied to companies in an agency setting is hereby revoked. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 brought a new approach to South African law in so far 
as the authority of directors to act on behalf of a company is concerned.  There 
are, however, still uncertainties regarding the intention of the legislature regarding 
the retention of the doctrine of constructive notice in respect of the so-called “RF” 
companies.  The exact extent and application of section 20(7) of the Companies 
Act of 2008 is also unclear.  Section 20(8) of the Companies Act further creates 
uncertainty as to how the common-law Turquand rule should be integrated with its 
statutory counterpart. 
 
The whole section 20 of the Companies Act also intermingle the capacity of a 
company with the authority of the directors to act on behalf of the company which 
might give rise to confusion.  These two concepts should rather be treated 
separately from one another. 
 
                                                          
912
  A representee should be entitled to rely on estoppel even if the representative of the 
company was never appointed by the company. 
913
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.3.4 above. 
914
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.3.4 above. 
915
  See Ch 3, para 3.2.2.3 above. 
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Amendments to the Companies Act of 2008 are necessary to provide clarity on the 
above uncertainties. 
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